

THE
BANQUET,
A
DIALOGUE
OF
PLATO
CONCERNING
LOVE.
THE SECOND PART.

L O N D O N :

Printed for W. SANDBY, in *Fleet-Street*.

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A
DIALOGUE

OF
THE



OF
THE SECOND PART

LONDON:
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THE
B A N Q U E T,

A
D I A L O G U E

CONCERNING
L O V E

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

GEORGE ALFRED DICKSON

OF THE

LEGATION OF THE

BANK OF AMERICA

WASHINGTON

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TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
GEORGE, EARL OF *HALIFAX*,
LORD LIEUTENANT
OF *IRELAND*;

THIS TRANSLATION OF THE
BANQUET OF PLATO

Is offered,

With ALL BECOMING HUMILITY,

by HIS EXCELLENCY'S

most obedient

humble Servant,

FLOYER SYDENHAM.

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GEORGE, EARL OF HALIFAX,
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THE TRANSLATION OF THE
BANKRUPT OF HALIFAX

is offered
With all becoming humility,
by the Translator,
and Obsequent
hand & service,
Richard D. D. D.

T H E
A R G U M E N T.

*I*N writing the *Argument* of Plato's Banquet, we find ourselves obliged, for the Sake of Perspicuity, to depart from our usual Method; and to begin by giving some Account of the Manner in which it is composed, and of the Order in which it proceeds: for by knowing these will better be understood what we have to say concerning the Name, the Title, or Subject, and even the Design of it. — The Composition then of this Dialogue is of a singular Cast, and different from that of any Other. For the Principal Part of it consists of Oratorical Speeches, spoken at a certain Banquet or Entertainment, by Some of the Company in their Turns, upon a Subject proposed by One of their Number. — The Speakers are these Six, Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agatho, and Socrates. Their several Speeches are finely distinguished by different Styles of Oratory, and with great Propriety display

play the peculiar Character of each Speaker. — The first of them, Phædrus, was a Young Gentleman, of the most ingenuous Disposition, modest, candid, and a Lover of Truth; refined, elevated, and heroic in his Sentiments; the same Person, whose Character Plato has thus drawn at large in a Dialogue inscribed with His Name. From thence also we learn, that he was a great Admirer of Lyfias the Orator: accordingly, the Speech, made by him in this Banquet, savours much of the Style of Lyfias, such as it is characterised by¹ Plato himself; the Diction being pure and elegant; the Periods round and well turned; but expressing the same Sentiments over and over again in Variety of Language; and where the Sentiments are various, void of all Method or Order in the ranging them.—The next Speech, reported in the Dialogue, is that of Pausanias; who appears to have been a Statesman or Politician, a great Admirer of both the Spartan and the Athenian Laws, and an Enemy to all other Systems of Government and Manners. The Style of his Oratory corresponds exactly with the Character, which Hermogenes gives us, of the Style used by Isocrates: for he is clear and distinct, and divides his Subject properly; is profuse in Ornaments, and rather too nice and accurate; diffuse and ample in his Sentiments, though not in his Expression; and taking a large Com-
pass

¹ See Platon. Phædr. pag. 234, 5. and 263, 4. Ed. Steph.

pass of Argument in the coming to his Point. We find him however free from those Faults, for which that Critick justly reprehends Isocrates: for in the Speech of Pausanias there is no Languor nor Tedioufness; nor is he guilty of preaching, or of being didactic; Vices in Oratory, which are the usual Concomitants of Old Age, and in Isocrates perhaps were principally owing to that Cause: certain it is, that most of his Orations now extant were composed in the Decline of his Life, and that in the latest of them those Blemishes are the most conspicuous. But at the Time, when the Speeches, reported in this Dialogue, were supposed to have been spoken, Isocrates was in the Flower both of his Age and of his Eloquence. Add to this, that Pausanias here immoderately affects some of those little Graces of Style, for which Isocrates was remarkable in his Younger Years most; ² such as ἀντιθέσεις, or Oppositions; παρασώσεις, or Paritys, where one Member of a Sentence answers either in Sound or Sentiment to another; and those meerly Verbal or Literal Similaritys, of Adnominations, Adliterations, and the same Beginnings or Endings of two or more Words near one another. One of these Ornaments, improperly used, Plato ridicules in the way of Mimickry, as

soon

² See Hermogenes περὶ ἰδεῶν, L. 1. C. 12. The same Critick περὶ μεθόδου, C. 13 and 16. Vit. Homer. inter Opusc. Mytholog. ex Ed. 2^{da}. pag. 300, 301. Quintilian. Institut. Orat. L. 9. C. 3. and Demetrius Phaler. περὶ ἑρμηνείας, §. 29.

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soon as the Speech of Pausanias is ended : which alone seems a sufficient Evidence, that Plato in framing that Speech purposely imitated the Style of Isocrates. His Intention in so doing, as appears probable, we think, from the Beginning of the Speech itself, was to set in Contrast those two celebrated Orators, Lyfias and Isocrates ; and to exhibit the Former as treating his Subject in a general, indiscriminating, indeterminate way, copious in his Language, but jejune in Matter ; the Other, as distinguishing and methodical, full of Matter, and ample in Particulars, from having studied the Nature of his Subject more distinctly, philosophically, and minutely. It may be pertinent to observe, that Plato seems to have had the same View, in introducing the Mention of Isocrates near the Conclusion of his Dialogue named Phædrus. — The next Speaker to Pausanias is Eryximachus ; whose Profession was that of Physick or Medicine ; and his Speech is suitable to his Profession : for he considers the Subject in a more extensive View ; and beginning from the Human Body, both in its sound and morbid State, goes on like a thorough Naturalist, and pursues his Instances through every Part of Nature, through Earth, Air and Sky, up to That which vulgarly was deemed Divine. His Oratory, to the best of our little Judgment in these Matters, agrees with what Hermogenes³ reports

³ See his Treatise *περί ιδεῶν*, L. 2. C. 9.

The A R G U M E N T. 9

ports of Pericles, that all the Ancient Orators, meaning, before the Time of Demosthenes, He had in Appearance, as well as in Reality, the most of the δεινότης, that is, Weight with his Hearers, and Power over their Passions. For, according to that Critick, the real δεινότης of an Orator consists in a ready and apt Use of his General Knowledge, or an opportune and proper Application of it, in managing his Subject; and the δεινότης is most apparent, he says, when the ἐννοιαί, the Thoughts and Sentiments, are profound, curious, and out of the common Road, yet striking and forcible. Now the real and the apparent δεινότης, as thus described, are Both of them remarkable in the only Oration of Pericles we have left, inserted by Thucydides in his History: and Both seem affectedly used in the Speech of Eryximachus; which we presume therefore Plato composed in Imitation of Pericles.—Next after Him speaks Aristophanes, the celebrated Comic Poet; thro' whose Comedys, such at least as are still remaining, runs the same rich Vein of Humour, the same lively and redundant Wit, the same Licentiousness of Sentiment and Language, the same Buffoon-like Ridicule and Drollery on the Gods, and the same loud Pretensions to Piety and Religion, which characterise his Speech in the Banquet.—The next Speech is made by Agatho, the Donor of the Feast. Agatho was at this Time a Young Man of a large Fortune, Generous, Magnificent,

C and

and Polished in his Manners; much admired by All for the Comeliness of his Person; and celebrated by Plato in the Protagoras for his fine Parts, and excellent Natural Disposition. His Genius inclined him to Poetry, and particularly to that of the Tragic Kind; in which he was so successful, as to win the Prize from all his Antagonists, in one of those Competitions for Excellence in writing Tragedys, annually held at the Feast of Bacchus. Upon this Occasion it was, that he gave his Friends that Entertainment, which Plato has immortalised by this fine Dialogue. We have no Piece of his Writing extant; but 'tis highly probable, that the Speech, here attributed to him, gives a just Representation of his Style: for the Language of it is extremely poetical, florid, and abounding with Metaphors; and the Sentiments are wonderfully elegant, ingenious, and full of Fancy, but have not so much as an Appearance of Truth for their Foundation.—The last Speaker on the Subject is Socrates: and his Speech is in every Respect worthy of the Man. For in his whole Conduct he was modest, and careful to avoid the least Degree of Ostentation; in all his Discourse he was ⁺ solicitous above all things for the Truth in every Subject, and proposed to himself That as the principal End in all his Disputes, Inquiries, and Researches; and whenever he took the Lead in Conversation, he began from Things
easy,

⁺ See the Greater Hippias, page 58.

The ARGUMENT. II

easy, common, and obvious, but gradually rose to Speculations the most difficult, sublime, and excellent. Agreeably to this Character, he delivers in his Speech nothing as from Himself; but introduces another Person, assuming the Magisterial Airs of a Teacher, yet condescending, gentle, and affable. This Person is Diotima, a Lady at that time in high Reputation for her supposed Intercourse with the Gods, and her Predictions of future Events. The Speech of Socrates contains the Recital of a Conversation between Himself and this Prophetic Lady; into whose Mouth he puts what he has a Mind to teach, on purpose to insinuate, that his Speech was indisputably true, was worthy of being thought divinely inspired, and conveyed the Knowledge of Divine Things. The Eloquence of it exemplifys that Doctrine, taught by Plato in his Phædrus and his Gorgias, that the Man, who best knows the Truth in every Subject he treats of, and intends the Good of those whom he endeavors to persuade, He who has the most Knowledge of Human Nature, and of the various Dispositions of Men, and consequently can adapt his Speech to the Temper of his Audience, He is likely to make the ablest and best Speaker; the other Qualifications, requisite to form an Orator, being comparatively mean, and, so far as Art is concerned in them, easily attainable. The Truth of this Doctrine was soon after abundantly confirmed in Demosthenes, who, forming himself

upon the Rules laid down by Plato, became at once the most perfect Patriot, Politician, and Orator of his (I had almost said of any) Age.— After these six Speeches are ended, a new Character is brought upon the Stage,—Alcibiades,—a Young Nobleman of the first Rank in Athens, of great natural and acquired Abilities, chiefly those of the Military Kind, but of dissolute and thorowly debauched Manners. Being ambitious of Power and Government in the State too early, before he was qualified for them by Knowledge and Experience, he had for some time been a Follower of Socrates, whose Eloquence and Reasoning he saw prevailing always over those of the Sophists : for he hoped to acquire, in His Company and Converse, the same superior Power of Persuasion ; in order to employ that Power with the People^s, and gratify the Views of his Ambition. He is introduced into the Banquet-Room, far from sober ; and his Behaviour and Speech (for he is engaged by the Company to make a Speech) perfectly agree with the Character of his Manners. The Subject, on which he speaks, is professedly, and in all Appearance, foreign to the Point spoken to by the rest ; as the disorderly and unthinking Condition, which he is in, requires it should be : but 'tis far from being so in Reality : Plato has not only woven it into his Design in this incomparable Dialogue, but has made it one of the most essential Parts, without

^s See Note 6. to the Greater Hippias, page 20.

without which the Work had been wholly defective in the End for which it was framed; as will presently appear. Between the Speeches are intermixed, occasionally, short Pieces of Conversation; which agreeably relieve the Mind, by unbending it at proper Intervals, amidst the Formality and Tedioufness of set Orations. After the last of the Six Speeches, that of Socrates, is ended, the latter Part of which is wrought up to all possible Sublimity of Speculation, some entertaining Dramatic Incidents occur, to lower the Flights of Enthusiasm, and bring us down again to Human Life and Manners. And this, for a particular Reason besides, is here necessary, because all those sublime Speculations were intended to be afterwards applied to Moral Practice.—These Speeches, with the Conversation and Occurrences at the Banquet, make the Principal Part of this Dialogue; and are introduced, not in a Dramatic, but a Narrative, Way. — The Introduction is partly Narrative, and partly Dramatic: by which means it is somewhat intricate. For the Dialogue opens with a Conversation between Two Persons only, Apollodorus, and some Friend of his, though in the Presence of Others, such as Dramatic Writers call Mute Persons. At the very Beginning, Apollodorus relates a short Conversation, lately held between Himself and Glauco; and tells his Friend, that he then gave Glauco an Account of what had passed at the Banquet given by

by Agatho: which Account, repeated by him here again, constitutes all the rest of the Dialogue. He says, it was delivered to Him by Aristodemus, One of the Company; who had begun his Narrative with the Recital of a short Conversation, held between Socrates and Himself, and of some other Occurrences previous to the Banquet. The same Recital, here made by Apollodorus to his Friend, and to the Company at that Friend's House, immediately introduces the Narrative or History of that truly noble Entertainment. — Such is the Manner, and such the Method, in which this Dialogue is composed. It appears from hence, that 'twould have been improper to inscribe it, like almost all the other Dialogues, with the Name of any One of the Speakers; ⁶ because no One bears such a Part in it, as may fitly be deemed Second to that of Socrates. The most proper Name, which could be devised for it, clearly is The Banquet; because This is equally expressive of all the Shining Persons of the Dialogue. — It is usually intitled “Concerning Love.” ⁷ Lambecius, however, strongly maintains the true Title of it to be “Concerning Good.” 'Tis easy to compromise the Difference, by a short Account of the Speeches in this Dialogue with regard to their Matter; as we have before considered them with regard to the Style and
Cha-

⁶ See Prologue to Plato's Works, at the End of the Synopsis, page 22.

⁷ See Lambec. Bibliothec. Vindobon. Lib. 7. sub init.

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Character of their Composition. — *The Subject, proposed to be spoken on, is “the Praise of Love,” simply and generally: and the Speech of Phædrus, who proposed it, takes the Word Love in a General Sense, so as to comprehend Love toward Persons of the same Sex, commonly called Friendship, as well as That toward Persons of a different Sex, peculiarly and eminently stiled Love.*—Pausanias distinguishes between Love of the Mind, and Love meerly of the Body, proving them to be Affections of very different Kinds, because productive of very different Effects.—Eryximachus considers Love, as that Universal Principle in Nature, which attracts, unites, or associates, one Thing to another in a regular Way; the Effect of whose Operation is Harmony or Concord: That, which heals also the Breaches made by the Opposite, the disuniting and dividing Principle, the Cause of irregular Motions and of Discord.—Aristophanes treats of Love, as other Writers of Comedy do; taking it only in the grossest Sense of the Word, as it means the Passion common to Man with all Brute Animals.—And Agatho talks about it, like other Enthusiastic Poets, in a vague Manner, without any determinate or fixed Meaning at all; taking it in various Senses; commonly indeed for the Refinement of that Passion between the Sexes; but sometimes for great Liking or Attachment of the Mind to any Object; and then, all at once, using the Word, like Eryximachus,

thus, to signify Concord and Harmony, not only between Rational Beings, but even the Unintelligent Parts of Nature. But when Socrates comes to speak upon the Subject, he goes much deeper into it by Degrees: in the first place, he premises certain Universal Truths relating to Love;—that the Object of it is Beauty; the Essence of it Desire; its Aim or End the Possession of Beauty, or, if already possessed of it, the Perpetuity of that Possession. Next, he considers Love as the Desire of Good; whatever is Beautiful being also Good, so far as it is Beautiful; and Love, peculiarly so called, being Part of that Universal Love or Desire of Good, common to all Beings intelligent and sentient. He considers this Universal Love or Desire of Good, as the Link between the Eternal Nature and the Mortal, between the Plenitude of Good and the Total Want of it. He considers, that the Aim of this Desire, agreeably to a certain Property of it before observed, is not only to enjoy Good, but to immortalise that Enjoyment. The Desire of Immortality therefore is of Necessity, he says, annexed to the Desire of Good, or Love of Beauty. But Personal Immortality being impossible to be attained by any Being whose Nature is Mortal, every such Being, prompted by Nature, seeks to continue itself, and its Enjoyment of Good, in the only Way possible, the Propagation of its Species, and the Production of some Being, resembling

its Self, another Self, to succeed, and to continue as it were the Enjoyment of the same Good. Hence the Love of that Beauty, with which every Animal is most smitten in the Beautiful of its own Kind, is accompanied with an Instinct, or Natural Desire, to mix and unite with it, and thus to generate another Animal of the same Kind. From Corporeal Beauty, and that lower Species of Love regarding it, Man, as his Mind opens more and is improved, naturally proceeds farther; attaining the Sight of that Beauty, which is seen only by the Eye of Mind, in the Temper and Disposition of some Fellow-Mind; and fired with that Love, which attends the Sight of Mental Beauty. To this Love also is annexed, says Socrates, the Desire of generating, of stamping upon that other Mind its own Thoughts, and of raising up and nurturing between them an Intellectual Progeny, of generous Sentiments and fair Ideas. By means of this Mixture and this Enjoyment, that is, by Converse, such as improves the Understanding, the Mind, he observes, rises higher, and attains to view Beauty in those Things themselves, the Subjects of their Conversation; first, in virtuous Pursuits, Studys, and Employments; next, in the Sciences, and every Branch of Knowledge. In the Embraces of these Beautys the Mind generates an Offspring of the fairest Kind and the most durable; the Poet, his Immortal Writings; the Hero, thro' the Force of his Exam-

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ple, continual Copys of his Virtue; the Founder of Civil Politys, thro' his Institutions, a long Succession of Patriot-Actions; and the Legislator, wise and beneficial Laws, to bless the latest Posterity. — But if the Soul be endowed with a Genius of the Highest Kind, she rests not here, nor fixes her Attachment on any One of these Mental Excellencys or Beautys in Particular: the genuine Lover of Truth and Nature rises from hence, as we are here taught, to the Science of Mind itself, in which all those Excellencys and Beautys are comprehended; and contemplates that universal, original, and Exemplar-Beauty, of which she her Self partakes; and from which every fair Form of Nature, every generous Sentiment, every amiable and graceful Action, each Particular Science, and all the fine Productions of Genius or of Art, derive their Beauty. To this Science only, that of Mind, does Plato allow the Name of True Wisdom; the Love and the Pursuit of this Supreme Beauty he calls Philosophy; and to the Embraces or Enjoyment of it, and to no other Cause, does he here ascribe the Generation and the Growth of True Virtue. — The last Speech, that of Alcibiades, is wholly in Praise of Socrates; and is intended by Plato to exemplify what Socrates had just before taught: for by describing the Character of that consummate Philosopher, and thus drawing after the Life, he exhibits to our View a Picture of Living Virtue, for the Ground of which is laid True Philosophy.

lofophy.— *In this ſhort Account of the Speeches, which compoſe the Principal Part of this Dialogue, it appears that the Five Firſt are, what they pretend to be, Encomiums upon Love. But Socrates, 'tis plain, has Something elſe in View: he makes the Subject propoſed an Occaſion only to introduce ſome Other; and in the Cloſe of his Speech plainly intimates, that it rather deſerved ſome other Title, than that of an Encomium upon Love. As therefore the preceding Speeches are in their Nature but preparatory, and in Fact introductory to that of Socrates, Lambecius is juſtifiable in altering the Title of this Dialogue: but from the Manner, in which Socrates conſiders the General Nature of his Subject, it might, with leſs Variation from the Vulgar Title, than that propoſed by Lambecius, be properly enough termed “ a Dialogue concerning the “ Love of Beauty, or the Deſire of Good.” Still farther, in our Review of the Speech of Socrates, we find, that his Drift was to conduct his Followers up the ſeveral Steps of Beauty, thoſe Objects of Love to the Human Mind in proportion to its ſeveral Degrees of Improvement; and finally to fix their Love and Admiration upon that Universal Conſummate Beauty, the Love of which characteriſes the Philoſopher, and diſtinguiſhes him from other Men, whoſe Purſuits are lower, and whoſe Loves are fixed on meaner Objects. Agreeably therefore to this, were it abſolutely neceſſary to alter the Title of this Dialogue, in order to*

express the Principal Subject of it, we should propose One of these Two,—“ Concerning the Love of the Supreme Beauty,” that is, the Mind of Nature ;—or, “ Concerning Philosophy,” that is, the Love of Wisdom.—Certain it is, that the Philosopher’s Design in this Dialogue is to engage his Disciples and Friends in the Study and Pursuit of this Wisdom, by representing the Object of it as incomparably the worthiest of their Love and Admiration ; and by shewing them, that this Wisdom, this Knowledge of the Universal Beauty, or Sovereign Good, is the only firm Foundation of That, which is the Particular Good of Man, True Virtue. — Not without Reason therefore did the
⁸*Ancients generally rank this Dialogue among those of the Ethic Class. But according to the Plan proposed in our Synopsis, the Character of it is of the Mixed Kind, that is, partly Narrative and partly Dramatic : And the Genius of it takes its Colour from the Didactic Part, the Speech of Socrates ; the Reasoning of which is wholly Analytical, resolving all Love into its Principles, and tracing all Beauty upward to that Source, from whence it is derived to every Part of Nature, MIND.*

P E R-

⁸ See *Diogenes Laert.* L. 2. Modern Interpreters, with a View to the sublimer Part of the Speech of *Socrates*, but without regarding the Drift of it, call this Dialogue *Metaphysical* or *Theological*. And among the Ancient Platonists, *Albinus*, as if he was attentive chiefly to the Speech of *Pausanias*, and referred all the Other Speeches to That, calls it *Political*.

¹ PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

² APOLLODORUS, ³ FRIEND OF APOLLODORUS,
⁴ GLAUCO, ⁵ ARISTODEMUS, ⁶ SOCRATES, AGA-
 THO, PAUSANIAS, ARISTOPHANES, ERYXI-
 MACHUS, PHÆDRUS, DIOTIMA, ALCIBIADES.

¹ The Readers of *Plato* will observe, that before each of his Dia-
 logues the Names of the Speakers in it are recited, not in the Order
 either of their real Dignity, or of their Importance to the Dialogue, as
 the Manner is of Modern Poets before their Tragedys and Comedys;
 but according to the Order in which they severally make their first Ap-
 pearance; and, since in every Scene of Conversation Two or More must
 appear at the same time together, These are named according to the
 Order in which they first speak: after this Manner we find the Persons
 of the Drama enumerated before all the Dramatic Writings of the
 Ancients.

² *Apollodorus* was a Disciple of *Socrates*, but of no long Standing at
 this Time. His Character therefore in the Dialogue is properly marked
 by the Vehemence of his Attachment to Philosophy, and Admiration of
 his Master. See more of him in Note 10. to the *Dialogue*.

³ This Friend is not mentioned by Name: a Circumstance, which
 alone seems to have induced Some to imagine, that by the *Friend of*
Apollodorus, *Plato* here meant Himself.

⁴ If this be the same *Glauco*, who was Brother to *Plato*, and *Plato*
 be the Friend here introduced, it seems strange, that *Apollodorus* should
 speak of *Plato's* Brother to *Plato* himself, as of one utterly unknown
 to *Plato*, mentioning his Name, afterwards, only as it were by Accident.

⁵ *Aristodemus* was a constant Humble Follower of *Socrates*. See
 more of him in Notes 7, and 8. to the *Dialogue* itself.

⁶ For the Characters of all the following Persons, we refer to the
 first Part of the preceding *Argument*.

7 S C E N E,

PRINCIPALLY, WITHIN THE CITY OF ATHENS.

7 The Scene of Conversation between *Apollodorus* and his *Friend*, the only *Dramatic* Part of the Dialogue, and where all the rest of it is introduced in the way of *Narrative*, appears to be the *House* of this *Friend*; as proper a Place as any for so long a Recital as *Apollodorus* had to make him; and the most proper, where to come to him with that Intention. — The *Way* from *Phalerus* to *Athens*, a long Walk, is, with no less Propriety, made the Scene of the Conversation, related by *Apollodorus* between Himself and *Glauco*; to whom, he says, he then made the same long Recital. — The Scene of the short Discourse next related, between *Aristodemus* and *Socrates* is made the *Street*; by which Piece of Conduct the breaking it off so abruptly is suitable to the Decorum of Place. (See Note to the Scene of *Io*.) And *Agatbo's House* is the grand Scene of the Principal Part, the Speeches at the Entertainment.

APOL-

APOLLODORUS.

THE Affair, concerning which ye inquire, I think my self now not quite unprepared to relate to you. For it happened ¹ a few Days since, as I was walking up to the City from my House at ² Phalerus, that an Acquaintance of mine, who was going the same Way, seeing Me at a considerable Distance before him, called out to me ; and by way of ³ Joke at the same time said,—Apollodorus, You Phalerean, will not You stop a while, till I come up to you ?—Upon which I stopped, and stayed for him. As soon as he had joined me,—Apollodorus, says he, I was just now inquiring

¹ The Word *πρώην*, which the older Editions give us in this Place, is, carelessly as it seems, omitted in that of *Stephens*: which Error, as well as many Others, we the rather take Notice of, to prevent a Repetition of the Same in any future Edition of *Plato*, where the Text of *Stephens* is likely to be made the Standard.

² *Phalerus* was a Sea-Port Town, between four and five Miles from the City of *Athens*; where frequently were furnished out, by way of Spectacles of Entertainment to the People, *Pompous Cavalcades*, issuing probably from thence, and marching to the City. See *Xenophon* in *Hipparchic*. p. 560. Ed. 2^{da}. *Steph.*

³ What the Joke is, will easily be discerned by Help of the preceding Note. For it lyes in a Humorous Opposition between the Haste with which *Apollodorus* seems to have been walking, agreeably to his Character, and the Slowness usual in *Cavalcades of Pomp*, with the frequent Stopping of those who are Foremost, till the more dilatory Train behind them is come up.

quiring after you ; from a Desire I have to be thorowly acquainted with what passed in the Conversation between Agatho, and Socrates, and Alcibiades, and the rest who were of the Party, at an Entertainment where the Subject of their Discourse was Love. I should be glad to be informed by You what was said on the Occasion. For the Person, who gave Me some Account of it, Such as He received from Phœnix the Son of Philippus, told me that You knew every Particular : but that as to Himself, he did not pretend to be at all perfect or exact in his Relation. Do You then give me an Account of it, Your self : for You have the best Right to relate a Conversation, in which an intimate Friend of your own had the most distinguished Share. But first, said He, tell me, were You your Self One of the Company ?—It appears plainly, said I, indeed, that your Author by no means gave you an Exact Account of the Circumstances of that Conversation, if you suppose it passed so lately, as to admit a Possibility of My being of the Company.—Really I imagined so, replied He.—How could it be, said I, Glauco ? Do you not know, that Agatho has not been at Athens for these many Years ? whereas it is not yet Three, since I first became a Follower of Socrates, and began, as I have continued ever since, daily to observe and study all his Sayings and Actions. Before that Time, running about here and there, wherever Chance led me, and fancying my self all the while well employed, no Mortal was in so wretched a Condition as I : it was such as You

are in at present, who give every Study and every Pursuit the Preference to that of Philosophy.—Leave off railing, said He, and tell me When that Conversation happened.—Before We wrote our selves Men, replied I. 'Twas at the Time when Agatho brought his first Tragedy upon the Stage, and won the Prize with it. 'Twas the very next Day, after that Himself and his ⁴ Chorus-Singers had offered the usual Thanksgiving-Sacrifice for his Victory.—'Tis then, said He, a long time since, it seems. But who was it, continued he, that related the Conversation to You? Was it Socrates himself?—Not Socrates, ⁵ by Jove, replied I; but the same Person, who related it to Phoenix. It was one Aristodemus, ⁶ a Cydathenian, a Man of

⁴ Those, who acted and sung the Chorus-Parts in his Play. See Note 60, to the *Io*.

⁵ This, by way of strong Negative; such as is often used in answering, when the Affirmative of the Question asked has not the least Appearance of Truth in it, or is most remote from the Matter of Fact. In this Passage therefore, slight as it may seem, is drawn a strong Line in the Character of *Socrates*; to shew, that of all Mankind He was the farthest from Ostentation, and the most unlikely ever to repeat to Others again, as Men of Vanity use to do, a past Conversation where he had distinguished himself, or any former Discourse of his own for which he had been admired.

⁶ In all the Editions of the *Greek* we here read *Kυδαθηνευς*: but it ought certainly to be printed *Kυδαθηναϊευς*; as appears from *Stephanus de Urb.* and from an old *Inscription* on a Pillar at *Athens* published in *Spon. de Pagis Attic.* voce *Kυδαθηναϊων*. See also *Meursius de Pop. Attic.* in eadem voce.

of ⁷ remarkably low Stature, ⁸ who always went barefoot. He was of the Party; being one of Those who at that time

⁷ *Xenophon* informs us, that *Aristodemus* was surnamed *the Little*. This Circumstance therefore serves to ascertain the Man. From the same Author we learn, that this Little Man was also one of the Minute Philosophers of that Age, till better taught by *Socrates*. For *Xenophon* represents him as ἔτε θύοντα τοῖς θεοῖς μηχανώμενον, ἔτε μαντικῇ χρώμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ποιμένων ταῦτα κατελελῶναι. We quote the very Words of this Passage for the sake of proposing to our Learned Readers an Emendation of the Word μηχανώμενον. For we are not satisfied with μήτε εὐχόμενον, the Conjecture of *H. Stephens*, nor with the ἔτε εὐχόμενον of *Leunclavius*; because Sacrifice to the Gods, we apprehend, always implied either Petition or Thanksgiving: nor can we acquiesce in retaining the Word μηχανώμενον, making it to signify, *when he undertook any thing*, and accordingly supposing with *Ernestus*, the Word τι to be tacitly understood; because the Supposition seems not agreeable to any Idiom of the *Greek* Language. We approve rather the Prudence of *Bessarion*, who, in his *Latin* Translation of this Passage, took no Notice at all of the Word μηχανώμενον. But as we must not make so bold with the Original, we propose, instead of that Word, to be read as in a Parenthesis, μὴ ἐκόντα μὲν ἔν; by which Alteration the Sense will be this, that *Aristodemus* offered no Sacrifices to the Gods, *no voluntary ones at least*, but in Compliance only with Custom, or in Obedience to the Laws. And this may appear to be the true Meaning, when we consider that Atheists in all Ages are ready enough to join in *Public Acts* of Divine Worship; and therefore not the Neglect of These, but of Such as were *voluntary*, could be any Indication to *Socrates* of the real Sentiments of *Aristodemus*. See *Xenophon* in *Memorabil.* L. 1. C. 4.

⁸ By this Circumstance *Aristodemus* was distinguished, it seems, as much as by his Littleness. 'Tis probable, that like his Fellow-Disciple *Antisthenes* the Cynick, he imitated what appeared the most rigid and severe in his Master's Way of Life, as being best suited to the natural

Rough-

time were the most attached to the Person and Company of Socrates. Not but that I asked Socrates himself concerning Some of the Particulars, reported by Aristodemus; and He allowed they were reported justly.—Why then, said Glauco, should not You favour Me with that Relation? The Way to the City is perfectly convenient for People to converse together, as they go along.—Upon which we resumed our Walk, and entered into the Relation which my Friend desired. So that I am now, as I said, not quite unprepared upon the Subject. If then I am to relate that Affair over again to You, ⁹ so it must be. Besides, I must own, that when I am discoursing, my Self, or hearing the Discourse of Others, upon Philosophical Subjects, abstracted from the Consideration of Improvement, I am beyond measure delighted. But when I hear Conversation of any other Kind, especially the usual Discourse between You Rich People who are still contriving to heap up Money, I feel a Tedi-ousness in my Self, and a Concern for You my Friends, who imagine you are employing your Time to good Pur-
 E 2 pose,

Roughness of his own Temper, and the Rudeness of his Manners; which led him to entertain Atheistical Notions of the Causes of Things, and to ridicule Those who paid real Worship to what was Divine in Nature. This Circumstance recalls to our Mind those Epithets of *Rough, Hard and Unyielding*, *ῥαχέϊα καὶ ἀνίτρυπος*, given to Atheism by *Plutarch* at the End of his Treatise *περὶ δεσιδαιμονίας*. See farther in Note III.

⁹ *Ταῦτα καὶ πλεονέχειν* is a Phrase we meet with frequently in *Plato*. We should chuse therefore so to read in this Place, instead of *ταῦτα καὶ π.* as it is printed.

pose, while you are only trifling. On the other hand, 'tis possible you may think that I lead an unhappy Life; and I believe, those Thoughts of yours are just: but as to You, I do not say that I believe—for I know—the State which You are in to be unhappy.

FRIEND.

You are always the Same Man, Apollodorus, always railing at your Self and the whole World. You seem to Me as if you absolutely thought all Men wretched, and your Self in the First place; excepting None but Socrates. Whence you acquired the Surname of ¹⁰ the Madman, for My Part I know not: for in your Discourse you are always the Same as you are now, severe upon your Self and all other People,—Socrates alone excepted.

APOLLODORUS.

My dearest Friend, 'tis evident enough now, that the entertaining Such Notions of my Self, and of all You, proves

¹⁰ *Xenophon* in his *Apology*, and *Plato* in his *Phædo* near the Beginning, and again toward the Conclusion of it, represent *Apollodorus* as a Man simple and sincere, but with such a Kind of Weakness in his Mind, as made him remarkably hasty, negligent of Decorum, and apt to speak inconsiderately and without Discretion. Why *Plato* puts the Narration of the Banquet into the Mouth of a Person of this Character, we cannot conceive;—unless it be by way of tacit Apology for giving the whole History intire, and for thus relating, amongst the rest, the indecent Speeches of *Aristophanes* and *Alcibiades*. For perhaps he thought *Propriety of Character*, with regard to the *Speakers*, insufficient to justify his inserting Such Speeches, without the Aid of another such Propriety, regarding the *Person* who repeats them.

THE BANQUET. 29

proves me beyond Question out of my Senses and a Mad-man.

FRIEND.

It is not worth the While, Apollodorus, to dispute about This at present. Only do what I desired of you, and give me an Account of the Speeches made at that Banquet.

APOLLODORUS.

The Speeches then were, as follows. — But I had better, I think, give you the whole History of that Affair from the Beginning, just as Aristodemus gave it Me. For he told me, that he met Socrates fresh out of the Bath, and perfectly clean, a Condition which he was not in very often; wearing on his Feet likewise a handsome Pair of Slippers, ¹¹ a Part of Dress which he used only on rare Occasions :

¹¹ *Socrates*, in his ordinary Way of Life, accustomed himself to endure *voluntary* Hardships: from which he drew this Advantage, that he suffered less than other Men, when called to bear Hardships that were *necessary*. In like manner the *Cynicks* and *Stoicks*, in Imitation probably of *Socrates*, did many Things ἀσκήσεως ἕνεκα, that is, for the sake of habituating, through Exercise, their Minds and Bodys to Endurance. But *Socrates*, unlike the *Cynicks*, made all This consistent with a Regard to the Decencys of Civil and Social Life, a due Compliance with Custom, and Conformity to Fashion. For he always readily relaxed from his Severity, whenever, as on the present Occasion, he deemed the Practice of it unseasonable. This Civility distinguishes the Manners of *Socrates* from the savage Rusticity of *Aristodemus* before mentioned. And we cannot help thinking, that these two seemingly slight Circumstances, in the Description of these two Persons, were mentioned by *Plato* so near together, on Purpose to make that Distinction the more easy to be noted. We learn from *Ælian*, in *Var. Hist.*

L.

casions : and that upon asking him, Whither he was going, that he had made himself so spruce and fine, Socrates told him, he was going to Agatho's House, to sup with him. For yesterday at the Sacrifice, said he, I quitted his Company, for fear of the Croud : but promised to be with him to Day. Now thus fine have I made my self, that I may visit so honorable and fine a Person in a Manner not unbecoming. But what think you, said he, Aristodemus, of going to Supper there, your Self, without Invitation ? How do you find your self disposed upon that Point ?—And I replied, said Aristodemus, that I was entirely at His Disposal.—Follow me then, said Socrates ; to corrupt the ¹² old Proverb, by altering it,—and proving, that

*When made by Worthy Men are Feasts,
The Worthy go, unbidden Guests.*

Homer,

L. 4. C. 18. that *Socrates* was charged, probably by the *Cynicks*, with being curious and nice about his House, and his Bed,—and his fine Slippers. Which confirms the Truth of our Observation in this Note.

¹² The Proverb, here alluded to, *Athenæus*, pag. 178. and *Zenobius*, C. 2. 19. have given us in this Verse, which the Latter quotes from *Eupolis* the Comic Poet,

Αὐτόμαλοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν.

*When made by Meaner Men are Feasts,
Their Betters go, unbidden Guests,*

That is, when they are pleased to honour with their Presence Such as could not presume to invite them.

THE BANQUET. 31

Homer, before us, seems not meerly to have corrupted, but to have offered Violence to the Proverb—by reversing it. For notwithstanding that he describes Agamemnon as a Man excellent in all Military Virtues, and Menelaus as a Man weak in Arms, who

¹³ ——— fail'd of manly Force
To fling the well-aim'd Javelin. —

yet,

¹³ Μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν. Menelaus is so called in the 17th Book of the *Iliad*, v. 588. *Athenæus* is very angry with *Plato* for receiving this Character of *Menelaus* as true; and for not considering that *Homer* puts it into the Mouth of *Apollo*, a partial Friend to the *Trojans*, and of consequence Enemy to *Menelaus*. He therefore stands up very stoutly against *Apollo* and *Plato*, to prove, by many Instances in *Homer*, that *Menelaus* was no Coward. But in reality he only proves Himself so inveterate an Enemy to *Plato*, as, for the sake of abusing Him, to mis-interpret *Homer*; who by the Word μαλθακὸν meant no more in that Passage, than, as the Old *Scholiast* rightly explains it, ἀνείμενον τῇ ἰσχυρί, ἀσθενῆ; and just so much *Athenæus* himself confesses true of *Menelaus*, that he was τῇ ῥώμῃ καλαδέεστος, somewhat Deficient in Strength. Thus much may serve to vindicate *Plato* in this Place against *Athenæus*. But a better Critick than *Athenæus*, unless he were well versed in *Plato's* peculiar Manner of Writing, would, with more Show of Justice, reprehend him here for the seemingly cold and insipid Length of this Digression about the Proverb. And indeed were this Part meerly a Digression, the Criticism would in reality be just. But *Plato* intended it for a Part highly important to his Dialogue;—to guard it against the Mis-construction, to which it might be liable from Men of severe, sour, and malignant Tempers;—to signify, that not all People were worthy, or properly qualified, to partake as it were of the Banquet he had provided;—and to point out, for Whom it was particularly improper to be present, τὰς μαλθακὰς, molles, the Voluptuous, or Men of effeminate Minds and Manners: in which

yet, on Occasion of a Sacrifice and Feast made by Agamemnon, ¹⁴ he has brought Menelaus to the Banquet uninvited, a Meaner Man to the Banquet of his Betters.—Perhaps I too, replied Aristodemus on hearing this, shall incur the Imputation of a Conduct, not, Socrates, such a one as You have supposed, but like that in Homer, if I go to the Banquet of a Man of great Abilitys, without being intitled to it either by Merit or Invitation. Will You therefore, if you lead me thither, make an Apology for so doing? for as to my Self, I shall not confess my coming without Invitation, but shall plead that I was invited by You.—Well, says Socrates,

With

which Sense the Word *μαλθακός* is often taken. See particularly *Xenophon* in *Mem.* L. 3. C. 11. §. 10. where it is applied to *libidinous* Love, and opposed to That which inspires the Sentiments of Friendship. *Homer*, 'tis true, had a different Meaning, such as we have before explained; and *Plato* uses a Kind of Catachresis, in adapting this Passage to his Purpose. But it was sufficient for Him, if any way it was applicable. Some Passage or other in *Homer* was here to be introduced, and the Reader's Mind to be detained on it for some Time. For This Observation will be found to hold true throughout all *Plato's* Writings, that, whenever he cites a Verse out of any Poet, especially out of *Homer*, he does it not, like Writers of a lower Class, to imbellish the Plainness of Prose with fine Tags of Poetry; but his View is always either to strike the Mind of his Reader more forcibly in the conveying some important Meaning, and to make it sink the deeper in his Memory; or else to prepare him for Something of Importance which is to follow, by ushering it in with the Solemnity of Verse, and, what in those Days was of much Weight, the Authority of the Poet.

¹⁴ See *Homer's Iliad*, B. 2. v. 408.

¹⁵ *With social Steps, Companions of the Way,*

as we walk along, we will consult together What Speech to make. But come, let us be going.—After this little Talk together, he said, on they went. But in the Way, So-

¹⁵ *Socrates* here makes Use of Part of a Verse, taken from *Homer's Iliad*, B. 10. v. 224. Σύν τε δὴ ἔρχομένω, that is, literally translated into *English*, “Two going together;” and seems, at first Sight, in his Application of it to mean *Himself* and *Aristodemus*. But immediately afterwards we find, that he had no sooner said this, than he let *Aristodemus* walk on before, and fell on meditating by *Himself*. As therefore it is not to be supposed of *Socrates*, that he at once, without assigning any Cause, and without giving any Notice, altered his Mind; or that he spake idly, and without any Mind or Meaning at all; 'tis plain, that, by his *Companion of the Way*, he can mean no Other than That *Divine Companion* within him, who, as he tells *Theages* in a Dialogue of *Plato's* called by that Name, followed and attended him continually from the Time when he was a Boy; That *Oracle*, which he consulted upon All he was about to say or do, and which never failed to admonish him rightly in every Case of Importance. Such was the Affair, in which he was now going to be engaged. For the Wise amongst the Ancients, principally *Socrates* and Those who derived from Him, together with the *Stoicks*, deemed all orderly Assemblies of Men to be Things solemn and important; but especially those for the Purpose of Conversation, because in these especially ought to appear the Essential Character of Man, as a Rational and Social Being. *Socrates* therefore, purposing to prepare himself for the Occasion, keeps behind, and walks alone in the Way to *Agatho's* House; in order to meditate, and consult his *Oracle*, what was proper for him to say and do in that Company to which he was going. At the same time *Plato* thus prepares his Readers for Something of high Importance, to be delivered by *Socrates*, the Product of all this Meditation.

Socrates musing, and attentive to Something in his own Mind, was outwalked by Him; and observing him to stop, bid him walk on. When he was come to Agatho's House, the Door of which was open, an Incident, he said, happened, which put him into some Confusion. For a Servant, who was coming out, meeting him there upon the Spot, led him directly to the Banquet-Room, where he found the Company just going to Supper. Immediately Agatho, on seeing him enter the Room, said, — Aristodemus, You are come very opportunely to sup with us. But if any other Purpose brings you hither, defer it to another Time. I was looking about for you in the Temple yesterday, with Intention to desire your Company, and could not see you. But how came you not to bring us Socrates with you?—Upon which, I looked back, said he, but could no where see Socrates following me, as I had imagined. However, I declared, I came along with Socrates, upon His Invitation hither to Supper.—You did well, said Agatho; but where is he then Himself?—He was following me in but just now, said I; and for My Part, I wonder where he can be.—Boy, said Agatho to One of his Servants, will You go and see if you can find Socrates, and conduct him in?—Then, turning to Me,—Do You, Aristodemus, said he, take your Place next to Eryximachus.—¹⁶ And immediately he

¹⁶ Thus in the Original; Καὶ ἐμὲ ἔφη ἀπονίζεν τὸν παῖδα, ἵνα πρὸς καλῶς αἰετοῖο. The remarkable Enallage, or Transition here, in speaking of

he ordered a Servant to come and wash my Feet clean,
¹⁷ that I might take my Place upon the Couch. Just then,
the

of himself, from the First Person to the Third, is no unusual Thing in *Plato*; but is too bold, and would be a Solecism in *English*. For, translated as literally as possible, the Sentence runs in this manner; "Immediately he bid the [proper] Servant, to wash off [the Dirt] from me, that [says He] he may lie down somewhere." The Words, included within Hooks, we have added to complete the Sense. The *First Part* of the Sentence, we see, is meerly *Narrative*, and the *Latter Part* represents *Agatho speaking*. But the Word ἐφ' ἧ, having been used just before, though in a different Sense, is here omitted, probably to avoid a Repetition of it. *Harry Stephens*, not aware of this Transition, has raised Doubts about the right Reading of this Passage; and has endeavoured, without any Necessity, to amend it, by altering καὶ ἀκέοις into καὶ ἀκεοίμην. The same learned Printer and Editor has, in a Passage of the *Euthyphro*, where there is a like Transition, proposed altering the Text in the same manner, from Want of observing this Peculiarity in *Plato's* Style, as *Dr. Forster* has judiciously remarked in his Notes on those *Five Dialogues*, published by Him, pag. 328.

¹⁷ In that polite Age, Luxury and too great a Delicacy and Softness of Manners had so far prevailed even amongst the brave *Grecians*, that when they made their Evening Meal, or Supper, which was with Them the Principal Meal of the Day, as Dinner is with Us, they used not to sit on Chairs, Stools, or Benches, at the Table, like the Modern *Europeans*; nor to sit or lie upon Mats or Carpets laid over the Floor, like some of the *Eastern Nations*: but their Custom was to recline themselves on Sofas, Couches, or Day-Beds; the Heads of which, being placed at the Sides of the Table, an Oblong Square, were covered with Cushions; and on these they leaned their Elbows. It was necessary therefore, that *Aristodemus* should have his dirty Feet washed, before he was fit to lie on one of those Sofas. This little Incident seems thrown in by *Plato*, to confirm the Account before given of the Manners of *Aristodemus*, and to exhibit them in a stronger Light, as opposite in this Particular

the Boy, who had been sent out, returned, and told us, that Socrates had withdrawn himself into the Porch of some neighbouring House, and was there standing; and when I called to him, said the Boy, he refused to come.—Abfurd! said Agatho; go and call him again; and do not leave him in that manner.—But Aristodemus told me, that He himself opposed it, and desired that Socrates might be let alone, for that 'twas usual with him so to do. As he goes along, he will sometimes stop, said he, without re-

to those of *Socrates*; about whom we see no such Ceremony used, because unnecessary. See Note II. Different from Either of these is the Case of *Alcibiades* farther on in the Dialogue. For as He comes in drunk and dirty, in the midst of his rakehelly Rambles about the Town, Slippers are ordered to be brought him, and not his Feet to be washed, as He wore Shoes. So minute is *Plato* in his Detail of every Circumstance, that may contribute to throw Light on the Characters of those Persons he introduces. Whatever Weight there is in this Observation, be it great or little, so much of Importance is there in the Blunder, committed by all the *Latin* Translators, and by the *Italian* after them, in making *Agatho* order Water to wash the *Hands* of *Aristodemus*, instead of his *Feet*: and in the same Degree is Praise due to the Judgment and Accuracy of *Monf. Racine*, who in his Translation of this Dialogue into *French*, corrects this Error; and though he might justly be supposed prejudiced in Favour of washing the Hands before Meals, after the modern *French* Fashion, as well as the ancient *Grecian*, yet explains rightly the Orders of *Agatho*; as being sensible, no doubt, that washing the *Feet* of *Aristodemus*, not his *Hands*, was a proper Preparative for his laying up his Legs on the Sofa. But he omits this Reason of *Agatho's* for giving those Orders, though expressly mentioned by *Plato*; probably because he was at a Loss how to translate the Words, being puzzled by the Doubts raised about them by *Stephens*, as mentioned in the preceding Note.

THE BANQUET. 37

regarding where, and stand still a while. I make no Doubt, but he will be here presently. Let me intreat you therefore not to disturb him, but leave him at Quiet.—Be it so then, if You think it best, said Agatho; but let the rest of us, however, proceed to Supper.—Then, turning to his Servants,—Boys, said he, serve us up Something or Other—'tis left to You What; for there is Nobody to give you any particular Directions:—You know 'tis not My Way on these Occasions.—You are now to suppose Me and these Gentlemen, my Friends here, invited by You to Supper: entertain us handsomely therefore, that you may have our Commendations.—Immediately upon this, he said, they went to Supper; but Socrates was still missing. ¹⁸ Agatho

¹⁸ There is None of *Plato's* Dialogues, in which *Socrates* is ushered in with so much Ceremony, as in This. In the first place, that Recital of the Conversation passed between *Apollodorus* and *Glaucó*, with which the Piece sets out, seems introduced only for the sake of giving the Reader a high Opinion of the Character of *Socrates*.—To this Purpose tend the Reflections, made by *Apollodorus*, upon the singular Wisdom of his Master.—To the same End is directed his Account of the Alteration produced in him by studying that Wisdom.—And for the same Reason is Mention made of the many Admirers of that truly Admirable Man.—But all these Circumstances are made to appear simple and artless, the more irresistibly to operate their intended Effect upon the Reader's Mind.—The short Conversation which follows, between *Apollodorus* and his Friend, carries on the same Intention; but goes greater Lengths of Praise, in the Character there given of *Socrates*.—Then comes a Narration of some little Circumstances, immediately previous to the celebrated Banquet, serving to prejudice the Reader's Mind with an Idea of the Excellence of the Company assembled at *Agatho's*:
of

tho therefore would every now and then be giving Orders to his People to call Socrates in; but I, said he, constantly opposed it. At length Socrates, having staid away, as usual, not very long, entered; about the Time, at farthest, when Supper was half over. Agatho then, who lay on the Couch at the lower End of the Table, alone, said—Come hither, Socrates, and lay yourself down by Me; that, by being close to you, I may have the Benefit of that Piece of Wisdom,¹⁹ which you made a new Acquisition of in the Porch. For 'tis plain, that you found it, and are in Possession; otherwise you would never have desisted from the Pursuit.—Socrates then, sitting down on the Couch, said,—It would be well, Agatho, if Wisdom were a Thing of such a Nature, as to pass from Those who

abound

of this Kind is the extraordinary Care, which *Socrates* we see has taken, of his Person and Dress, as a proper Mark of Respect to that Assembly; and another of the same Kind is the Argument, which he politely urges to *Aristodemus*, when he is persuading Him to be of the Party. The Circumstances subsequent, the profound Meditation of *Socrates* in his Way to *Agatho's*, his stealing aside immediately on his Coming there, plainly with Design to finish his Speculations, his staying away till Supper was half over, and during that Stay, the Conversation turning on *Socrates*, as the Principal Person wanting, together with the Impatience of *Agatho* at his Absence, are all contrived on Purpose to raise the Expectation of that great Figure *Socrates* is soon to make, and of that high Part he is to bear in a Conversation, where all the Speakers shine in their several Characters, upon the finest and most interesting Subject in Human Life.

¹⁹ In the Greek ὁ σοὶ προσέειπεν. Perhaps it should be προσέειπεν. Whether *Cornarius* found it so wrote in the *Hessenstein* Manuscript, he has not told us; but he here translates, as if he had, *quæ tibi accessit*.

abound with it into Such as want it, when they fit close to one another and are in Contact; like Water running ²⁰ thro' the Wool out of the fuller Vessel into the emptier. If this Quality attend Wisdom, I shall set a high Value upon partaking of Your Couch: for I shall expect to have Wisdom flow into me from You, in great Quantity, and of a Kind which appears the fairest. As for the little which I have, it must be ²¹ mean and trivial, doubtful and questionable, ²² seem-

ing
²⁰ Διὰ τῆς ἐρίης. 'Tis possible, this may mean a Woollen Bag, made in the Manner of our Flannel Jelly-Bags, to strain and purify the Liquor running through. Or perhaps it means a String of Wool lightly twisted, fastened at one End about the Mouth of the Cock, in a Ewer, or other Vessel out of which the Water is to run, and hanging down into some Basin, or other Receptacle; that the Water, as it runs along, may leave behind it in the Nappiness of the Wool any Dirt or impure Particles with which it may be loaded. This latter Conjecture is made the more probable by the Information we have from a certain Friend, a Man of Credit and Veracity, that in some Parts of *Wiltshire* the like Method is practised, of purifying Water by letting it run down in the Manner we have described, along twisted Wool, which they there call accordingly *the Twist*. *Cornarius* says in his *Eclogæ*, that he cannot conceive what *Wool* could have to do in the Affair; and therefore he supposes, that instead of the Word ἐρίης should be read ἀργάνη, meaning, he says, a *Conduit-Pipe* to convey Water out of one Cistern, when full, into another. But by this Alteration of the Word a very humorous Part of the Similitude is lost; that, which represents Wisdom streaming out of one Man into another, as it were by a strong Transpiration, through their *Woollen* or *Cloth Garments*, being in Contact together.

²¹ See the *Greater Hippias*, pages 124, and 125.

²² *Socrates* taught, that Outward Things, the Objects of Sense, were the Images only of those General Ideas, which are the Objects of Mind.

ing but a Dream. ²³ But the Wisdom, You are Master of, is splendid, and promises a future great Increase of Brightness; having already, in the Morning of your Age, shon out with so much Glory; as more than thirty thousand Grecians, ²⁴ before whom it appeared the other Day, can witness.—You are a Joker, Socrates, said Agatho. But this Controversy between us about our Wisdoms shall be tried by and by, and Bacchus shall decide the Cause. At present, turn your Thoughts to the Table.—Upon this, he told me, Socrates reclined himself, and made his Supper.

After

Mind or Intellect; though, like Images in Dreams, they seemed the very Things themselves. The Sophists of His Time, on the other hand, agreed with the Multitude in maintaining, that Objects of Sense were the only Realitys, and that those Ideal Things, which Socrates cryed up for real and true, were at best but Shadows, Out-lines, or faint Images of the former. So that Each seemed to the Other to be as it were in a Dream, taking the Image for the Substance. Accordingly, it was questioned between them, Who was the Dreamer, and Who had the Perception of a Man whose Mind was truly awake. See a Passage to this Purpose in *Platon. Theætet.* pag. 158. *Edit. Steph.* See also Lib. 5. *de Repub.* pag. 476.

²³ Plato has in his Writings used the Word “Wisdom” in two very different General Senses; the One was the Philosophical Sense of it, as it signify’d the Knowledge of Nature, and of the Principles of Things, the Science of Mind, or Science Universal; the Other was the Vulgar one; the Word being at that time commonly used, as it is in this Place, to signify Excellence in every Particular Science or Art, any Knowledge or Skill beyond Vulgar Attainment. See the former Part of *Plato’s Theages*, and *Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethicks*, L. 6. C. 7. After this Observation made, it will every where be easy to determine, Which Meaning is intended.

²⁴ Those, who were Spectators at the acting of his Tragedy.

After He and the rest of them had done, performed their Libations, sung the Praises of the God, and gone through the other usual Ceremonys, they were beginning to sit in to Drinking : when Pausanias, he said, opened the Conversation thus,— Well, Gentlemen, says he, What Method shall we take, to find most Pleasure in our Bottles to Night ? For my own Part, I confess to you that last Night's Debauch sits very heavy upon Me, and I want a little Respite. I imagine too, that many More of us are in the same Condition, Such as were here at the Entertainment yesterday. Consider therefore what Way is the best, to make Drinking agreeable and easy to us. Aristophanes then said, —'Tis a good Proposal of yours, Pausanias, in My Opinion, This, that we should by all means procure ourselves an easy Drinking-Bout. For I am One of those, who were well soaked Yesterday.—Upon hearing This, Eryximachus the Son of Acumenus said,— Both of you say well. But I should be glad to be informed about One other Person, and that is Agatho ; in what Condition of Strength He finds himself, with regard to Drinking.—I am by no means very strong at present, my Self neither, said Agatho.—'Tis lucky for Us, said Eryximachus, for Me, and Aristodemus, and Phædrus, and the rest of us here, if You fail and are disabled, You stout Men at the Bottle. For We are at all times weak in that respect. Socrates indeed I except ; for He is equally well qualified, to drink, or to let it alone. So that He will be satisfied, and ready to comply, whichever Course

we take. Since None of the Company therefore seem inclined to drink hard, I may be the less displeasing perhaps, if I speak the Truth about this Matter in plain Terms. For I have been convinced, my Self, from the Experience acquired in Our Profession, that hard Drinking is usually attended with ill Consequences. For which Reason, I should neither choose to venture far in drinking, my Self, nor advise it to any other Person, especially when oppressed with the Load of the last Night's Debauch.—As for Me, said Phædrus, addressing himself to Eryximachus, I am accustomed to hearken to Your Advice in every thing, especially in what relates to your own Profession: but now, I find, all the rest of the Company are in the same complying Disposition.—This they all assented to, and agreed not to make the present Meeting a Debauch; but to drink, every Man, just as much as might be agreeable to him.—This Point then being determined, said Eryximachus, that we are to drink at our own Pleasure, and that no Compulsion is to be used; the next Thing I have to offer is This,—that the²⁵ Piper-Girl, who has just now entered the Room, may be dif-

²⁵ It was customary with the Ancients, at or after their Feasts and Banquets, to entertain their Minds without the laborious Exercise of Thinking, through those nobler Senses which have a near Affinity with the Mind; regaling their Ears with Vocal and Instrumental Musick, and their Eyes with Spectacles either beautiful or wonderful. The Performers therefore and Exhibitors in these several Ways used to attend on these Occasions. Accordingly in the *Banquet of Xenophon* One of each Kind is introduced; and after they have all performed their Parts,

dismissed ; to pipe to her Self, or, if she pleases, to the Women in the inner Rooms ; and that We enjoy one another

the Conversation begins.—*Plato* has been accused of Want of Elegance and Politeness in not taking the same Method in *His Banquet*, but dismissing the Female Musician so roughly. Those, who make this Objection, seem not to discern the Difference between the Banquets described by these two Excellent Writers ; nor to be sensible that they framed these, as well as other of their Works, on different Plans, tho' on the same Subjects.—The Guests at the Entertainment given by *Callias*, and described by *Xenophon*, were a Mixed Company, composed partly of *Autolycus* and his Friends ; who either Themselves excelled in *Bodily Exercises*, or admired most the Excellencies of that Kind in Others ; and partly of *Socrates* and His Friends, whose Abilities and Excellencies lay rather another Way, in the *Exercises of the Mind*. Such a promiscuous Assembly it was proper to entertain in the usual Manner.—But the Guests of *Agatho* were a Select Party, who had All a high Relish for the Rational Pleasures of Conversation, Good Sense, Wit and Humour ; and Every one of whom probably expected the Enjoyment of Those Pleasures only that Evening, and to be able afterward to say to each other, like our Poet *Cowley* to his Friend *Harvey*,

*We spent it not in Toys, in Lust, or Wine,
But Search of deep Philosophy,
Wit, Eloquence, and Poetry,
Arts which I lov'd, for they, my Friend, were thine.*

It seems also, as if *Agatho* had assembled them for that very Purpose : for he had the Day before made his Grand Feast, (as it was the Custom to do after a Thanksgiving-Sacrifice,) to which not only his Friends and Intimates, but a Croud of Acquaintance, all Such as were known to him, had been invited ; and where, as it appears, they had drank hard, and consequently conversed little.—Farther ; at *Callias's* Entertainment, in order to furnish Matter for some little Talk, a Proposal was made,

other this Evening in the way of Conversation. The Manner and the Subject, I am ready, if You permit me, to propose.—To this they all unanimously gave Consent, and desired him to propose accordingly.—Eryximachus then said, —I SHALL BEGIN my Proposal after the manner of Euripides in his Prologue to the *Melanippe*, for

²⁶ *The Tale, I have to tell, is not my own;*

I that Each of the Company should declare, *on What he most valued himself, and Why.* This gave Occasion to much Pleasantry, to many ingenious and shrewd Sayings and Repartees, on various Subjects, in few Words: After which, *Socrates* alone made a Discourse, of no considerable Length, on the Subject of Love; to give Time for some short Preparations, making without, for playing an *Interlude* of *Bacchus and Ariadne*. The Whole is short, and ends early enough for Some of the Company to take their accustomed Evening-Walk.—But the Conversation at *Agatho's* had an Air of Solemnity and Formality; as it consisted of Oratorical Speeches, on one Subject, but so ample and diversified in Matter, so prolix, and protracted to so late an Hour of the Night, that a Variety of other Entertainments of a different Kind would have been inconsistent, unnecessary, improper and absurd.

²⁶ The old *Grecian* Tragedys were Dramatic Representations, Each, of some single Event, uncommon, and important, chiefly Such as had happened long before, and made a Part of their Fabulous or Ancient Story: the Whole of which, not being then recorded in any Writings, but handed down through Oral Tradition, was subject to much Variety in the telling. This not only permitted the Tragic Poets great Latitude in the Choice of their Fables, or Fabulous Storys, to represent; but allowed Room also for much Invention of their own; especially with regard to Circumstances, both of Things and Persons, and what had happened previous to those Signal Events celebrated in their Tragedys. Of these Circumstances, and these prior Accidents, which the Poet

made

I have it from Phædrus here. For Phædrus is continually saying to Me, with an Air of Indignation,—Is it not astonishing,

made the Foundation of his Fable, it was necessary to inform the Audience; because they might possibly have heard those Storys related with different Circumstances; and must certainly have been ignorant of Such as were *ignota indictaque*, or of the Poet's own Invention. This was the Rise of *Prologues*; in which the Audience had the necessary Information given them. The Prologue was spoken, now and then in the Person of some Deity, the secret Cause or Leader of the great Event going to be represented; but more frequently in the Dramatic Character of one of the Actors in the Drama: in Either of which Cases the Prologue made a Part of the Play itself. Sometimes, the Player spoke it in his own proper Character of Player, according to the Modern Custom: and very rarely, the Author spoke it himself, appearing openly and professedly as Author; or the Player, appearing for him, as His Representative. An Instance of this Kind is the Case here cited by *Plato*: and the Reason, why *Euripides* chose such a Prologue to his *Melanippe*, probably was This. He had given, it seems, great Offence to the Ladys in that Age, by drawing so many of his Female Characters bad, and making their infamous Actions so frequently the Subject of his Plays. But None of his Characters, except that of *Phædra*, were likely to be thought more injurious to the Sex, than this of *Melanippe*. And in Fact so it proved; for we learn from *Aristophanes* in *Θεσμοφορίαι*, that *Euripides* incurred the Displeasure of the Fair by no Plays more than by these Two. When his *Melanippe* therefore was to be brought upon the Stage, his Business was to ward off this Blow, as well as he was able, by an Apology beforehand. Accordingly, as in his Prologue to the *Hippolytus*, he had artfully made *Venus* take upon her Self the whole Blame of *Phædra*'s unhappy Conduct, so in his Prologue to the *Melanippe*, as appears by the Line here quoted, (for the Prologue and the Play are Both lost,) he humorously excuses and exculpates Himself, by declaring, with an Air of Simplicity, that the Plot of the Play was ready made to his Hands, and that He had no Finger in it;
from

nishing, says he, Eryximachus, that the Poets have made Hymns and Odes in Honour of some Other of the Deitys; and yet not One Poet, amongst so many in every Age, has ever composed a Panegyrick upon Love; but the Praises of a God so powerful, and of so excellent a Nature, to

from whence it was to be concluded, that if *Melanippe* was a Bad Woman, He could not help it. The Verse of *Euripides* seems to have been This,

Ἐμὸς γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μύθου, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν.

Or, if the γὰρ be added by *Plato*, to weave it into his own Style, the Verse probably was This,

Ὁ μύθος ἐκ ἐμῶς ἐστίν, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν.

The intended Application of this Passage out of the Poet is as follows: *Eryximachus*, being of a grave Profession, thought it incumbent on a Man of His Character to apologise in the same Way for introducing such a Proposal as This,—that Love should be the Subject of Discourse that Evening;—a Proposal, which would seem much more decent to be made by the Youthful and Handsome *Phædrus*; to whom therefore he is pleased to attribute it.—That is, in fine, *Plato* himself with infinite Address, as usual, apologises in this manner for making Love the Subject of his Dialogue. For, as he always exhibits his Subject in every Light, which it can possibly be viewed in, and thorowly fits the Nature of it, he could not avoid introducing here, amongst the rest of the Speeches, Those which seemed the most exceptionable. — At the same time also, by beginning like one of the Prologues of *Euripides*, and with a Verse taken from thence, he signifies (to Such as are acquainted with his Manner) his Intention, that this first Speech of *Eryximachus* should be, or be taken for, the Prologue to the following Dramatic Entertainment. See the latter Part of Note 13.

to this Day remain unfung? The same Complaint I have to make against the Sophists: the Best of whom, as you will find, have, in their Prosaic Compositions, made Encomiums on Hercules, and other Great and Illustrious Persons; as the celebrated Prodicus ²⁷ has done, for Instance. This, however, is not greatly to be wondered at. But I have lately met with a Treatise, written by One of those Wise Men, ²⁸ containing a high Panegyrick upon Salt on account of its Utility. ²⁹ And many other Things of
as

²⁷ *Plato* here means the Dissertation of *Prodicus*, intituled Ὀραὶ, so often exhibited, and so much admired; as we learn from *Philostratus* in his *Lives of the Sophists*, and from *Xenophon* in his *Memoirs of Socrates*. The Allegorical Story, or Fable, of the Judgment of Hercules, related in that Dissertation, is recorded by the last mentioned excellent Writer, though, as he tells us Himself, not in the Pompous Words of the Original Author, but in his own Simplicity of Style, much more elegant. Concerning *Prodicus*, see Note 14. to the *Greater Hippias*.

²⁸ The *Greek* of this Passage runs thus,—βιβλίῳ—ἐν ᾧ ἐνῆσαν ἅλεις, ἐπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφέλειαν. In translating which Words into *English*, we have thought it most advisable to follow all the Translators before us into other Languages, just as They seem to have followed one another, down from *Ficinus*; not because we approve their Interpretation, for the *Greek* Words will by no means bear such a one; but because we are at a Loss for the true Meaning, our selves: the Text in this Place being apparently so much corrupted, as to require an abler Critick than we deem our Selves to be, for the Amendment of it.

²⁹ *Erasmus*, in a long List, enumerates Many such, Some as ancient as the Time when *Plato* lived; which he cites as Precedents, in the same Manner, and for the same Reason, that *Plato* speaks of some such here; that is, to introduce with the better Grace, or perhaps to apologize for, a Dissertation of his own of the like Kind, a *Panegyrick on*
Rally

as little Worth you may see set off with great Encomiums. That so much Pains should be bestowed upon Subjects so mean, and yet that no Man should ever to this Day have undertaken to give Love his due Praises, but that so Great a God has been neglected to such a Degree, is it not astonishing?—Now Phædrus, in all This, which I have repeated from His Mouth, seems to Me to plead well. I should be glad therefore to have Him gratified, and to contribute My Share to his Gratification. Besides, that I think it highly becoming This Assembly to decorate with all possible Honours the Deity of Love. If All of you then are of the same Opinion with Me, we may spend our Time agreeably enough to Night in Discoursing. For My Proposal is, that Every Man of us should speak a Speech in Praise of ^{3o} Love, as proper and handsome a one as he is able, the Right Hand Way down; and that Phædrus should take the Lead, as He is at the Upper End, and is, besides, the Father and Founder

Folly: as may be seen in that incomparable Piece of Humour, near the Beginning, and in his *Epistle to Sir Thomas More* prefixed to it.

^{3o} Ἰσέον, ὅτι πάντα οἱ Ἕλληνες, αἱ δύναντες ἔχοντα ἐώρων, ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἐπιστάσεως θεῶν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἐνεργεῖν ἐνόμιζον. ἐνὶ δὲ ὀνόματι τό τε τὴν δύναμιν ἔχον καὶ τὸν ἐπιστάσαντα τῷ τε θεῶν ὀνόμαζον. 'Tis proper to know, that the Greeks held an Opinion, that every Thing in Nature, in which they saw any Power (Force, or Virtue) inherent, exercised not its Power without the Superintendence of the Gods: and also, that they called by one and the same Name that Thing which had the Power and that Deity who presided over it. This Sentence, with which Moscopulus begins his *Commentary on Hesiod*, will serve very properly instead of a Preliminary Note to all the following Speeches concerning Love.

Founder of the Argument.—You may be assured, Eryximachus, said Socrates, that None of Us will put a Negative on your Proposal. For by no means ever should I, ³¹ who pretend not to the Knowledge of any Other Matters, than those which belong to Love: neither would Agatho, nor Pausanias: no more will Aristophanes, without Dispute; for His whole Time is taken up about Bacchus and Venus: nor indeed will any Other Person, whom I see present.—We indeed, who sit lowest, and are to speak last, shall have the Disadvantage. However, if the Prior Speakers speak well and fully to the Point, we shall desire nothing more. Let Phædrus then, with our Best Wishes to attend him, begin, and make his Panegyrick upon Love.—To This all the rest of the Company consented, and joined with Socrates in the encouraging Phædrus to begin. Now what was said by Each of the several Speakers, Aristodemus did not perfectly remember; neither can I indeed, All that He told me: but the Speeches of Those whom I looked on as the most considerable Persons, and every thing which I thought most worth remembering, I will endeavour to relate to you distinctly.

He told me then, that Phædrus, in Compliance with the Request made him, spoke First; and began, somewhat in this way, with saying —

The

³¹ From the Conclusion of the Speech, hereafter spoken by *Socrates*, it will appear What his Meaning is in this Place.

THE SPEECH OF PHÆDRUS.

³² that LOVE was Powerful, and wonderfully Great, both on Earth and amongst the Gods: that superior Dignity belonged to him on many accounts, but especially with regard to his Generation.—³³ FOR to be One of the Eldest

³² The Beginning of *Phædrus's* Speech is not recited in the very Words of it, but is related in the Way of Narration: by which means the Transition from the Narrative Style to the Oratorical, and from the preceding Narration to the first Formal Speech, is made the more gentle, easy, and elegant.

³³ We cannot illustrate this first Part of the Speech of *Phædrus* better, than by the two following Quotations: the First from *Aristotle*, who, in the 3d Chapter of the 1st Book of his *Metaphysics* having shown the Necessity, which the Physiologists at length found themselves under, of supposing, beside the *Material Principles* of the Universe, both the *Active* and the *Passive*, some Other from whence Universal Motion might begin, a Principle, whose Nature it was to be the *Beginning of Motion* always, of a Motion not irregular and wild, but *orderly*, tending to operate *Beauty* and produce *Good*, continues his Subject in the next Chapter thus, — Ὑποπλεύσειε δ' ἂν τις Ἡσίοδον πρῶτον ζηῆσαι τὸ τοιῦτον, κ' ἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος ἔρωλα ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐν τοῖς ἔσιν ἔθηκεν ὡς ἀρχὴν, οἷον καὶ Παρμενίδης. καὶ γὰρ ἔτος καλᾶσκευάζων τὴν τῷ παντὸς γένεσιν, “ Πρώτισον μὲν, φησιν, ἔρωλα θεῶν μῆσις αἰὼ πάντων.” Ἡσίοδος δὲ, “ Πάντων μὲν πρώτισα χάος γένητ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα Γαῖ' εὐρύς τερος, — Ἡδ' ἔρος, “ ὅς πάντεσσι μελαπρέπει ἀθανάτοισιν.” ὡς δέον ἐν τοῖς ἔσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ αἰτίαν, ἥτις κινήσει καὶ συνέξει τὰ πράγματα. It may reasonably be presumed, that Hesiod was the first Writer who considered such a Moving Cause in Nature; and that the same Notion has been entertained by every other Writer since, who has supposed Love or Desire to be a Principle in Things: for instance, by Parmenides. For He, in describing the Generation of the Universe, says,

First

THE BANQUET. 51

Eldest of the Gods, said he, is a Circumstance redounding highly to his Honour. And that he enjoys this Advantage, appears in that he had no Parents; and that never any Writer, whether Uninspired, or Poet, pretended that he had. But Hesiod says,—

H 2

Eldest

*First from th' Eternal Counsel forth came Love,
First of the Gods. ———*

The Words of *Hesiod* are these,

*Eldest of All was Chaos; Earth rose next,
Wide-bosom'd, ———
————— and with Her rose Love,
Supreme amongst the Gods, excelling All.*

Words, which imply the Necessity of some Cause subsisting amongst Things, for the moving and holding together of them all. The other Quotation shall be from a learned Greek, the Interpreter of the Allegorys in Hesiod's Theogony, pag. 238. a. ex Edit. Heinsii. It is this; — "Ἐρώλα δὲ ἐνταῦθα νοήσον, ἔ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης παῖδα· πῶς γὰρ τῆς μητρὸς μήπω γεγυνίας, ἔτος παράγει· ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινα πρεσβυγενῆ ἔρωλα ἐκληπίον. οἶμαι δὲ τὴν ἐγκαλεσπαρμένην φυσικῶς κινητικὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάσῳ τῶν ὄντων, καθ' ἣν ἐφίεται ἕκασον τῷ εἶναι· τὸ μὲν, νοερώς· τὸ δὲ, αἰσθητικῶς· δεῖ γὰρ προὔποκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐν ἐκάσῳ ἐπιηδειότηλα καὶ ὁρμὴν, πρὸς τὸ, τόδε τι γενέσθαι. By Love in this place we are to understand, not the Child of Venus; for how can He be introduced, at the time when his Mother (that is, the Order of Things, or Beauty of the Universe) did not as yet exist? but some Elder Love must be supposed here meant; signifying, as I apprehend, that Moving Cause (or Principle) naturally implanted in every Being, to which is owing that Each aims at the Perfection of some Form, either Intelligent or Sentient. For, previous to the Attainment of any Particular Form, there must be supposed in every Being, as a necessary Foundation, an Aptitude and a Tendency to attain such Form.

*Eldest of All was Chaos ; Earth rose next,
Wide-bosom'd, a fix'd Seat secure to All
For ever yielding ; and with Her rose Love.*

Here the Poet tells us, that next after Chaos were born these Two, Earth and Love. — Parmenides relates the Generation thus,

*First from th' eternal Counsel forth came Love,
First of the Gods. —*

Acufilaus says the same Thing with Hesiod. — ³⁴ On so many different Hands is it agreed, that Love is among the most

³⁴ This Expression may seem strange, when only Three Writers have been cited. But Each of them, on account of his Excellence, stands as at the Head of a numerous Tribe ; and may therefore justly be supposed, and taken for, the Representative of that Tribe to which he belongs. *Hesiod* is singled out from amongst all the Poets, to be cited, as being the Best of Those who composed Poems *περὶ θεογονίας* or *περὶ κοσμογονίας*, concerning the Generation of the Gods, or the Origin of the Universe. His beautiful Poem on that Subject, from whence the Quotation here is made, is still extant. — *Parmenides*, a Philosopher of the *Italic* Sect, (concerning which see Note 14. to the *Lesser Hippias*,) wrote in Verse, as did also most of the Disciples of the same School ; but, on account of his superior Reputation, is chosen to represent all his Brother-Philosophers, who taught the Principles of Things. — And *Acufilaus*, a Writer unfortunately lost, who treated of the first or most remote Antiquitys, and the Genealogys of the Gods and Heroes, being of the highest Credit with all Lovers of that Learning, stands for the whole Body of *Antiquarians*, particularly for Such as dealt in *Fables* or *Allegorys*, which in After-Ages were explained by the *Mythologists*.

most Ancient of the Gods. — And as he is thus of highest Antiquity in the Nature of Things, so is he Cause of the greatest Good to Human Kind. For to Young Persons, at their first setting out in Life, I know no greater Good than Love; to the Party Beloved, if she has a worthy Lover; or to the Lover himself, if his Mistress be worthy: because That, which should be our Leading Principle in order to Right Conduct, in every Circumstance of Life, not Con-sanguinity has Power to excite in us, neither have Ho-nours, nor Riches, nor Aught else, so effectually as Love. The Principle I mean, is the Sense of Shame attending a Base Conduct, together with a Sense of Honour in the do-ing what is Honorable. For without such a Principle, no Civil Community nor Private Person can execute any thing great or noble. In Confirmation of this, I take upon me to assert, that if a Man in Love be found committing a base Action, or suffering base Usage from Any, thro' Cowardice or without taking his Revenge, he is not in so much Pain at being seen by his Father, by his Intimates, or by any Other Person, as at being seen by his Mistress. The same Effect we see it has upon the Party Beloved, to be more ashamed of her Lover's Sight than of the Eyes of the whole World, if she be discovered doing aught dishonorable. If therefore there could be any Contrivance to have a City or an Army composed of Lovers and their Beloved, the In-terest of the Whole could not be promoted by any better Way than this; in which every Individual would have a

Care

Care not to behave basely, and a Zeal to behave nobly, excited by a Desire to gain the Good Opinion of some Other. Such a People, fighting Side by Side in Battle, a Handful of them, would conquer—I could almost say—the World. For a Lover deserting his Rank, or throwing down his Arms, would less endure to be seen by his Beloved, than by all Mankind. Rather than bear this, he would choose to dye a thousand Deaths: ³⁵ so would he, rather than forsake the Defence of his Beloved, or rather than forbear flying to her Aid, if she had fallen into Danger. —There is not any Man such a Dastard, whom Love himself would not inspire, and make an Enthusiast in Virtue: so that he should become equal to a Man born with a Disposition the most excellent. For what Homer says of certain of his Heroes, that ³⁶ some God inspired them with a Force resistless, This in reality Love does to Lovers; such an Effect being produced in them by Love alone.—And then, to dye for Another, only Lovers are ready; not only Men, but Women too. A signal Instance of This appears in the Daughter of Pelias, Alcestis; who, as the Story goes among the Grecians, undertook to reprieve her Husband's Life by her

³⁵ In the *Greek* Text of this Passage, καὶ μὴν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν, there is a manifest Omission of the very material Word ἢ, or some Other equivalent to it, immediately before the Word ἐγκαταλιπεῖν.

³⁶ The Passage, particularly alluded to, ἐμπνευσε μένος, is in the Twentieth Book of the *Iliad*, v. 110. But Expressions of the same Import occur in many other Places of *Homer*, such as ἦκε μένος, ὥρσε μένος, &c.

her own Death, ³⁷ when no other Mortal could be found, willing to dye for him, tho' he had both a Father and a Mother then living. But Love wrought in Her Heart an Affection for him so far surpassing Theirs, that she proved Them to be, in comparison with her Self, Strangers to his Blood, and in Name only his Relations. When therefore she had executed her Undertaking, the Gods themselves, as well as Men, deemed the Atchievement so singularly noble, that out of Many Persons, eminent for many Virtues, She was added to the Number of those Select Few, distinguished by being restored to Life again after Death, as a Reward for their distinguished Excellence: For to Her also was her de-

³⁷ The Thought in this Sentence is evidently taken from the *Alceſtis* of *Euripides*; in the Prologue to which are these Lines,

Πάντας δ' ἐλέγξας καὶ διεξελθὼν φίλους,
Πατέρα, γεραιάν θ' ἢ σφ' ἔτικτε μητέρα,
Οὐχ' εὔρε πλὴν γυναικὸς, ἥτις ἤθελε
Θανεῖν πρὸ κείνης —

*He try'd his Friends all round, their Love profess'd
Proving how real; his Father who begat,
His Mother fond who bore him; yet found None,
None but the faithful Partner of his Bed,
Content to die, His dearer Life to save.*

The next Sentence alludes to some Passages in the Scene between *Admetus* and his Father *Pheres* in the same Play: to which we refer Such of our Readers as study Oratory, and know the Usefulness of comparing together Passages in fine Writers, where different Turns are given to a Thought fundamentally the same.

departed Soul sent back again by the Gods, admiring at the Heroic Greatness of her Resolution. So much do they encourage us to make Love our Care, by bestowing Superior Honours on all Such, as exercise upon that Subject in particular Superior Virtue. But Orpheus, the Son of Oeager, the Gods dismissed from those Invifible Regions, without granting him to fucceed in the Purpose of his Journey thither; fhewing him only the Phantom of his Wife, but not restoring to him the Reality: for that he appeared effeminate and cowardly, fuitable to his Profession, that of a meer Fidler; not daring to dye for the fake of Love, like Alceftis; but contriving actually to go alive to the Other World. For This did the Gods affign him an adequate Punifhment, ordaining his Death to be by Women. In a very different Way difpofed they of Achilles, the Son of Thetis, in fending Him to the Iflands of the Bleft: becaufe, ³⁸ tho' he had heard from the Goddefs his Mother, that he muft foon dye Himfelf, after he had flain Hector; but that if he flew not Hector, he fhould return home, and live to a good old Age, he dared to make Death his Choice; not only hazarding his Life in Aid of his Friend Patroclus, as ready to dye that he might fave him, but afterwards avenging his Death at the Expence of his own Life, as refolute not to furvive him. This exalted Virtue of his the Gods paid a fingular Regard to; and rewarded with their choicest Favours the Regard which He had fhown to Friendship, in

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fetting

³⁸ See *Homer's Iliad*, Book 18th.

setting so high a Value on the Man who admired and loved him. For Æschylus talks idly, when he says that Achilles was the Admirer of Patroclus; Achilles, whose Excellence, tho' he was but in the Dawn of Manhood, surpassed, not only Patroclus, but all the other Grecian Heroes. — True it is, that the Gods confer superior Honours on all Virtue, to the Exercise of which Love and Friendship minister Occasion: but they more wonder, more approve, and bestow greater Rewards, where the Person Admired feels all the Force of Friendship and Affection for the Admirer, than where the noblest Offices of Friendship are performed by the Other Party. For the Admirer has more of Divinity in him than the Person Admired, as being full of the God who inspires and possesses him. For this Cause did the Gods reward Achilles with a higher Degree of Happiness than they did Alcestis; for to Her they gave only a second Life on Earth, but to the Hero they assigned his Mansion in the Islands of the Blest.—Thus have I performed My Part, in asserting Love to be the Eldest in Age, and of highest Dignity, amongst the Gods; and to be in a peculiar manner the Author of Virtue and Happiness to All of Human Kind, whilst they continue in Life, and when Departed.

Such, Aristodemus told me, was the Discourse, made by Phædrus. After Phædrus, spoke some Others, whose Speeches, he said, he did not well remember: omitting These therefore, he repeated next That of Pausanias; who began thus:—

THE SPEECH OF PAUSANIAS.

IN MY OPINION, Phædrus, the Subject was not fairly and distinctly set before us, when it was proposed in General Terms, that we should make Encomiums upon Love. This indeed would have been right, were there but One Love, or if Love were but of One Kind. But since the Truth is otherwise, the better Way is to declare first, Which Love it is our present Business to praise. To put this Matter therefore on a right Footing, I shall in the first place distinguish That Love, whose Praises we ought to celebrate; and then do my Best to celebrate them, my Self, in a Manner worthy of his Deity.—We all know, that 'tis the Office of Love to attend always upon Venus. If then there were only One Venus, there had been no Occasion for more than One Love. But since there are Two Venuses, there must of Necessity be Two Loves. For 'tis undeniable,³⁹ that Two different Goddesses there are, Each of whom

is

³⁹ This Distinction between the Two Venuses, laid down by *Pausanias* as the Foundation of his Argument throughout his Speech, is not a fanciful one of his own; but is a Part of that Mythology, which the great Lord *Bacon* styles the *Wisdom of the Ancients*. It is sufficiently confirmed and illustrated by the following Passage in *Xenophon's Symposium*; a Sentence which he puts into the Mouth of *Socrates*. Εἰ μὲν ἓν μία ἔστιν Ἀφροδίτη, ἢ διτταὶ, ἑρᾶν τε καὶ πάνδημος, ἔκ οἶδα· (καὶ γὰρ Ζεὺς, ὁ αὐτὸς δοκῶν εἶναι, πολλὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει·) ὅτι γε μέντοι χωρὶς ἐκάλερα βωμοὶ τε εἰσὶ καὶ ναοὶ καὶ θυσαίαι, τῇ μὲν πάνδημῳ ῥαδιουργότεραι, τῇ δ' ἑρᾶν ἀγνότεραι, οἶδα. εἰκάσαις δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐρώσεως τὴν μὲν πάνδημον τῶν ζωμάτων ἐπιπέμπειν, τὴν δ' ἑρᾶν τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων.

Now,

is a Venus: One of them Elder, who had no Mother ⁴⁰, and was born only from Uranus, or Heaven, her Father; She is called the Celestial Venus: the Other, Younger, ⁴¹ Daughter of Jupiter and Dione; and to Her we give the Name of the Vulgar Venus. Agreeably to this Account, 'tis proper to call That Love, who attends on the Latter Venus, by the Name of the Vulgar Love, the Other by the Name of the Celestial. All the Gods indeed our Duty it is to honour with our Praises: but we ought to distinguish, as well as we are able, Each by his peculiar Attributes; that we may give to Each his due Praise. For every Action or Operation is attended with this Condition; — the

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Now, whether in reality there be One Venus only, or whether there be Two, a Celestial Venus and a Vulgar one, I know not: (for Jupiter also, whom I presume to be but One and the Same Being, has many Surnames given him :) but This I know, that Altars are raised, Temples built, and Sacrifices offered to each of these Two Venuses distinctly; to the Vulgar one, Such as are common, trivial, and of little Worth; to the Celestial one, Such as are more valuable, pure, and holy. Agreeably to This, it may be supposed of the different Loves, that Those of the Corporeal or Sensual Kind are inspired by the Vulgar Venus; but that Love of the Mind, and Friendship, a Delight in fair and comely Deeds, and a Desire of performing such our Selves, are inspired by Venus the Celestial.

⁴⁰ See Hesiod's Theogony, or Account of the Generation of the Gods, v. 180, & seq. But the Celestial Venus, meant in this place, is that Portion of the Universal Beauty, which is imparted to the Human Mind with its Ideas, and to the Human Soul with its Temper and Affections: and the Name of the Vulgar Venus is here given to Beauty merely Outward and Corporeal, in Living Forms, but without Correspondence with, or Reference to, any thing Beautiful within. See Note 46. to the Greater Hippias.

⁴¹ See Cicero de Naturâ Deorum, L. 3. n. 23. Ed. Davis.

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Doing it, considered simply in its self, is neither base nor honorable; as for Instance, ⁴² every one of the Things we are now doing, Drinking, Singing, or Discourfing, is in its self a matter of Indifference; but the Manner of doing it determines the Nature of the Thing. Rightly performed, it is right and honorable; performed in a wrong Manner, it is wrong and dishonorable. So likewise not every Love is generous or noble, or merits high Encomiums; but That Love only, who prompts and impels Men to love generously and nobly. The Attendant of the Vulgar Venus is a Love truly Vulgar, suffering himself to be employed in any the meanest Actions: and This Love it is, who inspires the Mean and the Worthless. Those, who are the most addicted to This Love, are, in the first place, the least disposed to Friendship:—in the next place, they are more enamoured of the Bodys than of the Minds of their Paramours:—and besides, they choose for the Objects of their Passion the fillest Creatures they can light on: for, confining their Views to the Gratification of their Passion by the Act of Enjoyment, they are regardless in what Manner they gratify it, whether basely or honorably. Hence it comes, that in the Pursuit of their Loves, and afterwards in the Enjoyment, they are equally ready for any Action which offers itself, whether Good or Bad, indifferently. For the Love, who

⁴² In the *Greek*, instead of οἷον, ὃ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, we suppose, it ought to be read οἷον, ὧν νῦν η. π., For the Sentence thus proceeds, ἢ πίνειν, ἢ ἄδειν, ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, (in every one of which Verbs the Article τῷ seems to be implied,) ἔκ ἐστὶ τέτων αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καλὸν εἶδεν.

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who inspires them, is born of that Younger Venus, in whose Generation there is a Mixture of the Male and the Female; whence it is, that she partakes of Both. But the Other Love is sprung from the Celestial Venus; from Her, whose Propertys are these:— in the first place, she partakes not of the Female, but of the Male only; whence she is the Parent of Friendship:— then, she is in Age the Elder, and a Stranger to Brutal Lust: and hence it comes, that as many as are inspired by This Love, addict themselves to Friendship, conceiving an Affection for That, which by Nature is of greater Strength and Understanding. — Now, whether the Man, who is under the Influence of Love, feels the genuine Impulse of This generous Affection, is easy to discern. For, if so, he fixes not his Love on any Person, who is not arrived at the Maturity of her Understanding. But commencing their Loves from This Date, one may well presume them duly qualified, Both of them, to live together throughout Life, Partners in all things. Nor is the Lover likely, in this Case, to act like One, who, after discovering some Childish Folly in the Person he has chosen, exposes her, and turns her into Ridicule, forfeits his Faith to her and forsakes her, and attaches himself to a new Mistress. To prevent this, there ought to be a Law, that no Man should make Choice of too Young a Person for the Partner of his Bed; because, What so young a Person may hereafter prove, whether Good or Bad, either in Mind or Body, the Event is so uncertain. Men of Vir-

ture indeed Themselves to Themselves make This a Law : but upon those Vulgar Lovers we should put a Public Restraint of this Kind ; in the same manner as we restrain them, as much as possible, from entering into Amorous Intrigues with any Women above the Rank of Servitude. For they are of This Sort of Lovers, They, who bring upon their Mistresses Reproach and Shame ; and have given Occasion to that Verse of one of the Poets, in which he has dared to vilify the Power of Love, by pronouncing

*'Tis Loss of Honour to the Fair,
To yield, and grant the Lover's Pray'r.*

But he said This, only with a View to Lovers of This Kind, from seeing their untimely Haste and Eagerness, their Ingratitude and Injustice. For certainly no Action, governed by the Rules of Justice and of Decency, can any way merit Blame. Now, the Rules concerning Love, established in other States, are easy to be understood, as being plain and simple : but our own Laws, and those of Sparta, upon this Head are complex and intricate. ⁴³ For in Elis, and amongst

⁴³ 'Tis remarkable, that *Xenophon* in his *Banquet*, where he distinguishes between the *Virtuous Friendship* established among the *Spartans*, and the *Libidinous Commerce* authorised by Fashion and common Practice amongst the *Bæotians* and *Eleans*, cites this *Pausanias*, as One who had confounded them together, and given them equal Praises. He there likewise attributes to *Pausanias* some of the same Sentiments, and those of the most striking Kind, which *Plato* records as delivered by

Phædrus

amongst the Bœotians, and in every other Grecian State where the Arts of Speaking flourish not, ⁴⁴ the Law in such Places absolutely makes it honorable to gratify the Lover: nor can any Person there, whether Young or Old, stain such a Piece of Conduct with Dishonour: the Reason of which Law, I presume, is to prevent the great Trouble they would otherwise have, in courting the Fair, and trying to win them by the Arts of Oratory, Arts, in which they have no Abilities. But in Ionia, ⁴⁵ and many other Places, and in all Barbarian Countrys

Phædrus in His Speech. We cannot help imagining, that *Xenophon*, in citing *Pausanias*, alludes to what was said at *Agatho's* Entertainment: and if our Conjecture be true, That little Circumstantial Difference confirms the Account given by *Plato* in the main, and argues it to have some Foundation at least in real Fact.

⁴⁴ The Word *Law* here, and wherever else it occurs in this Speech, from hence to the End of it, means not a Written Law, a Positive Precept or Prohibition in express Terms; but *Custom* and *Fashion*. For the General Acceptance of any Rule of Conduct, whether Rational or not, obtains by Length of Time the *Authority of Law* with the People who follow it; as it receives the *Essence of Law*, in a Civil Sense, from the Common Consent which first established it.

⁴⁵ The *Greek* Text in this place is greatly corrupted. *Stephens* has tried to amend it by some Alterations, but without Success: for 'tis probable, that more than a few Words are wanting. We have therefore contented our selves with the Sense of this Passage; which we think mis-represented by the former Translators. For by the "many other Places" we imagine that *Plato* means, besides *Sicily*, (where in those Days Tyranny, or *Arbitrary Sway*, commonly prevailed,) all those Northern Parts of *Greece* likewise, where the Government was absolutely Monarchical. For *Ionia*, *Sicily*, and all Places where the *Greek Language* was spoken by the People, *Plato* would certainly distinguish from those

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Countrys universally, the same Conduct is ordained and held to be dishonorable. For the Tyrannical Governments, under which the People of those Countrys live, discountenance that Way of mutual Love and bring it into Disrepute. But the same Fate in those Countrys attends Philosophy, or the Love of Wisdom; as it does no less the Love of Manly Exercises. And the Reason, I presume, in all these Cases, is the same;—it is not the Interest of the Rulers there to have their Subjects high-spirited or high-minded; nor to suffer strong Friendships to be formed amongst them, or any other Tyes of a common or joint Interest: and these are the usual and natural Effects of Love, as well as of those other Studys and Practices prohibited by Tyrants. —Those, who formerly tyrannised over Athens, experienced This to be true. For the firm and stable Friendship between ⁴⁶ Aristogiton and Harmodius was the Destruction of Their Tyranny.—Thus we find, that wherever the stricter Tyes of Love and Friendship are forbidden or discouraged, 'tis owing to Vice; to Lust of Power, and of whatever is the Private Interest of the Governor; to Want of Spirit and Courage, and every other Virtue in the Governed: and that wherever they are enjoined or encouraged simply and without Restriction, 'tis owing to a Littleness and Laziness of
of those Countrys where the *Vulgar Language* was *different*; these last being by the *Grecians* termed *Barbarian*.

⁴⁶ The Story is told by *Thucydides*, and many other Ancient Writers; but in a Manner the most agreeable to the Mind of our Author in this place, by *Herodotus*.

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of Soul in those who have the Making of the Laws.—But in our own State the Laws relating to this Point are put upon a better Footing; tho', as I said before, it is not obvious or easy to comprehend their Meaning. For when we consider, — that with Us it is reputed honorable for Men openly to profess Love, rather than to make a Secret of it; and to fix their best Affections on Such as excel in the Accomplishments of Mind, tho' inferior to Others of their Sex in Outward Beauty; — that Every one highly favours and applauds the Lover, as not thinking him engaged in any Designs which are base or unbecoming a Man; — that Success in Love is held an Honour to the Lover; Disappointment, a Dishonour; — and that the Law allows the Lover Liberty to do his Utmost for the accomplishing his End; and permits such strange Actions to be commended in Him, such, as were a Man to be guilty of in any other Pursuit than that of Love, and as the Means of succeeding in any other Design, he would be sure of meeting with the highest Reproaches from Philosophy. For if, with a View either of getting Money out of any Person, or of attaining to any Share in the Government, or of acquiring Power of any other Kind, a Man should submit to do such Things, as Lovers ordinarily practise to gain their Mistresses, supplicating and begging in the humblest Manner, making Vows and Oaths, keeping Nightly Vigils at their Doors, and voluntarily stooping to Such Slavery, as no Slave would undergo, both his Friends and his Enemys would prevent him from

so doing ; his Enemys, reproaching him for his Servility and Illiberality ; his Friends, admonishing him and ashamed for him. But in a Lover all This is graceful ; and the Law grants him free Leave to do it uncensured, as a Business highly commendable for him to undertake and execute. But that, which is more than all the rest prodigious, is, that the Gods, tho' they pardon not the Crime of Perjury in Any besides, yet excuse in a Lover the Violation of his Oath ;—if the Opinion of the Multitude be true ; for Oaths in Love, they say, are not binding. Thus the Gods, as well as Men, give all Kinds of Licence to the Lover ;—as says the Law, established in Our State.—Viewing now the Affair in This Light, a Man would imagine, that among Us not only Love in the Lover, but a grateful Return likewise from the Beloved Party, was reputed honorable. — But when we see the Parents of the Youthful Fair appointing Governesses and Guardians over them, who have it in their Instructions not to suffer them to hold Discourse in Private with their Lovers ;—when we see their Acquaintance, and their Equals in Age, and Other People besides, censuring them, if they are guilty of such a Piece of Imprudence, — and the Old Folks not opposing the Censurers, nor reprehending them as guilty of Unjust Censures ;— in This View, a Man would be apt to think, that on the contrary we condemned those very Things which he might otherwise suppose we had approved of.—But upon the Whole, the Case, I believe, stands thus : the Affair of Love, as I said at first, considered simply

ply and generally, is neither right nor wrong ; but carried on and accomplished with Honour, is fair and honorable ; transacted in a dishonorable Manner, is base and dishonorable. Now 'tis a Dishonor to a Maiden to gratify a Vicious and Bad Lover, or to yield to him from base and unworthy Motives : but in granting Favours to a Good and Virtuous Lover, and complying with his Love from generous and noble Views, she does her self an Honour. The Vicious Lover is He of the Vulgar Sort, who is in Love with the Body rather than the Mind. For he is not a Lasting Lover, being in Love with ⁴⁷ a Thing which is not Last-

⁴⁷ *Diogenes Laertius*, in his Life of *Plato*, has preserved a little Sonnet, (for we know not by what other Name to call it,) written by *Plato* in his younger Time of Life ; in which he imitates the Spirit of this Sort of Gallantry. As it expresses a Sentiment common to such transient Lovers in all Ages and Countrys, and has with some Variation been copied by many succeeding Poets, it may perhaps not look strange in an *English* Dress, tho' a *Deshabille* somewhat loose, and too large for a fine *Attic* Shape.

1.

*Take the Gift that I bestow,
Catch this Apple that I throw;
Part of the Heap, my Fairest, see,
The Heap I've treasur'd up for Thee.*

2.

*Take it; and my offer'd Love
If, beside, thou dost approve,
In kind Return to my blest Arms
Yield up the Treasure of thy Charms.*

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3.

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Laſting. Since, with the Flower of Youth ⁴⁸ when That is gone which he admired, the Lover himſelf too takes Wing and flys away, ſhaming all his fine Speeches and fair Promiſes. But the Man, who is in Love with his Miſtreſs's Moral Character, when her Diſpoſition and Manners are ſettled in what is right, He is a Lover who abides thro' Life, as being united with That which is durable and abiding. Our Law wills accordingly, that all Lovers ſhould be well and fairly proved; and that, after ſuch Probation, upon Some the Favours of the Fair ſhould be beſtowed, to Others they ſhould be conſtantly reſuſed. It encourages there-

^{3.}
But if (how that But I hate!
Be it not confirm'd by Fate!)
Thou favour'ſt not my amorous Suit,
Still take my Preſent of the Fruit:

^{4.}
Think, when thou behold'ſt its Bloom,
What to-morrow 'twill become:
Think, that if eaten not to-Day,
To Teeth of Time 'twill fall a Prey.

⁴⁸ The Greek of this Paſſage, ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τῆ ζώματός ἀνθεὶ λήγοντι, ἔπερ ἦρα, we have tranſlated according to the following minute Alteration of only one Word, ἅμα γὰρ — ἀνθεὶ, λήγοντος ἔπερ ἦρα. The very next Words, οἵχεται ἀποπλάμενος allude to a Verſe of Homer's, the 71ſt in the Second Book of the *Iliad*; where he ſpeaks of the Departure of the Dream, ſent to *Agamemnon*. By which Alluſion *Plato* teaches the Fair and Young, that the Promiſes of ſuch Lovers, as are here ſpoken of, are flattering and deceitful, and like that False Dream, tend only to delude and ruin.

therefore the Lover to pursue, but bids the Beloved Party fly : by all Ways of Trial, and in every Kind of Combat, making it appear of Which Sort the Lover is, and of Which Sort his Mistress. For this Reason it is, that the Law deems it dishonorable, in the first place, to be won soon or easily ; in order that Time may be gained ; for of the Truth of many Things Time seems to be the fairest Test : in the next place 'tis held dishonorable for the Fair-one to be won by Considerations of Profit or Power ; whether she be used ill, or terrified, and therefore yield, thro' Want of noble Endurance ; or whether she be flattered with Riches or Rank, and despise not such Kind of Obligations. For none of these Things appear fixed or durable ; much less can they give Rise to any Generous Friendship. There remains then one only Way, in which, according to Our Law, the Fair-one may honorably yield, and consent to her Lover's Passion. For, as any Kind of Servitude, which the Lover undergoes of his own free Choice in the Service of his Mistress, is not by Our Law deemed Adulation, nor accounted a Matter of Disgrace ; so on the other Part, there is left only one other Servitude or Compliance, not disgraceful in the Fair ; and this is That which is for the sake of Virtue. For 'tis a settled Rule with Us, that whoever pays any Court or Attendance, whoever yields any Service or Compliance to Another, in Expectation of receiving by His Means Improvement in Wisdom, or in any other Branch of Virtue, is not by such voluntary Subjection guilty of Servility.

lity or base Adulation. Now these two Rules are to correspond one with the other, and must concur to the same End, the Rule relating to Lovers, and This which concerns Philosophy and every other Part of Virtue, in order to make it honorable in the Fair-one to comply with her Lover's Passion. For when the Lover and his Mistress meet together, bringing with them their respective Rules, Each of them ; the Lover, His, — that 'tis right to minister any way to the Service of his Mistress ;—the Fair-one, Hers,— that 'tis right to yield any Service or Compliance to the Person who improves her in Wisdom and in Virtue ;—the One also, with Abilitys to teach and to make better ;—the Other, with a Desire of Instruction and the being bettered ;—then, Both those Rules thus corresponding and conspiring, in these Circumstances only, and in no other, it falls out, by a Concurrence of all the necessary Requisites, to be honorable in the Fair-one to gratify her Lover. Besides, in This Case, 'tis no Dishonor to her to be deceived : but in the Case of Compliance on any other Terms, she incurs Shame equally, whether she be deceived, or not. For if, on a Supposition of her Lover's being wealthy, she yields to him with a View of enriching herself, but is disappointed, and gets Nothing from her Paramour, whom at length she discovers to be poor, 'tis not at all the less dishonorable to Her ; because such a Woman discovers openly her own Heart, and makes it appear, that for the sake of Wealth she would yield Any Thing to Any Person : and This is highly dishonorable and

and base. But if, imagining her Lover to be a Good Man, and with a View to her own Improvement in Virtue thro' the Friendship of her Lover, she yields to him, and is deceived, finding him a Bad Man, unpossessed of Virtue, her Disappointment, however, is still honorable to Her: for a Discovery has been also made of Her Aims; and it has appeared evident, that as a Means to acquire Virtue and to be made Better, She was ready to resign to Any Man her All: and This is of all things the most generous and noble. So intirely and absolutely honorable is it in the Fair-one to comply for the sake of Virtue. This is That Love, the Offspring of the Celestial Venus, himself Celestial; of high Importance to the Public Interest, and no less valuable to Private Persons; compelling as well the Lover, as the Beloved, with the utmost Care to cultivate Virtue. All the other Loves hold of the Other Venus, of Her the Vulgar. — Thus much, Phædrus, have I to contribute, on this sudden Call, to the Subject you have proposed to us, the Praise of Love.

Paufanias here pausing,—for I learn from the Wise to use ⁴⁹ Paritys in speaking, and Words of Similar Sound;—
Aristo-

⁴⁹ See the *Argument* of this Dialogue, page 7. and Note 10. to the *Greater Hippias*. These little Ornaments of Style were introduced into Oratory, and taught first by *Gorgias*; who 'tis probable had observed them There, where every Beauty and Ornament of Speech great or little is to be found, that is, in *Homer*. *Isocrates*, who had studied the Art of Oratory under *Gorgias*, seems to have received from Him, what
I his.

Aristodemus told me, it came next in Turn to Aristophanes to speak : but whether from Repletion, or whatever else was the Cause, he happened to be seized with a ⁵⁰ Fit of the Hiccups, and consequently became unfit for Speech-making. Upon which, as he sat next to Eryximachus the Physician, he addressed him thus — Eryximachus, says he, you must either drive away my Hiccups, or speak in My Turn, till they have left me.—To which Eryximachus replied,

his own Judgment when mature afterwards rejected, the immoderate and ill-timed Use of those superficial Ornaments. The foregoing Speech of *Pausanias*, in Imitation of *Isocrates*, abounds with various Kinds of them, and those the most puerile and petty ; which it was impossible for Us to preserve or imitate, in translating those Passages into *English* ; because, tho' all Languages admit them, yet every Language varies from every other in the Signification of almost all those Words where they are found. An Instance of this appears in the Passage now before us ; where the *Greek*, Πausανίης δὲ παυσάμενος, translated justly, runs thus, “ *When Pausanias had ceased speaking,*” that is, had ended his Speech. But all *Similarity of Sound* would thus entirely be destroyed. As therefore it was necessary, in this Place, to preserve it in some measure, however imperfectly ; we found ourselves obliged, here, to make *Sense* give Way to *Sound*.

⁵⁰ Besides the General Reason for this little Episode, common to it with the others in this Dialogue, given in the *Argument*, page 13. it is finely contrived, with a Design to set *Aristophanes* in a ridiculous Light, and prepare us for the ridiculous Speech he is too soon to make. Probably also it is farther intended by *Plato*, to revenge the unjust Ridicule thrown on *Socrates* by that Poet. At the same time it places *Eryximachus* in a respectable View, as a Man of Knowledge and Skill in his Profession, tho' shown but in a slight Case ; thus preparing us for a Speech from Him very different from that of *Aristophanes*, a Speech grave and full of Science.

plied,—Well ; I will do Both. I will speak in Your Turn, and You, when your Hiccups are gone, shall speak in Mine : and while I am speaking, if You hold your Breath for a considerable Time, your Hiccups perhaps will have an End. Should they continue notwithstanding, then gargle your Throat with Water. But if they are very obstinate, take some such Thing as this Feather, and tickle your Nose, till you provoke a Sneezing. ⁵¹ When you have sneezed once or twice, your Hiccups will cease, be they ever so violent.—As soon as you begin your Speech, says Aristophanes, I shall set about doing what You bid me.—Eryximachus then began in this manner,—

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⁵¹ Hippocrates, in *Aphorism.* Sect. 6. N. 13. and Celsus, in Lib. 2. C. 8. assure us, that “ if Sneezing comes upon a Man in a Fit of the “ Hiccups, it puts an End to the Disorder.” Upon this General Rule, no doubt, was founded the present Prescription of Eryximachus. Dr. G. E. Stahl, however, used to tell his Pupils, as appears from his *Collegium minus*, Cas. 53. that the Rule indeed was true, where the Sneezing was spontaneous, or the Work of Nature ; but that a Sneezing procured by Art, or forced, was never recommended. *Sternutationes*, says he, *sponte singultui supervenientes, solvunt quidem singultum ; sed arte productæ non commendantur.* But we must remark, that this great Modern is here putting the Case, not of the Hiccups, when they are the only Disorder ; but of a Malignant Fever, and those Symptomatic Hiccups, which are often the Concomitants of that and other dangerous Diseases.

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THE SPEECH OF ERYXIMACHUS.

SINCE Pausanias, after setting out so excellently well, ended his Discourse imperfectly, it seems a Task incumbent on Me, to finish the Argument which He began.—For in distinguishing two different Kinds of Love, he made, I think, a very proper and just Distinction.—But that Love gives us an Attraction not only to Beautiful Persons, but to many other Things beside; and that he dwells not only in Human Hearts, but has also his Seat in other Beings, in the Bodys of all Animals, and in the Vegetable Productions of the Earth; ⁵² in fine, that he lives throughout all Nature; my own Art, that of Medicine, has given me Occasion to observe; and to remark, how great and wonderful a God is Love, stretching every where his Attractive Power, and reaching at all Things, whether Human or Divine.—I shall instance first in Medicine; that I may pay my first Regards to my own Profession. I say then, that our Bodys partake of this Twofold Love. For Bodily Health and Disease bear

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⁵² That in this Speech of *Eryximachus* the Word *Love* is taken for *Concord*, we need not tell our Readers. But Such as have a Taste for Philosophic Poetry may be obliged to Us for informing them, that they may see this Subject finely illustrated in a very elegant Poem, intituled *CONCORD*, inscribed to the late *Earl of Radnor*, about ten Years since; but of which so very few Copys were printed, or at least made public, that 'tis little known even amongst the Few able Judges of its Merit. Posterity will be inquisitive after every Work, penned by the Author of *HERMES*.

an Analogy to the two different Dispositions of the Soul, mentioned by Pausanias. And as the Body in a State of Health, and the Body when Diseased, are in Themselves very different One from the Other, so they love and long for very different Things. The Love in a Healthy Body is of One Kind ; the Love in a Diseased Body is of Another Kind, quite different. Now, as Pausanias says, 'tis honorable to comply with a Good Lover, but dishonorable to yield to one who is Vicious : So is it with respect to the Body : Whatever is in a sound and healthy State, 'tis commendable and right to please ; 'tis the Physician's Duty so to do, and the effectual Doing of it ⁵³ denotes him truly a Physician. But to gratify That which is diseased and bad, ⁵⁴ is blameable ;
and

⁵³ The Words, used by *Plato* in this place, are still stronger, and signify *denominates him a Physician*. For the Preservation of Health, through a Right Use of the Non-Naturals, that is, such a one as is agreeable to Nature, respecting the Difference of Sex, Age, Temperament of Body, Climate, Season of the Year, and other Circumstances, was accounted in the Days of *Plato* not only a Part, but the Principal one too, of the Art of Medicine ; and was by the old *Greek* Physicians carried to a Degree of Accuracy and Perfection, absolutely unknown or totally neglected in After-Ages.

⁵⁴ This Passage is illustrated by that of *Hippocrates*, near the End of his Treatise *de Morbo Sacro*. Χρῆ—μὴ αὐξεῖν τὰ νοσήματα, ἀλλὰ σπεύδειν τρύχειν, προσφέροντας τῇ νόσῳ τὸ πολεμιώτατον ἐκάστη, μὴ τὸ φίλον καὶ ζύνηθες. ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ζύνηθείας θάλλει καὶ αὐξέσαι, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς πολεμίας φθίνει καὶ ἀμαυρεῖται. Having spoken of Nourishment, he says, that — the Physician should take care not to nourish and increase Diseases, but as soon as possible to exhaust and wear them out ; applying to every Disease that which is hostile and repugnant to it the most, not that which is friendly,

and the Physician, who would practise agreeably to the Rules of Art, must deny it the Gratification⁵⁵ which it demands. For Medical Science, to give a Summary and brief Account of it, is⁵⁶ the Knowledge of those Amorous Passions of the Body, which tend to Filling and Emptying. Accordingly, the Man, who in these Passions or Appetites can distinguish the Right Love from that which is Wrong, He has most of all Men the Science belonging to a Physician. And the Man, who is able to effect a Change, so as in the Place of One of those Loves to introduce the Other; and

friendly, of the same Temper with it, or habitual to it: for by the Latter it acquires Growth and Vigour; by the Former it decays and is extinguished. This, by the way, is the Foundation of an excellent Practic Rule; and that is, in Chronical Diseases sometimes to change the Medicines, though at first found ever so beneficial, when they are become too familiar, and the Disease is habituated to bear them; for they would then by degrees lose their Efficacy.

⁵⁵ *To administer proper Remedys, says our Great Master, is to counteract the Genius or Nature of the Disease; and never to concur or correspond with it. "Ἰησις ἀντίνοον, [f. καὶ] μὴ ὁμονοεῖν τῷ πάθει. Hippoc. Epidem. L. 6. §. 5. n. 7.*

⁵⁶ What follows, when stript of the Metaphor, necessary on the Occasion, is the same thing with This of Hippocrates, Τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἐσιν ἰήματα. Ἱατρικὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ πρόσθεσις καὶ ἀφαίρεσις· ἀφαίρεσις μὲν τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων, πρόσθεσις δὲ τῶν ἐλλειπόντων. ὁ δὲ κάλλιστα τὰτα ποιεῶν, ἀριστος ἰηρὸς. Lib. de Flatibus, not far from the Beginning. *Contrarys are a Cure One for the Other. For the Practice of the Art of Medicine consists of two Operations, Adding and Subtracting; or Supplying and Drawing off; a Drawing off of that which is over-abundant, a Supplying of that which is deficient. Whoever can perform these in the best manner, He is the best Physician.*

and knows how to infuse Love into those Bodys, which have it not, yet ought to have it ; and how to expell a Love, with which they are, but ought not to be possessed ; He is a Skilful Practiser of his Art. ⁵⁷ For those Things in the Body, which are most at Variance, must He be able to reconcile to each other, and to conciliate Amity between them and mutual Love. The Things, most at Variance, are such as are the most Contrary one to the other ; as the Cold is to the Hot, the Bitter to the Sweet, the Dry to the Moist, ⁵⁸ and all Others of that Sort. Into these Things, thus at Variance, our Ancestor Æsculapius had Power to inspire a Spirit of Love and Concord ; and, as our Friends here, the Poets, tell us, and as I believe, framing into a System the Rules for so doing, was properly the Author of Our Art. So that Medicine, in the Manner I have described, is all under the Direction and Management of Love. So is ⁵⁹ the Gymnastic Art in like manner ; and so is ⁶⁰ the Art of

⁵⁷ See *Hippocrates*, throughout his Treatise *de Naturâ Hominis*.

⁵⁸ That is, all such contrary Qualitys in the Humours of the Body, as are distinguishable by Sense.

⁵⁹ The End of the Medical Art is Health ; that of the Gymnastic is Strength, or an Athletic Habit of Body. But in the Means they make use of to gain their several Ends, favouring and indulging the Disposition of Body which is right, counter-acting and correcting such, as are wrong, these Arts are exactly analogous, one to the other.

⁶⁰ The Genius and Condition of the Soil bear an Analogy to the Temperament and present State of the Body ; the different Kinds of Manure and other Cultivation are analogous to Food and Medicine. A
Good

of Agriculture.—And that Musick is so too, is evident to every Man who considers the Nature of this Art with the least Attention ; and is perhaps the very Thing which Heraclitus meant to say : for his way of expressing himself is inaccurate and obscure. “⁶¹ THE ONE, says he, “⁶² disagreeing with its Self, yet proceeds in amicable Concord ; like “ the Harmony made by the Bow and Lyre.” Now ’tis very absurd to say, that in Harmony any Disagreement can find Place ; or that the component Parts of Harmony can ever disagree. But his Meaning perhaps was this ; that Things in

Good Soil is improved by a Manure homogeneous to it ; a Bad Soil meliorated by an opposite Method of Cultivation, altering its Nature and Condition. As to the Metaphor, the same has been always used in Agriculture to this Day. We say, that such a Soil loves such a Manure ; and that such a Tree, Plant, or other Vegetable, loves and delights in such a Soil ; when they are correspondent, when the Nature of the One is fitted to that of the Other, and is favourable to it in making it thrive and flourish.

⁶¹ Τὸ ἐν, φησὶ, διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρεσθαι, (but this Word should be printed with a σ’, not with a ζ’, for *Heraclitus* wrote not in the *Attic* Dialect, but the *Ionic*,) ὥσπερ ἀρμονίαν τόξῳ τε καὶ λύρῃ. *Aristotle*, if He is the Author of the Treatise περὶ κόσμου printed among his Works, cites the following Passage from the same *Heraclitus*, calling him *The Obscure* ; a Passage to the same Purpose ; Συνάψεως ἔλα καὶ ἔχι ἔλα, Συμφερόμενον καὶ διαφερόμενον, Συνᾶδον καὶ διαδόν, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἐν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα. By THE ONE *Heraclitus* meant the *Universe* ; to which he gave that Name, on account of the *Union* of All Things. Τὸ ἐν πάντα ἐστὶ, says an ancient Platonist, ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶν ἑνωσις.

⁶² Because it arises out of *Contrary Principles*, and because *Contrary Elements* enter into its Composition.

in their own Nature disagreeing, that is, Sounds, some shrill and others deep, at length brought to an Agreement by the Musical Art, compose Harmony. For Harmony cannot consist of Shrill and Deep Sounds, whilst they remain in Disagreement : because Harmony is Consonance, or a Conspiracy of Sounds ; and Consonance is One Kind of Agreement : but 'tis impossible, that any Agreement should be between disagreeing Things, so long as they disagree : and no less impossible is it, that Things, between which there is no Agreement, should at the same time harmonise together, so as to produce Harmony. And as it is with Sound, so is it with Motion ; the Quick Measures and the Slow ones, by Nature disagreeing, but afterwards brought to agree together, compose Rythm. ⁶³ In both these Cases, where Things differ and are opposite to one another, ⁶⁴ 'tis the Art of Musick which brings about the Reconcilement and Agreement ; just as the Art of Medicine does ⁶⁵ in the former Case ;

⁶³ That of disagreeing *Sounds*, and that of disagreeing *Measures of Time*.

⁶⁴ Musick, says *Aristotle* in that elegant Treatise mentioned in Note 61. " mingling together Sounds Shrill and Deep, of Long and of Short Time, as they issue at once from different Voices, makes one compleat and finished Harmony." Μεσική, ὅξεις ἅμα καὶ βαρεῖς, μακρὲς τε καὶ βραχεῖς φθόγους μίξασα, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς, μίαν ἀπέτελεσεν ἁρμονίαν. Cap. 5. He observes, that, in This the *Art* of Musick imitates *Nature* ; and says, This was the Meaning of *Heraclitus* in that Passage cited by Him, as before-mentioned.

⁶⁵ That of the disagreeing Qualitys of the Humours in a Human Body.

Cafe ; inspiring them in the same manner with the Spirit of Love and Concord. And thus Musical Science is the Knowledge of those Amorous Conjunctions, whose Offspring are Harmony and Rythm. Now in the Systems themselves, whether of Harmony or of Rythm, there is no Difficulty at all in knowing the Amorous Conjunctions : for here Love is not distinguished into Two Kinds. But when the Intention is to apply Rythm and Harmony to the Ears of some Audience, then comes the Difficulty ; then is there need of a Skilful Artist, whether in composing the Odes, and setting them to Musick, or in making a right Choice of Those ready composed and set⁶⁶, and properly adapting them to the Geniuses of Youth. For here that Distinction takes Place ; here must we recur again to that Rule of Pausanias, that the Decent, the Well-ordered, and the Virtuous

⁶⁶ Poetry and Musick were employed by the *Grecian* Masters of Education, as a principal Means, to form the Manners of their Youth, to inspire them with becoming Sentiments, and excite them to worthy Actions. In the Choice therefore of Poetry and Musick, proper for this Purpose, great Judgment was used, and much Care taken. It was not left, as now a days, to the Fancy or Humour of Men, whose Profession is only to teach Words, or Musical Notes, with their several Combinations. Legislators and Magistrates then thought it an Object the most worthy of their own Attention : and the greatest Philosophers, who framed Models of Government according to Ideal Perfection, or laid down Maxims fit to be observed by every Wise State, treat it as a Subject of highest Importance ; and accordingly are very exact and particular in explaining the natural Effects of every Species of Musick, or Musical Poetry, on the Mind. See *Plato's Republick*, B. 2, and 3. his *Laws*, B. 2, and 7. and *Aristotle's Politicks*, B. 8.

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Virtuous 'tis right to gratify, for the sake of preserving their Love, and of improving Such as are yet Deficient in Virtue. The Love, by whom These are inspired, is the Noble, the Celestial; That Love, who attends the Celestial Muse. ⁶⁷ But the Attendant of Polyhymnia, and the Follower of every Muse at random, is the Other Love, He of the Vulgar Kind: whom we ought cautiously to indulge, whenever we indulge him; that he may enjoy his own Pleasures, without introducing Disorder and Debauchery. And this is an Affair of no less Difficulty, than in Our Art it is, to manage prudently the Appetites which regard the Table; so as to permit them the Enjoyment of their proper Pleasures, without Danger of Diseases. Thus, in the Practice of Musick, and of Medicine, and in every other Employment, whether Human or Divine, we are to preserve, as far as consistently we may, Both Loves: for ⁶⁸ Both are to be found in All Things.—Full of Both is the Constitution of the Annual Seasons. And when those Contraries in Nature, before-mentioned, the Hot and the Cold, the Dry and the Moist, under the Influence of the Modest Love, admit a sober Correspondence together, and temperate Commixture; they bring along with them, when they come, fair Seasons, fine,

⁶⁷ See Lord Shaftesbury's Characterist. vol. 1. pages 314, and the three following.

⁶⁸ That is, the *rational*, the *regular*, and the *sober*, together with the *sensual*, the *lawless*, and the *wild* or infinite. See Plato's *Philebus*, throughout.

fine Weather, and Health, to Men, Brute Animals, and Plants, doing Injury to None. But when That Love, who inspires lawless and ungoverned Passion, prevails in the Constitution of the Season, he corrupts, injures and ruins many of the fair Forms of Nature. For the usual Fruits of This Love are Plagues, and other preter-natural Diseases, which come upon Animals, and Vegetables too: Mildews, Hail-Storms, and Blights being generated from the irregular State of the Amorous Affections in those Elementary Beings, and the Want of Temperance in their Conjunctions. The Knowledge of which their Amorous Affections, and consequent Conjunctions, considered as owing to the Aspects of the Heavenly Bodys, and as respecting the Seasons of the Year, is called Astronomy.—Farther, all Kinds of Sacrifice, and all the ⁶⁹ Subjects of the Diviner's Art, those Agents, employed in carrying on a ⁷⁰ reciprocal Intercourse between the Gods and Mortals, are employed with no other View, than to preserve the Right Love, and cure that which is Wrong. For every Species of Impiety is the usual Consequence of not yielding to and gratifying the Better Love, the regular; and of not paying to Him, but to ⁷¹ the Other

⁶⁹ Such as Dreams, Omens, the Flight of Birds, &c.

⁷⁰ For, according to the Religious Opinions then in Vogue, the Prayers of Men were conveyed to the Gods by the means of Sacrifice; and the Divine Will was revealed or made known to Men thro' Dreams, and other Things which seem Accidental, interpreted by Diviners.

⁷¹ What *Plato* means by these Two different Kinds of Love, as relative to the Affairs of Religion, may be discerned by Those, who have

Other Love, our Principal Regards, in every thing we do relating to our Parents, whether Living or Deceased, and in every thing relating to the Gods. In all such Cases, to superintend the Loves, to cherish the Right, and cure the Wrong, is the Business of Divination. And thus Divination is an Artist, skilled in procuring and promoting Friendliness and Good Correspondence between the Gods and Men, thro' her Knowledge of What Amorous Affections in Men tend to Piety and Justice, and What are Opposite to these, and lead the Contrary Way. — So widely extensive, so highly predominant, or rather all-prevailing, is the Power of Love: Of all Love in General this is true; but especially, and the most true is it, of That Love, who attains his Ends in the Attainment of Good Things, and enjoys them without ever exceeding the Bounds of Temperance, or violating the Laws of Justice. For it is This Love, who bears the Chief Sway both in the Human Nature and the Divine; it is This Love, who procures for us every Kind of Happiness; enabling us to live in Social Con-

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verse,

have carefully read the *Earl of Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue*. It may suffice, however, for understanding of the General Meaning in this Place, to consult his *Miscellaneous Reflections*, page 222, and the two following.—In the *Greek Text* some Corruption has here crept in. *Stephens* has endeavored to amend it, in a manner agreeable to *Plato's Style* in other Places, it must be confessed. Yet we must prefer the Omission of the Word *περί* before *τὸν ἑταίρον*, because the Sentence is made much easier by this Alteration; and because the accidental Insertion of the Word *περί* may easily be accounted for; as will appear to any Good Critick in this way, who will be pleased to consult the Original.

verse, one with another, and in Friendship with Beings so much superior to our Selves, the Gods.—It is possible now, after all, that, in the Panegyrick I have made on Love, I may have omitted, as well as Pausanias, many Topicks of his due Praise: it has not, however, been done designedly; and if I have left aught unsaid, 'tis your Business, Aristophanes, to supply that Deficiency: or if your Intentions are to celebrate the God in a different way, now that your Hiccups are over, you may begin.

To This Aristophanes replied, — I am now indeed no longer troubled with my Hiccups: but they would not be easy, before I brought the Sneezings to them. — I wonder that a modest and decent Part of the Body should be in Love with and long for these Ticklings, or be pleased with such boisterous roaring Noises, Such as Sneezing is: for as soon as I had procured it a Good Sneezing, immediately it was quiet.—Eryximachus upon This said,—Friend Aristophanes! consider what you are about: you are raising up a Spirit of Ridicule here, just as you are going to begin your Speech; and put Me upon the Watch, to lay hold of some thing or other in it for the Company to laugh at, when you might, if you pleased, have spoken in Quiet. — To which Aristophanes, in a good-humoured way, reply'd,—You are in the Right, Eryximachus: What I said just now, let it be looked on as unsaid. — But, pray, do not watch me. For I am in Pain for the Speech I am going to make;

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—not, for Fear there should be any thing in it to laugh at; for a Laugh would be an Advantage gained to Me, and the Natural Product of My Muse; — but for Fear it should be really in its self Ridiculous.—You shoot your Bolt, Aristophanes, said Eryximachus, and then think to march off. But take Care of what you say, and expect to be called to a strict Account for it. Perhaps, however, I shall be gracious enough to spare you.—Aristophanes then began;

THE SPEECH OF ARISTOPHANES.

My Intentions, Eryximachus, are to speak in a Way very different, I assure you, from the Way taken by You and Pausanias in your Speeches. To Me Men seem utterly insensible What the Power of Love is. For were they sensible of it, they would build Temples and erect Altars to him the most magnificent, and would offer to him the noblest Sacrifices. He would not be neglected as he is now, when none of these Honours are paid him, tho' of all the Gods, Love ought the most to be thus honoured. For of all the Gods, Love is the most friendly to Man,⁷² his Relief and Remedy in those Evils, the perfect Cure of which would be productive of the highest Happiness to the whole Human Race. I will do my Best therefore to make his Power
known

⁷² Ἰατρός τέτων, that is, κακῶν, not ἀνθρώπων, as *Racine* and all the former Translators, except *Cornarius*, erroneously imagined. Their Mistake was owing plainly to the wrong Punctuation in all Editions of the Original in this place.

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known to You, and You shall teach it to Others. But you must first be informed, What the Human Nature is, and what Changes it has undergone. For our Nature of old was different from what it is at present.—In the first place, there were anciently Three Sorts, or subordinate Species, of the Human Kind ; not as at present, only Two, Male and Female ; there being, then, a Third Species beside, which partook of Both the Others : the Name only of which Species now remains, the Species its self being extinct and lost. For then existed actually and flourished Hermaphrodites, who partook of Both the Other Species, the Male and the Female. But they are now become meerly a Name, a Name of Abuse and of Reproach.—In the next place, the Intire Form of every Individual of the Human Kind was Cylindrical ; for their Bodys, Back and Sides together, were every where, from Top to Bottom, Circular. Every one had Four Hands, and the same Number of Legs. They had Two Faces, Each, upon their Round Necks, every way Both alike : but these Two Faces belonged but to One Head ; on the Sides of which were placed these Faces, opposite one to the other. Each had also Four Ears and Two Distinctions of the Sex. From this Description 'tis easy to conceive, how all the other Parts of the Human Body were doubled. They walked upon whichever Legs they pleased, on any Side ; and, as they walk now, upright. But when any one wanted to go with Expedition, then, as Tumblers, after pitching on their Hands, throw their Legs upward,

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and bring them over, and thus tumble themselves round; in the same Manner did the People of those Days, supported by their Eight Limbs alternately, and wheeled along with great Dispatch. — Now you are to know, that these Three Species of the Human Race were precisely so many in Number, and their Bodys made in such a Form, for this Reason ;—because the Male Kind was produced originally by the Sun, the Female rose from the Earth, and the Third, which partook of the Other Two, was the Offspring of the Moon ; for the Moon, you know, partakes of ⁷³ Both the Others, the Sun and the Earth. The Bodys therefore of Each Kind were Round, and the Manner of their running was Circular, ⁷⁴ in Resemblance of their First Parents. Their Force

and

⁷³ Meaning, that the Moon borrows her Light from the Sun, and is of like Nature with the Earth, because another Earth her Self. For so all the ancientest and best Philosophers taught, both Those of the *Ionic* School, and Those of the *Italic*. Proofs of which may be seen collected by Dr. *Davis* in *Not. ad Ciceron. Academic.* pag. 226, 7, 8. and by *Menage* in *Observat. ad Laertium*, pag. 74, 317, 318. That *Socrates* received from *Anaxagoras* and embraced the same right Opinions concerning the Nature of the Moon, appears from *Plato*, in *Apolog. Soc.* pag. 26. and in *Cratyl.* p. 409. Ed. *Steph.*

⁷⁴ *Plato* never writes with Negligence or Over-sight. 'Tis with Design therefore, that no Exception is here made of the Earth. So that, in the Opinion of *Aristophanes*, as *Plato* represents it, the Motion of all the three Orbs, here mentioned, the Sun, Moon, and Earth, is Circular. From hence it may be inferred, that Learned Men at *Athens* in the time of *Socrates* were not only acquainted with the *Pythagorean* Doctrine, according to which the *Sun* is in the *Centre of this Planetary System*, and the Earth rolls around it, a Doctrine revived many Ages after by *Copernicus* ; but also were no Strangers to the *Revolution of the Sun*

and Strength were prodigious ; their Minds elevated and haughty ; so they undertook to invade Heaven. And of Them is related the same Fact, which Homer relates of Ephialtus and Otus, that they set about raising an Ascent up to the Skys, with Intention to attack the Gods. Upon which Jupiter and the other Deitys consulted together what they should do to these Rebels ; but could come to no Determination about the Punishment proper to be inflicted on them. — They could not resolve upon destroying them by Thunder, as they did the Giants ; for thus the whole Human Race would be extinct ; and then the Honours, paid them by that Race, would be extinct together with it, and their Temples come to Ruin.— Nor yet could they suffer those Mortals to continue in their Insolence.—At length Jupiter, after much Consideration of so difficult a Case, said ;—I have a Device, by which the Race of Men may be preserved, and yet an End put to their Insolence ; as my Device will

much

Sun around its own Axis, discovered again by *Kepler* after the Knowledge of it had been long lost. This Point therefore probably made a Part of the *Pythagorean System*, espoused by *Plato* in his later Age of Life. See *Menage ad Laert.* pag. 388, 9. Should it be objected, that *Aristophanes* might perhaps mean such a Motion of *the Earth* around its own Axis, it is sufficient to answer, that this was a Tenet never held by Any, who supposed the Earth placed in the Centre of the Universe. This Passage therefore, we should imagine, may be fairly added to the Number of those many, which prove the great Knowledge of the Ancients in *Astronomy* : for which see the *Two Letters* of the very learned Mr. *Cosford* to the late Dr. *Martin Folkes*. Whether the two illustrious Moderns, before mentioned, took the first Hints of their Discoverys from any Passages of this Kind in the Ancients, does not appear.

much diminish the Greatness of their Strength. For I intend, you must know, to divide every One of them into Two: by which means their Strength will be much abated, and at the same time their Number much increased, to Our Advantage and the Increase of our Honour. They shall walk upright upon Two Legs: and if any Remains of Insolence shall ever appear in them, and they resolve not to be at Quiet, I will again divide them, Each into Two; and they shall go upon One Leg, hopping. As he said, so did he; he cut all the Human Race in twain, as People cut Eggs, ⁶⁵ to salt them for keeping. The Face, toge-

⁷⁵ The Greek Original in this place stands at full Length thus; — ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὠὰ τέμνοντες καὶ μέλλοντες ταριχεύειν, ἢ ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὠὰ ταῖς θριξίν. — Now the Absurdity of supposing Eggs ever to have been cut with Hairs, when Knives, much better Instruments for that Purpose, were at hand, first led us to imagine that the Passage might be corrupt. On a little Examination, it appeared probable to us, from the Repetition of the Words — ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὠὰ — that the latter Part of this Sentence was nothing more than a Various Reading in the Margin of some ancient Copy. Trying then the two last Words — ταῖς θριξίν — by the Abbreviations common in old Manuscripts, we made our Conjecture still more probable (to our selves at least) by reading the latter Part of the Sentence thus — ἢ, ὥσπερ τὰ ὠὰ τέμνοντες εἰς ταρίχευσιν — which Words we suppose written in the Margin after this manner, ἢ ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὠὰ τ. εἰς ταρίχσιν. the Initial Letter of τέμνοντες being put for the whole Word, as usual in such Cases. Thus the last Words, being read (as it was common to do for the greater Expedition) by some ignorant Librarian to the new Copyist, literally as they were written, were easily mistaken by a Writer unattentive to the Sense, and made ταῖς θριξίν. — That 'twas customary with the Ancients to salt and pickle Eggs, for keeping, after

together with the half-Neck, of every half-Body, he ordered Apollo to turn half round; and fix it on that Side, where the other Half of the Body was cut off; with Intention, that all People, viewing themselves on that Side, where they had suffered the Loss of Half Themselves, might be brought to a sober Way of Thinking, and learn to behave with more Modesty. For what remained necessary to be done, he bid him exercise his own Healing Art.—Accordingly, Apollo turned the Face of Every one about to the Reverse of its former Situation: and drawing the Skin together, like a Purse, from all Parts of the Body, over That which is now called the Belly, up to One Orifice or Opening, he tyed up at the Middle of the Belly this Orifice, now called the Navel. He then smoothed most Part of the Wrinkles of the Skin, after having framed the Bones of the Breast under it; in the same manner as Shoemakers smooth the Wrinkles of the Leather, when they have stretched it upon the Last. But a few Wrinkles, those on the Belly and Navel, he let remain, for a Memorial of their old Crime and Punishment.—Now, when All the Human Race were thus bi-sected, every Section longed for its Fellow-Half. And when These happened to meet together, they mutually embraced, folded in each other's Arms, and wish-

boiling them hard, ('tis to be supposed) and cutting them in two, we learn from *Alexis* the Comic Poet, as cited by *Athenæus*, pag. 57, and 60. as also from *Columella*: which last mentioned Author tells us farther, that sometimes they were hardened for that Purpose in a Pickle heated over the Fire.

wishing they could grow together, and be united. The Consequence of this was, that they Both died, thro' Famine, and the other Evils, naturally brought on by Idleness. And if One of these Halves died, and left the Other behind, the surviving Half was immediately employed in looking about for another Partner; and whether it happened to meet with the Half of a Whole Woman, (which Half we now call a Woman,) or with the Half of a Whole Man, they were continually embracing. After all, Jupiter, seeing them thus in danger of Destruction, took pity on them, and contrived another Device; which was, to place the Distinction of Sex before: for till then This had still remained on the other Side; and they had engendered, not with One Another, but with the Earth,⁷⁶ like Grasshoppers. This Scheme Jupiter carried into Execution; and thus made

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the

⁷⁶ This alludes to a Vulgar Error of those Days, (as it is almost universally deemed in these,) concerning the Generation of those winged and buzzing Insects, (of whatever Species they were,) by the ancient *Greeks* named τέττιγες, (which we now commonly translate *Grasshoppers*;) that they were All spontaneously, as it is called, produced out of the Earth: an Error, owing to an Observation frequently made, as appears from *Plutarch*, in *Sympos.* Lib. 2. and from *Aldrovandus*, Lib. 2. *de Insectis*, pag. 312. that after great Rains or Inundations, in the warmer Climates, those Insects suddenly appeared in much greater Numbers than before; the Heat and Moisture together making them probably, according to the Nature of Insects, more prolific than at other Seasons. Agreeable to the received Opinion of those Days is the fabulous Account, here given by *Aristophanes*,—that those Insects laid their Spawn in the Earth, by whose Warmth they were cherished, hatched, and emitted up to Light.

the Work of Generation to be thenceforth carried on by Both Sexes jointly, the Female conceiving from the Male. Now, in making this the sole Way of generating, Jupiter had these Ends in View ; that, if a Man should meet with a Woman, they might, in the Embrace, generate together, and the Human Kind be thus continued ; but if he met with another Man, that then Both might be surfeited with Such Commixture ; and that immediately, ceasing from their Embraces, they might apply themselves to Business, and turn their Studys and Pursuits to the other Affairs of Life. — From all this it appears, how deeply Mutual Love is implanted by Nature in All of the Human Race ; bringing them again to their pristine Form ; coupling them together ; endeavoring out of Two to make One, and thus to remedy the Evils introduced into the Human Nature. So that every One of us, at present, is but the Tally of a Human Creature ; which has been cut, like a Polypus, ⁷⁷ and out of One made Two. Hence it comes, that we are All in continual Search of our several Counterparts, to tally with us. As many Men, accordingly, as are Sections of that Double Form, called the Hermaphrodite, are Lovers of
of

⁷⁷ All learned Naturalists know the great Uncertainty we are in now-a-days concerning the rarer Animals of all Kinds, mentioned by the Ancients. Under this Difficulty of ascertaining What Animal is meant by the $\psi\eta\tau\alpha$, mentioned here by *Plato*, we have translated it a *Polypus*, because the wonderful Property, ascribed here to the $\psi\eta\tau\alpha$, is the same with that in the *Polypus*, which a few Years since afforded great Entertainment to the *Virtuosi* in many Parts of *Europe*.

of Women : and of this Species are the Multitude of Rakes. So, on the other hand, as many Women, as are addicted to the Love of Men, are sprung from the same Amphibious Race. But Such Women, as are Sections of the Female Form, are not much inclined to Men ; their Affections tend rather to their own Sex : and of this Kind are the Sapphic Lovers. Men, in like manner, Such as are Sections of the Male Form, follow the Males : and whilst they are Children, being originally Fragments of Men, 'tis Men they love, and 'tis in Mens Company and Caresses they are most delighted. Those Children, and those Youths, who are of this Sort, are the Best, as being the most Manly in their Temper and Disposition. Some People, I know, say, they are shameless and impudent : But in this they wrong them : For it is not Impudence and Want of Modesty, but 'tis Manly Assurance, with a Manly Temper and Turn of Mind, by which they are led to associate with Those whom they resemble. A shrewd Conjecture may hence be formed, from what Race they originally spring ; a Conjecture, justified by their Conduct afterwards. For only Boys of this Manly Kind, when they arrive at the Age of Maturity, ⁷⁸ apply themselves to Political Affairs : and as they advance farther in

⁷⁸ *Aristophanes* in this Sentence hints at *Pausanias* : but for fear his Hint should not be apprehended by the Company, he takes Care to explain it to them, Himself, near the Conclusion of his Speech, by an ironical and affected Caution in guarding against the being so understood.

in the Age of Manhood, they delight to encourage and forward the Youth of their own Sex in Manly Studys and Employments ; but have naturally no Inclination to marry and beget Children : they do it only in Conformity to the Laws, and would chuse to live unmarried, in a State of Friendship. Such Persons as these are indeed by Nature formed for Friendship solely, and to embrace always whatever is Congenial with Themselves.—Now, whenever it fortunes, that a Man meets with that very Counterpart of Himself, his other Half, they are Both smitten with Love in a wondrous manner ; they recognise their ancient Intimacy ; they are strongly attracted together by a Consciousness that they belong to each other ; and are unwilling to be parted, or become separate again, tho' for ever so short a Time. — Those Pairs, who of free Choice live together throughout Life, are Such as have met with this Good Fortune. — Yet are None of them able to tell, What 'tis they would have, One from the Other. For it does not seem to be the Venereal Congress. In all Appearance, it is not meerly for the sake of This, that they feel such extreme Delight in the Company of each other ; and seek it, when they have it not, with so eager a Desire. 'Tis evident, that their Souls long for some Other Thing, which Neither can explain ; Something, which they can only give obscure Hints of, in the way of Ænigmas ; and Each Party can only guess at in the Other, as it were, by Divination. But when they were together, and caressing each other,

were Vulcan to stand by with his Tools in his Hand, and say,—“Mortals! What is it ye want, and would have, One from the Other?”—and finding them at a Loss what to answer, were he to demand of them again, and say,—“Is This what ye long for,—to be united together with the most intire Union, so as never, either by Night or Day, to be separate from each other?—If ye long for This, I will melt you down, Both of you together, and together form you Both again; that, instead of Two, ye may become One; whilst ye live, living a Joint Life, as One Person; and when ye come to dye, dying at once One Death; and afterwards, in the State of Souls departed, continuing still Undivided. Consider now within your selves, whether ye like the Proposal, and whether ye would be glad to have it carried into Execution.”—I am certain, that not a single Mortal, to whom Vulcan should make this Offer, would reject it. ’Twould appear, that None had any other Wish; and every Man would be conscious to himself, that the secret Desire, which he had of old conceived in his Heart, was at length brought to Light and expressed in clear Language, that is, to be mingled and melted in with his Beloved, and out of Two to be made One. The Cause of which Desire in us All is this,—that our pristine Nature was Such as I have described it;—we were once Whole. The Desire and Pursuit of this Wholeness of our Nature, our becoming Whole again, is called Love. For, as I said, we were antiently One: but now, as a Punishment for our Breach

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Breach of the Laws of Justice, the Gods ⁷⁹ have compelled us to live afunder in separate Bodys : just as the People of Arcady

⁷⁹ As *Arcadia* consisted chiefly of Plains and Pasture-Lands, the People of that Country had for many Ages led a Pastoral Kind of Life, dispersed in small Villages ; and lived in the Enjoyment of perfect Peace and Liberty. But in process of Time, when they were in Danger of falling under the Yoke of the *Spartans*, their Neighbours, whom they observed a Warlike People, growing in Greatness, and aspiring to the Dominion of all the *Peloponnesus*, they began to build and fortify Citys, where they assembled and consulted together for their Common Interests. This Union gave them Courage, not only to be Auxiliaries in War to the Enemys of the *Spartans*, but at length, as Principals themselves, to make frequent Inroads into the *Spartan* Territorys. The *Spartans* therefore, carrying the War into the Country of the *Arcadians*, compelled them to demolish the Fortifications of their Chief Citys, and even to quit their Habitations there, and return to their ancient Manner of living in Villages. — The Term, made Use of here in the *Greek* Text, is διωκίσθημεν, instead of which *Cornarius* bids us read διεσχίσθημεν, *we have been cleft in sunder* : his Reasons for it are these, — that the same Term is used immediately afterwards, and Terms of like Import twice or thrice before ; — Reasons, which have great Weight, we know, with all Verbal Criticks. *H. Stephens*, accordingly, approves the Alteration, and assigns those very Reasons for it, given by *Cornarius*. But in Support of the Common Reading we hope to produce an Argument of equal Weight with those Gentlemen according to their own Rules of Criticism. It is this ; — that *Xenophon*, in relating the latter Part of that History, which we have just given an Abridgment of, — the Treatment, which the *Arcadians* met with from the victorious *Spartans*, — makes Use of the same Term with *Plato* ; καθήρεθ' ἡ μὲν τὸ τεῖχος, says he, ΔΙΩΚΙΣΘΗ δὲ ἡ Μαντινέαι τετραχῆ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὤκεν. *Græc. Histor. L. 5. pag. 323. Ed. Steph. 1580.* Any tolerable Judge of Language, in general, will see that

Arcady are treated by the Spartans. — If therefore we behave not to the Gods with Reverence and Decency, there is Reason to fear, ⁷⁹ we shall be again cleft in sunder, and go about with our Guilt delineated in our Figure, like Those who have their Crimes engraven on Pillars, our Noses split and our Bodys split in Two. The Consideration of This should engage every Man to promote the Universal Practice of Piety toward the Gods; that we may escape this Misfortune, and attain to that better State, as it shall please Love to guide and lead us. Above all, let None of us act in

Oppo-

that this Word, as used by *Plato*, is proper and natural in the Simile, and Metaphorically applied to his present Subject. But Those, who are versed in *Platonic* Language, will imagine, that *Plato*, in making Choice of this Similitude, would insinuate to us, that Human Souls, having formerly lived a *Larger Life*, and more *united*, were now confined to live *separately*, and to inhabit *distinct* Bodys.

⁷⁹ This Passage in the Original has been (perhaps wilfully) much corrupted. The Words, which we read, are these; — ὅπως μὴ καὶ αὐθις διασχισθησόμεθα, καὶ περιίμεν ἔχοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς σήλαις, καταγραφὴν ἐκείλυπώμενοι, διαπεπρισμένοι καὶ τὰς ῥίνας γεγονότες, ὥσπερ λίσπαι. *Ruhnkenius*, to whom the Learned World is obliged for the Publication of *Timæus*, an old Glossographer on *Plato*, instead of καταγραφὴν reads καὶ γράφην. (διὰ δυοῖν.) *Budæus* supposes a Transposition of this Word, and the Word next to it, putting a Comma between them, and referring ἐκείλυπώμενοι to the Words immediately preceding. Neither of these Emendations will be found sufficient to restore the Passage *ad pristinam puritatem, an impuritatem potius dicam?* — The learned Lady, who translated this Dialogue into *French*, probably the *Marchioness de Grave*, has omitted the whole Sentence, *an quia sensum kaud intellexerit, an quia benè intellecti puduerit, in ambiguo est.*

Opposition to this benign Deity ; whom None oppose, but Such as are at Enmity with the Gods. For if we are reconciled to Love, and gain his Favour, we shall find out and meet with our naturally Beloved, the other Half of our Selves ; which at present is the Good Fortune but of Few. —Erxyimachus now must not carp at what I say, on a Suspicion that I mean Pausanias and Agatho : tho' perhaps They may be of the Fortunate Few : But I say it of All in general, whether Men or Women, thro' the whole Human Race, that every One of us might be happy, had we the Perfection of Love, and were to meet with our own proper Paramours, recovering thus the Similitude of our pristine Nature. If this Fortune then be the Best absolutely, it follows, that the Best, in our present Circumstances, must be That which approaches to it the nearest ; and that is, to meet with Partners in Love, whose Temper and Disposition are the most agreeable and similar to our own. In giving Glory to the Divine Cause of this Similarity and Mutual Fitness, we celebrate in a proper Manner the Praise of Love ; a Deity, who gives us, in our present Condition, so much Relief and Consolation, by leading us to our Own again ; and farther, gives us the fairest Hopes, that, if we pay due Regard and Reverence to the Gods, he will hereafter, in recovering to us our ancient Nature, and curing the Evils we now endure, make us Blest and Happy.

Thus,

Thus, Eryximachus, you have My Speech concerning Love, a Speech of a different Kind from Yours, and no way interfering with what You have said. Therefore, as I desired of you before, do not, I pray you, make a Jest of it; that we may hear, peaceably and quietly, all the Speeches which remain to be spoken; or rather Both the Speeches; for, I think, only those of Agatho and Socrates are yet behind.—Well; I shall not disobey you, said Eryximachus: for I must acknowledge, that I have been highly entertained and pleased with your Speech. If I was not perfectly well assured, that Socrates and Agatho were deeply versed in the Science of Love, I should much fear they would be at a Loss for something to say, so copiously and so variously has the Subject been already handled. But now, notwithstanding this, I am under no Concern about the Success of those Great Masters.—I do not wonder, said Socrates, that You are free from all Concern, Eryximachus, about the Matter; since you have come off so honorably your Self, and are out of all Danger. But if You were in the Circumstances I am in, much more in those which I shall be in, when Agatho shall have made his Speech, your Fears would be not a few, and your Distresses, like mine at present, no Trifles. — I see, said Agatho, you have a Mind, Socrates, by such Suggestions, to do as Enchanters do with their Drugs, that is, to disorder and disturb my Thoughts, with imagining this Company here to be big with Expectations of hearing some fine Speech from Me. — I must

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have forgotten then, Agatho, said Socrates, the Courage and Greatness of Mind, which you discovered lately, and of which I was a Spectator, when you came upon the Stage, together with the Actors, just going to exhibit your Compositions ; when you looked so large an Audience in the Face, without being in the least daunted ; I must have forgotten this, if I thought you could be now disturbed on account of Us, who are comparatively so few in Number.—I hope, Socrates, said Agatho, you do not imagine Me so full of a Theatre, as not to know, that a few Men of Sense make an Assembly more respectable and awful, to a Man who thinks justly, than a Multitude of Fools.—I should be greatly mistaken indeed, said Socrates, if I imagined in You, Agatho, Any thing which favored of Rusticity or Ill Breeding. I am satisfied enough, that if you met with Any whom you supposed Wise, you would regard Them more than you would the Multitude. But I doubt, We have no Pretensions to any such particular Regard, because We were at the Theatre, and made a Part of that Multitude. The Case, I suppose, is in truth This ; Were you in the Presence of other Sort of Men, that is, the Wise, in Reverence to Them perhaps You would be ashamed, — if you were then employed in any Action you thought unbecoming or dishonorable. Is it not so ? or How say you ? — It is true, said Agatho. — And would you not, said Socrates to him again, revere the Multitude too, and be ashamed even in Their Presence, if you were seen by Them doing any thing
you

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you thought base or wrong? — Phædrus here interposed; and said, — my Friend Agatho, if you go on giving Answers to all the Questions put to you by Socrates, he will be under no manner of Concern, what becomes of our Affair of the Speeches, or what the rest of us here are doing in the mean time. It is sufficient for Him, if he has but Somebody to talk with in his own Way, especially if it be a Person who is Handsome. I must confess, I take much Pleasure, my Self, in hearing Socrates dispute: but 'tis necessary for me to look to the Affair I set on Foot my Self, That of the Panegyricks on Love, and to take Care that I have a Speech from every Person in this Assembly. When you have, Each of you, paid your Tribute to the God, you may then dispute, with all My Heart, at your own Pleasure. — You say well, Phædrus, said Agatho; and nothing hinders but that I begin my Speech. For I shall not want frequent Opportunitys of disputing again with Socrates.

THE SPEECH OF AGATHO.

⁸¹ I SHALL begin by showing, in what Way a Panegyrick on Love ought to be made, and then proceed that Way in making—

⁸¹ The following Speech abounds with Wit; but 'tis Wit of a rambling and inconsistent Kind, without any fixed Idea; so far is it from aiming at Truth.—The Beginning of it is a just Specimen of the Whole. For after *Agatho* has undertaken to give a Description of the *Person and Qualitys of Love*, under the very first Article of this Description, the

Yoush—

making one my self. For None of those, who have gone before me, have, in My Opinion, celebrated the Praise of Love; but All have made it their sole Business to felicitate Human Kind upon the Good they enjoy thro' the Beneficence of that God. For what he is in Himself, He from whom all this Happiness is derived, None of them has shown. Now, whatever the Subject of our Panegyrick be, there is but one Right Way to take in the composing it: and That is, the showing how excellent is the Nature, and how good are the Operations or Effects of that Person or Thing we are to praise. In this Way it is, that We ought to make our Panegyricks on Love; praising, first, the Excellence and Absolute Goodness of his own Nature, and then, his Relative Goodness to Us in the Blessings he bestows. According to this Method, I take upon me in the first place to say, if without Offence to what is Sacred and Divine I may be allowed to say it, that, tho' all the Gods enjoy a State of Blessedness, yet Love is Blest above all Others, as he excels them all in Beauty and in Virtue. — The most Beautiful he must be, for these Reasons: first, in that he is
the

Youthfulness of Love, he uses the Word *Love* in no fewer than Four different Senses. — In the first place he means, as *Socrates* afterwards observes of him, That which is *Loved*, rather than That which *Loves*; that is, *Outward Beauty*, rather than the *Passion* which it excites. — Immediately, he changes this Idea for that of the *Passion* its self. — Then at once, without giving Notice, he takes a Flight to the *First Cause of orderly Motion* in the Universe; see Note 33. — And This he immediately confounds with the *Harmony of Nature*, the complete Effect of that Cause.

the Youngest of the Gods, my Phædrus! Of This He himself gives us a convincing Proof, by his running away from Old Age; and out running Him, who is evidently so swift-footed. For Old Age, you know, arrives and is with us, sooner than We desire. Between Love and Him there is a natural Antipathy: ⁸² so that Love comes not within a wide Distance of him; but makes his Abode with Youth, and is always found in Company with the Young. For, as the Old Proverb rightly has it, "Like always goes to Like." I must own therefore, tho' I agree with Phædrus in many other of his Opinions, I cannot agree with him in This, that Love is elder than Saturn and Japetus. Of all the Gods, I affirm, He is the Youngest, and enjoys perpetual Youth. Accordingly I contend, that, if any such Events happened among the Gods, as Hesiod and Parmenides report, they were occasioned by the Power of ⁸³ Necessity, not

⁸² We have taken the Liberty of translating here, as if in the *Greek* it was printed εἰς ἐνός πολλὰ πλεονάζειν, and not εἰς ὅλος π. π.

⁸³ *Necessity* here means that unintelligent, *blind Force*, which the ancient *Physiologists* supposed to be inherent originally in the Nature of Things; to be the Fountain of Disorder, Discord, and every other Evil; and of old universally to have prevailed. For, in Their Opinion, the *Cause of Orderly Motion* anciently existed not at all; — or, if it did exist, yet remained thro' all the Infinity of Time past, down to a certain *Æra*, wholly inactive; — or, if it acted, yet produced no Order in Things, being obstructed in its Action and overpowered by the contrary Power of Necessity; — or, the Order which it produced was soon ruined, amidst that Chaos and Confusion, in which they tell us that All Things were once involved. — To speak properly therefore, there was,

not that of Love. For had Love been with them, there
had

according to Them, only *One First Principle* of Things, *Infinite Matter*; to which essentially belonged *Motion*, a Motion like that of a Stormy Sea, or a Tempestuous Air. This ceaseless Agitation, in which the innumerable Particles of Matter *pressed on one another*, like the Sea-Waves, or continual Blasts of Wind, constituted That Force, which the Ancienter Poets and Physiologers called *Necessity*. The *Power* of this *Necessity*, we see then, must have been greater or less, in proportion to the more or less *Determinate Nature* of the Parts of *Infinite Matter*.—Concerning this Point the different Philosophic Hypotheses to the Time of *Anaxagoras*, are briefly related in Note 93. to *the Greater Hippias*: to which it now becomes opportune to make the following Supplement. —Nearly contemporary with *Anaxagoras* lived *Empedocles*; who, coming out of the *Pythagorean* or *Italic* School, held the Four Elements to be ἀγέννητα, the *Original, Primary, Forms of Nature*. Farther, on observing that the disagreeing and contrary Qualities of these Elements in time dissolved those Bodys, which by their Agreement they had composed, he was induced to think, that this Agreement between them, which he called *Friendship*, and that Disagreement, which he called *Strife* or *Contention*, were the Two *Reigning Powers* in Nature, by whose *alternate Government* all Natural Bodys were *generated* and *destroy'd*. —Now *Pythagoras*, and all his genuine Disciples, such as *Empedocles* was, held that not only the *Matter*, but the *Form* also, of the World was *eternal*. For it seemed to Them necessary to suppose, that the Elements, being not only *Few*, and *Bounded*, but *Regular Forms*, were themselves formed by *Mind*; and that This was a Principle *co-æval* with *Matter*: for, since it is the Nature of Mind to *form with Order*, wherever it is, and the Nature of Matter to be the *Subject* of Form, and to be incapable of subsisting without some Form or other, it follows, that if all the ἀγέννητα, the *Original Forms of Nature*, were such as inferred a *Forming Mind*, and if Matter, the Subject of these Forms, subsisted thro' *Infinite Time* past, then the *Forming Mind* not only must have been *eternal*, but must have acted eternally according

had been no ⁸⁴ Castrations, no Chains, none of those many other Acts of Violence had been done or suffered amongst them :

ing to its own Nature, without any Obstacle to oppose it, forming its Subject with *perfect Order*; and its Subject being *Infinite Matter*, it must eternally have formed it into that most *Beautiful Order of All things*, THE WORLD.—According to this Doctrine therefore, the Disagreement or *Strife* between Things was as much the *Work of Mind* as their *Friendship* or Agreement; not only because Both are necessary to produce the Harmony of Things, as *Eryximachus* in his Speech observed; but because also without the *ἔρις* or *Strife* of the Elements, all Nature would be at a Stand; for if nothing were dissolved, nothing New would be generated; and consequently Mind, contrary to the Nature of it, would cease to act; or, if it acted, must act otherwise than according to its Nature, which is to begin Orderly Motion, to unite Things which are separate, and reduce to regular Form Things which are disordered.—We shall have Occasion to treat of this Point more copiously in our Notes on *the Timæus*.—We have introduced it here, not only to distinguish the Doctrine of *Necessity* and *Love*, as it was delivered by the *old Physiologists*, from the Doctrine of *Strife* and *Friendship*, maintained by *Empedocles*; but to show even the *Opposition* between them, and thus by *Contrast* to illustrate the former, espoused by the Poet *Agatho*.

⁸⁴ The Allegorical Meaning of these Fables was to describe the Contest and Opposition between the several Mechanical Powers of the Parts of Infinite Matter in their (supposed) original wild Motion; before the Cause of Order could extricate its self, come forth into Action, and get the Mastery over them All. The *Chains* and *Fetters* signify the hindering one another from operating; and the *Castration* means a Precluding of some Determinate Forms from generating, or producing their natural Effects. — *Hesiod*, in whose fine Poem concerning the *Generation of the Gods* we read these Fables, was one of those ancient *Physiological Poets*, mentioned in the preceding Note.—But had it not been for this Passage in *Plato*, no Person could ever have suspected, that

them : but Friendship and Peace had flourished in Heaven,
as

Parmenides had philosophised in the same manner concerning the Origin of Things. And as to our selves, we are rather inclined to think, that *Plato* has represented *Agatho* mistaking the Sense of that Philosopher, on purpose to show the total Ignorance of this fanciful young Poet on so profoundly philosophical a Subject ; an Ignorance, which he makes him afterwards ingenuously confess. We are confirmed in this Opinion by some Verses of *Parmenides*, recorded by *Simplicius* in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*, fol. 7. a. which are these :— Speaking of the World, that Philosophic Poet says,

Ταυλόν τε δὲν, ἐν ταυτῷ τε μένον, καθ' ἑαυτὸ κεῖται.

so the first Line is printed ; but perhaps it should be thus ;

Ταυλόν τ', ἐν ταυτῷ τε μένον, κατὰ ταυλά τε κεῖται.
Οὕτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κράτερη γὰρ ἀνάγκη
Πείραλος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἔργει.

*Still 'tis the same, in the same Place abides,
Its State and Disposition still the same :
Thus stably fix'd ; for strong NECESSITY
Fast holds it in her CHAINS : the Chains are BOUNDS,
Which all around incompass it, and strict
Inclose it. —*

It is evident at first Sight, that the Chains, mentioned in these Verses, are very different from the Chains which *Hesiod* writes of. — But farther ; if *Parmenides* is here speaking (as *Simplicius* tells us he is) of the κόσμος νοητός, the *Intelligible World*, that is, the World as it contains always all the same Kinds and Species of Things, (and what he says is not true of the World as it is continually passing and the Forms of it incessantly changing ;) he must then by *Bound* mean the same Thing which

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as they now do, and have ever done, since ⁸⁵ Love began his Reign, and became Chief amongst the Gods. —

P 2

Thus

which *Plato* does throughout his *Philebus*, that is FORM. Add to this, that *Plato* in his *Timæus*, pag. 43. uses the same Metaphor of *Chains* to express the *Bounds* by which *Forms* are held, as well in the *permanent* World as in the *passing*; and calls those of the first Sort δεσμοὶ ἀλύτοι, *Chains* or *Bonds* *indissoluble*. — If this be true, it follows, that by *Necessity*, in the Verses just cited, *Parmenides* means that GREAT BEING, in whose MIND are contained all the permanent Forms, the Kinds and Species of Things. But of this more in our Notes on the 10th Book of *the Republick*. It is to be observed, in Confirmation of what we have said, that in the Passage of *Parmenides*, before cited by *Phædrus*, we find no Mention made of *Chaos*, or any thing which can signify an original *Blind Force* in the Nature of Things: but the direct Contrary is plainly enough expressed; for we are there told, that *Love* was introduced into the World by some Cause which acted with *Counsel*, *Contrivance*, and *Design*.

⁸⁵ *Love* is here taken for that *Harmony* of Things, the Result of their Agreements and Disagreements. See Note 83. Whence the Ancient Mythologic Poets fabled, that *Harmonia* was the Daughter of *Venus* and *Mars*, that is, of the φιλία and ἔρις of *Empedocles*; as we learn from *Heraclides*, in the *Opusc. Mytholog.* ex Edit. 2^{da}. pag. 494. and the Author *de Vitâ Homeri*, in the same Collection, pag. 328. — To this Passage in *Plato*, and to the ancient Doctrine, mentioned in the preceding Note, our learned Poet, *Spencer*, probably alludes in his *Fairy Queen*, B. 5. C. 10. for in St. 34. he calls this *Harmony* or *Concord*,

Mother of blessed Peace and Friendship true,

and in the next Stanza thus proceeds,

*By Her the Heav'n is in his Course contained,
And all the World in State unmoved stands,
As their Almighty Maker first ordained,
And bound them with inviolable Bands, &c.*

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Thus then it appears, that Love is Young.—Nor is he less delicate and tender. But he wants a Poet, such as Homer was, to express in fit Terms how great his Tendernefs. Now Homer, where he tells us that Ate or Mischief was a Goddess, of a subtle and fine Frame, thus describes the Tendernefs and Delicacy of her Feet ;

*The tender-footed Goddess shuns the Ground ;
With airy Step, upon the Heads of Men
Sets her fine Treading, and from Head to Head
Trips it along full nimbly. —*

The Poet here produces a fair Proof, I think, of her Tendernefs, her Going on the Soft Place rather than the Hard. The same Argument shall I make Use of, to prove the Tendernefs of Love. For He neither walks on the Ground, nor goes upon Human Heads, (which in truth are Places not altogether soft ;) but the softest Places, possible to be found, does Love make the Places of his Range, and of his Dwelling too. For in the Manners and in the Souls of Gods and Men he fixes his Abode : — not in all Souls indiscriminately ; for if he lights on any, whose Manners are rough, away he marches, and takes up his Residence in tender Souls, whose Manners are the softest. Since therefore with his Feet, and all over his fine Frame, he endures not to touch Any but the softest Persons, nor in any but their softest Parts, he cannot but be extremely delicate and tender. —

Thus have we seen, that Love is full of Youth, Delicacy and Tenderneſs. — He is, beſides, of a ſoft and yielding Subſtance. For it would be impoſſible for him to diffuſe himſelf thro' every Part of us, and penetrate into our inmoſt Soul, or to make his firſt Entry and his final Exit unperceived by Us, if his Subſtance were hard and reſiſting to the Touch. But a clear Proof of his yielding, eaſy, and pliant Form is that Gracefulneſs of Perſon, which it is certain belongs to him in the higheſt Degree by the Acknowledgement of All: For Ungracefulneſs and Love never agree, but are always viſibly at Variance.—That he excels in Beauty of Colour, is evident from his Way of Life, in that he is continually converſant with Flowers, his own Likeneſs. For Love reſides not in a Body, or in a Soul, or any other Place, where Flowers never ſprung; or, if they did, where they are all fallen, and the Place quite deflowered. But wherever a Spot is to be found flowery and fragrant, he there feats himſelf and ſettles his Abode.—Concerning the Beauty of this Deity ⁸⁶ thus much is ſufficient; tho' much ſtill remains unſaid. — ⁸⁷ I am to ſpeak next on the Subject of his Virtue.

⁸⁶ Thus far *Agatho* has confounded the Object of Love, *the Amiable*, with the *Paſſion* itſelf, conſidered as *refined*, and peculiarly belonging to the *Human Species*.

⁸⁷ From Allegory, and Metaphor, and true Wit, *Agatho* deſcends to Pun, and Quibble, and Playing on Words, with ſcarce a Semblance of juſt Thought. — In this next Part of his Deſcription he means, by Love, that *groſſer* Part of the Paſſion, common to all Animals: and this too he confounds with the *Satisfaction* of it thro' Enjoyment.

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Virtue. And here the highest Praise, which can be attributed to any Being, is justly due to Love ;—that he does no Injury to God or Man ; nor by God or Man can he be injured. He never acts thro' Compulsion or Force, Himself ; for Compulsion or Force cannot reach Love : nor ever forces he or compels Others ; for every Being obeys freely and willingly every Dictate and Command of Love : where Both Partys then are willing, and Each is freely consenting to the Other, Those in the City who are Kings, the Laws, say there is no Injustice done.—But not only the Perfection of Justice belongs to Love ; he is equally endued with consummate Temperance. For to be superior to Pleasure, and to govern the Desires of it, is every where called Temperance. Now 'tis universally agreed, that no Pleasure is superior to Love ; but on the contrary, that all Pleasures are his Inferiors. If so, they must be Subjects and Servants, all of them, to Love ; and He must rule, and be the Master. Having Dominion thus over all Pleasures and all Desires, in the highest Degree must He be Temperate.—Then, in Point of Valour, not Mars himself can pretend to vye with Love. ⁸⁸ For it is not, Mars has Love, but Love has

Mars ;

⁸⁸ To apprehend the Wit of this Passage, we must observe, that the Word *has* is here used in two Senses : in the first Part of the Sentence, it means *the Soul being affected with the Passion* ; in the next, it means *the Passion possessing the Soul*. There is the same double Meaning of the Word *habeo* in the *Latin* and every Modern Language derived from it ; and is no Solecism in *English*.—But there seems to be more Wit and Smartness in a Repartee of *Aristippus*, in which he play'd on the

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Mars; the Love, as Fame says, of Venus. Now the Person who has Another in his Possession, must have the Mastery over that Person whom he possesses. The Subduer and Master then of Him, who in Valour excels all Others, must himself in that Virtue excel without Exception All.—Thus we have already shown the Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude of this God. To show his Wisdom is yet wanting: and I must do my Best, to be no way wanting to my Subject. —⁸⁹ In the first place then, that I may honour my own Art, like Eryximachus, with my first Regards,—in the⁹⁰ Wisdom of Poetry Love is so great a Master, that he is able to make Any one a Poet. For, tho' a Man be ever so much a Stranger to the Muses, yet, as soon as his Soul is touched by Love, he becomes a Poet. ⁹¹ It concerns Me, to lay a

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same Word, tho' somewhat differently; when, on his being reproached with having *Lais*, a celebrated Courtezan, for his Mistress, he replied, ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἐκ ἔχομαι. True, I have her, that is, enjoy her; but She has not Me; that is, has me not in her Power.

⁸⁹ *Agatbo*, in this Part of his Description, uses the Word *Love* in three different Senses: First, as it means that *fine Passion* in the Human Species only, which, by rousing and improving the Facultys of the Soul, supplies the Want and does the Office of Genius: Next, as it means the *Passion*, whose Power is exerted chiefly in the Body, and by exciting every *Animal* to the Work of *Generation*, executes the Ends for which Nature implanted it in them all: Lastly, as it means a Particular *Genius*, or strong Bent of the Mind from Nature to some Particular *Study*, which seldom fails of improving and perfecting every *Art*.

⁹⁰ See Note 23.

⁹¹ In this Sentence *Agatbo* justifies the Character, which *Socrates* had given of him just before, and shows himself a truly polite and well-bred?

particular Stress on this Argument, to prove Love an excellent Poet, in all that Kind of Creative Power,⁹² which is the proper Province of the Muses. For no Being can impart to Another that which its Self has not, or teach Another that which its Self knows not.—In the other Kind of the Creative Power, the Making of Animals, 'tis undeniably to the Wisdom of this Deity, that all Living Things owe their Generation and Production. — Then, for the Works of the Mechanic Arts, know we not, that every Artist, who hath Love for his Teacher, becomes eminent and illustrious; but that the Artist, whom Love inspires not
and

bred Man. For, upon his Mention of the Art of Poety, in which he had lately appeared so excellent, he here *modestly* declines the attributing any *Merit* in that respect to his own *Poetic Genius*, as if he was a Favorite of the *Muses*; and with great *Gallantry* transfers the Praise, bestowed upon Himself, to *Love*; as if Love, and not the Muses, had inspired him.

⁹² *Plato* has here contrived an Opportunity for *Agatho* to play upon a Word, or use it in more Senses than one. For the *Greek* Word *ποίησις*, which we have translated *Creative Power*, signifies not only *Making* or *Creation*, but *Poetry* too: as the Word *ποιητής* signifies both *Creator* and *Poet*. Taking Advantage of these different Meanings, *Agatho* attributes *ποίησις* or *Creation* to each of the Three Kinds of *Love*, mentioned in Note 88, as the Work or Effect of Each.—To the First he attributes *Poetry*, an *Art* which *creates*, as it were, or makes out of *nothing real*, out of the *meer Imagination* of the Poet, its own *Subject*.—To the Next he justly ascribes the *Making* or Generating of *Animals*, in a Way peculiar to *Nature*; who, beginning from the *smallest Materials*, and collecting all the rest by insensible Degrees from all neighboring Quarters, forming all the while, and animating
whilst

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and animates, never rises from Obscurity? —⁹³ The Bowman's Art, the Art of Healing, and that of Divination, were the Inventions of Apollo, under the Guidance of Love, and the Influence of his auspicious Power. So that the God of Wisdom himself, we see, was the Disciple of the God of Love. Prompted by Love, the Muses invented the Art of Musick, Vulcan the Art of working Metals, Minerva the Art of Weaving, and Jupiter the Art of well Governing the Gods and Mortals. From the Beginning of that Æra were the Affairs of the Gods well settled; from the Time when Love arose and interposed among them, — the Love certainly of Beauty; for Disorder and Deformity are by no means the Objects of Love. — Antecedent to that Time it was, as I observed before, that those many sad and strange Accidents, they tell us, befel the Gods: it was when Necessity reigned, and ruled in All things. ⁹⁴ But as soon

whilst she forms, seems to *create* out of *Nothing* too. — And Love, in the Sense in which he uses the Word last, he no less justly supposes to have the Principal Hand in *making* the most excellent *Works* of every *Art*, where the Artist hath his *Subject-Matter* ready created, and lying all at once before him, and apparently therefore *creates* nothing but the *Form*.

⁹³ In the following String of *Fables*, some of which are *Allegorical*, some merely idle and amusing *Fictions*, Love is taken in various Senses. But as every one of them has been already considered, we leave to our Readers, by the Help of the Mythologists, to separate the several Loves, which *Agatbo* has here jumbled together.

⁹⁴ Since *Agatbo* here returns to the Subject, with which he first began, we must beg Leave to follow him, in doing so our selves; be-

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cause,

soon as the Charms of Beauty gave Birth to the God whom
We celebrate, with him rose every Good which blesses either
Gods

cause, after what we have said in Note 83 and the next following, we have a better Opportunity, than we had before, of distinguishing the Doctrine of *Parmenides* concerning Love from that of *Hesiod*; and because also we shall be better able, when that is done, to explain some new Matter which arises in this Place.—To begin with *Parmenides*, whose Doctrine seems to be of the earliest Antiquity; we must first observe, that he made the Foundation of his Philosophy *this*, to distinguish between the *Intelligible World* and the *Sensible*; that is, between the World considered as *permanent*, and considered again as *passing*. This is apparent from all his Remains, compared together. He treated of Both these Worlds, that is, of the World in Both these Senses, *distinctly*: and to make this Distinction properly, applying in every particular Passage what he says of the World to that World which he there meant, is the Key to all his Philosophy. In the Passage, cited from him in Note 84. where he means the World of *permanent Forms*, he places at the Head of Things *Universal Mind*, comprehending and containing All.—But when he comes to speak of the World of *Forms transitory*, or *passing*, μελεθὼν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ὁ Παρμενίδης, says *Simplicius*, Com. in *Aristot. Phys.* fol. 7. b. he first mentions the Active and the Passive Elements of Nature, τῆς γενέσεως, concurring in the Generation of every Form, tho' contrary to each other; and then adds

Ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τέτων Δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾷ.

*In midst of these is that Divinity,
Which governs All things. —————*

That is, the Intellectual Soul of the World, mixing those Elements together, and directing the Motion of All things.—*Simplicius* afterwards in the same Work, fol. 9. a. tells us, that *Parmenides* held this Δαίμων, or Soul of the World, to be θεῶν αἰτίαν, the Cause, or Parent, of the
Gods,

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Gods or Mortals.—Thus, Phædrus, in the first place, Love, as he appears to Me, is most excellent Himself in Beauty and

Gods, that is, of the Powers of Nature; and that *This* was what he meant by *Love*, in that Verse (cited by *Phædrus* in his Speech)

Πρώτιστον μὲν ἔρωτα θεῶν μήϊσατο πάντων.

*First from the MIND Eternal forth came LOVE,
First of the Gods. —*

By what Word *Parmenides* had expressed that *Source of all Deity*, which we have called by the Names of *Counsel* and *Mind*, does not indeed appear to Us: for we know not the Verses which immediately preceded *This*: but, as the Verb μήϊσατο signifies *he designed and contrived*, we have supposed the Noun, or Name, included in the Verb; and from the Kind of Energy, and the Manner of energising, have inferred the Nature of the energising Cause, Source, or Author. But in all Probability the Word was either Μῆτις, Ζεὺς, or Νῆς, Terms made use of in the *Orphic Theology* to express the Original or *First Cause of Things*; it being evident, that *Parmenides* derived his Doctrine from that Quarter. For amongst the *Orphic Fragments*, recorded by *Proclus*, we find the following,

— Μῆτις, πρῶτος γενέτωρ, καὶ Ἔρως πολυερπής.

Procli Com. in Timæum, L. 3. pag. 156.

**MIND, great Progenitor of All; and LOVE,
Fountain of every various Stream of Joy.**

And this,

Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς, Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀπάντων ἀρχιγένεθλος.

Ἐν κράτος, εἰς Δαίμων γενέλο, μέγας ἀρχὸς ἀπάντων.

Id. Ibid. L. 2. pag. 95.

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and in Virtue ; in the next place, he is the Cause of the like Excellencys in other Beings. — I feel within me an Inclination

*JOVE is the King Supreme ; JOVE is, alone,
Great Ancestor, and Parent-Stock of All.
From All congenial thus, thus close ally'd,
One Strength resulted ; and One mighty SOUL.
Thus rose, commanding and directing All.*

And this other,

——— πατρικὸς νοὸς αὐτογένητος
Πᾶσιν ἐνέσπειρεν δεσμὸν πυρίεστιν ἔρωτος.

Id. Ibid. L. 3. pag. 155.

This Passage, in order to explain, from the Platonists and chiefly from *Proclus*, the full Sense of the Word πυρίεστιν, we have paraphrased at large as follows,

*The Self-originate Paternal MIND,
To bind together All things, planted LOVE
Deep in their Natures : for with Force of Fire
Running thro' All things, Love assembles them ;
Links them together in his Golden Chain ;
Inspires thro' All One Life ; and is, Himself,
Their One harmonious harmonising SOUL.*

Justly therefore is it observed by Dr. Gale, in his Notes to *Apollodorus*, pag. 3. that Μῆτις was the Supreme God of Orpheus and his Followers ; and that *Hesiod*, who is said to have corrupted the *Orphic Theology*, began with doing so in this Point. For *Hesiod*, we see, derived Love from *Chaos* alone, without the Help of Μῆτις, Mind, Counsel, or Design, which he introduced into the World, not till long after ; and ought therefore to be ranked with *Democritus*, *Epicurus*, and Others, who supposed that Mind arose from Matter. See Lord *Shaftesbury*,

clination to make a Verse or two on this Subject, on the Effects which Love produces ; —

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vol. 2. p. 296. So that by *Love* 'tis probable that He meant nothing more than a blind *Attraction* of *Like to Like*. For amongst the Infinite Number of the Particles of Matter in the supposed Chaos, Some were similar to Others ; the Dissimilarity of Things not being Infinite : and amidst the infinite Irregularity of the Motions of them all, Similar Particles must sometimes have happened to meet : in These therefore the Principle of Attraction must have operated, so as to make them cohere together. In like manner Many of the same Sort were by degrees assembled. Thus they grew powerful ; and, in Mythologic Language, became Gods. But in process of time, as the Assortment of Things from the same Cause, that is, Attraction, more and more took place ; and as Order is, in its own Nature, more powerful and durable than Disorder ; those half-formed Gods were dethroned by their Issue, that is, by the Elements of Nature, at length completely separated, and severally occupying their due Places. For we are to observe, that Another *blind Force* is here introduced, the former being found insufficient to make the World ; and This is complicated of two Others, *Gravity*, and *Attraction* to the *Centre* ; being a Centripetal Force of the Elementary Bodys, in proportion to the Specific Gravity of Each. In consequence of this, the *Earthy* Particles, wherever they happened to be, when they were all first assembled together, made a *Centre* ; and the Particles of the *other Elements* placed themselves *round it*, one above another, in as fair Ranks, as if they had been full of *Mind*, and in *Love* with *Order*. — What *Homer* meant, when he said,

Ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς εἰς τὸν ὅμοιον.

Some Power Divine Like ever leads to Like.

whether by this *Divine Power* he meant *blind Force*, or a *directing Mind* ; (for every *Power in Nature*, which the *Greeks* understood not, they

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*The rugged Main he smooths, the Rage of Men
He softens; thro' the troubled Air he spreads
A Calm, and lulls th' unquiet Soul to Rest.*

It is He, who frees us from Reserve and Strangeness; and who procures us Openness and Intimacy: It is He, who establishes

they called *God*;) and whether his *Jupiter* made that Golden Chain, reaching from Earth to Heav'n, or only held it in his Hand when made; and whether therefore this Prince of Poets is to be referred to the Party of *Orpheus*, or to that of *Hesiod*, is not quite clear: and 'tis impossible for Us, as *Socrates* says in the *Lesser Hippias*, to ask him What he had in his Mind when he wrote those Verses. But this is certain, that the *Orphic Divines*, θεολόγοι, (as *Proclus* always calls them) and the old Physiologists, or *Naturalists*, φυσικοί, so called by *Aristotle*, all concur in the Point of Doctrine, at which we are now arrived, — that as soon as this *Creative Power*, whether Intelligent or not, this *Elder Love*, had framed and established the Order of Things, *Venus*, that is, the *Beauty of Nature*, shone out in all her attractive Charms; and thus gave Occasion to the Birth of the *Younger Love*, celebrated in this place by *Agatho*. — To compleat this Subject, we have only to remark, that the *Venus* just now mentioned, the *Outward Beauty of Nature*, in the Whole or in any Part, is, according to the *Platonists*, the *Younger Venus*, or the ἐγκόσμιος, the *Mundane*; the *Elder Venus*, whom they stile also ὑπερκόσμιος, being the *Beauty of the Ideal World*, of which the Other is a *Copy* continually renewed, or, what is the same thing, a continued *Series* of fresh Copys. — To this Original and *Archetypal Beauty* the Speech of *Socrates* will conduct our Thoughts. — In the mean time, whoever has any Relish for this ancient Doctrine, may find much Entertainment in the Perusal of some Passages in the Works of our most excellent Poet, *Spencer*, relating to the *Two Worlds*, the *Intelligible* and the *Sensible*, the *Two Venuses* thence arising, with their *Two attendant Loves*; — Passages, which at the same time that they illustrate by

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blishes social Meetings and Assemblies, such as this of Ours : in Festival Entertainments, in Dances, and in Feasts, He is the Manager, the Leader, and the Founder : introducing Courtesy and Sweetness, banishing Rusticity and Savageness : dispensing abroad Benevolence and Kindness, restraining Malignity and Ill-Will : propitious, gracious, and good to All : the admired Spectacle of Wise Men, the heart-felt Delight of Gods : the Envy of Those to whose Lot he falls not, the Acquisition of Such only as are Fortunate : the Parent of Delicacy and Tenderness, of Elegance and Grace, of attractive Charms and amorous Desires : observant of Good, o'erlooking Evil : in Difficultys, in Fears, in silent Wishes, and in soft Addresses, the Protector, the Encourager, the Patron and the Inspirer : of Gods and Men, of All linked together, the Beauty and the Ornament : a Guide to all which is good and amiable, the best and the most charming : whom it is the Duty of Every one to follow ; joining in Chorus to his Praise ; or bearing Part in that sweet Song, sung by Love himself, with which he softens the Heart and sooths the Mind of every God and Mortal.—This is My Speech, Phædrus, which I consecrate to Love ; a Speech, partly jocose
and

by their beautiful Imagery what has thus far been said on those Subjects, receive much of true Light from it, Themselves. These are — the Description of *Nature* in the last of his Two separate *Cantos of Mutability*, and the Judgment there given by Nature in the Cause referred to her Decision ; — the Beginning of each of his Two First *Hymns to Love and Beauty* ; — and the Description of *Love* in his Poem entitled “ *Colin Clouts come home again.*”

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and partly serious, such as the best of My poor Abilitys in Wit and Eloquence are able to furnish out ⁹⁵.

⁹⁵ Now that we have viewed *Love*, under those different Ideas of it, severally presented to us in the preceding Speeches, and mixed confusedly in the Speech of *Agatho*, it may perhaps not be disagreeable to see all those Ideas exhibited together without Confusion, in a *Sonnet to Love*, recorded by *Laertius* in his *Life of Crantor*; which we have thus translated in the way of Paraphrase, to serve instead of Notes to it.

1.

*Love ! tho' thy Birth be boasted high by Fame,
Said to have sprung from Heav'nly Race ;
Doubts fill my Mind, yet free from wilful Blame,
Whether from Heav'n or Earth thine Origin to trace.*

2.

*First of the Gods immortal, into Light,
Midst the dark Ocean rolling round,
Did Erebus and old Imperial Night
Produce thee, ere a Place for Earth or Heav'n was found ?*

3.

*Or fill'd with Jove's own Intellectual Fire,
Did Venus bring thee forth, Her Son ?
From Universal Beauty rose Desire ?
And thus to thy Dominion every Heart was won.*

4.

*Or is thy baser Being born of Earth ?
Hence to gross Body bends thy Way.
Or if the spritely Winds have giv'n thee Birth,
Hence haply art thou fickle, light and fleet, as They.*

5.

*Forgive these Doubts : so many Goods and Ills,
Flowing from Thee, 'mong Men abound ;
So dubious, sway'd by Thee, are Human Wills ;
No Wonder, if ambiguous be thy Nature found.*



When Agatho had done speaking, Aristodemus told me, the Room rang with the Applauses of the Company ; all of them loudly declaring, that Agatho's Speech on Love was worthy of himself, and worthy of the God in whose Honour it was spoken.—Upon which Socrates, directing his Eyes to Eryximachus, said,—Well, what think you now, You, Son of Acumenus? Think you not, that I had good Grounds for those Fears, I told you I was under ; and that I spake prophetically, when I said, that Agatho would make an admirable Speech, and that I should be driven to Distress? — The First Thing, replied Eryximachus, I think you foretold truly, “ that Agatho's Speech would be excellent ; ” —but the Other, that “ Your Self would be driven to Distress,” I do not believe was a true Prophecy.—How, my good Friend, said Socrates, should I avoid being at a Loss, and distressed for Something to say? or how indeed could any other Person, who was to speak, after a Speech on the same Subject, so full of Beauty and Variety? It was not, I must acknowlege, in all Respects, and in all the Parts of it, equally admirable : But Who, that heard the Conclusion, could help being astonished at the elegant Choice of Words, and Beauty of the Diction? For my Part, when I consider, how little I shall be able to say any thing, that will not fall far short of it, I should be tempted to run away for very Shame, had I any Possibility of making my Escape. For, whilst

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he was speaking, he put me in mind of ⁹⁶ Gorgias: and to say the truth, That which Homer relates, struck me at that

⁹⁶ In taking a superficial View of this Passage, nothing more appears in it, than a Compliment made to *Agatho* on that rich Vein of Oratory, which had run through all the latter Part of his Speech, in likening it to the Eloquence of *Gorgias*. For the Reputation of *Gorgias*, as an Orator, was at the highest Pitch imaginable amongst the Athenians in that Age, as may be seen in *the Greater Hippias*, page 26, and in Note 91 to that Dialogue.—In outward Appearance, we say, this seems to be the whole Meaning of the Mention of *Gorgias* in this Place; and is indeed the Whole of what *Stephens* understood from it. — But under the Compliment lies concealed a Piece of Satyrical Humour. For *Gorgias* was the First who corrupted Oratory with the injudicious and unlimited Use of *Antitheses*, *Paritys*, and those other still lesser Ornaments of Style, enumerated in *the Argument*, page 7. He was fond of them to such a Degree, that when the Great Fathers of Criticism, *Plato* and *Aristotle*, had, by their excellent Rules, established a better Taste in Style; and when *Demosthenes*, in exhibiting to the World a living Pattern of Perfection in Oratory, was seen to disdain those adulterated Beauties, which had vulgarly been so much admired; from that time, falling into Disrepute with all Men of Sense, they obtained the Name of γοργιασμοί, *Gorgiasms*. — Now the latter Part of *Agatho's* Speech, beginning with the Specimen he gives of his Poetry, is full of these *Gorgiasms*. It is indeed nothing else but a Chain of *Antitheses* and *Paritys*; *Paritys* chiefly of That Kind called by the ancient Criticks ἰσόκωλα, where two or more larger Members of a Sentence are alike in their Grammatical Structure, as being composed of like lesser Parts, Noun answering to Noun, Verb to Verb, and so of the rest. Amongst these are also introduced, as additional and assistant Graces, many of the more puerile *Gorgiasms*, Similitudes of Sound, and every Kind of Jingle. — That the *Tragedies* of *Agatho*

that Time very sensibly. — Now, thought I, what if Agatho should at the last send forth the Head of that formidable

Agatho were no less crowded with *Gorgiasms*, we learn from *Ælian* in his *Various Histories*, L. 14. C. 13. as also from *Aristophanes*, (for on this Point we may well give Credit to him,) who in his *Θεσμοφορίάζουσα* has introduced the Person of *Agatho* versifying, in an Ode where the Numbers are remarkably soft, the Measure light, and the Words smooth and delicate, and abounding with *Adnominations*, and *similar Terminations*. — Thus we find, that *Plato*, in the Speech attributed to *Agatho*, has purposely and properly imitated *Agatho's Style*, chiefly in the latter Part of that Speech; as in all the former Parts 'tis probable that he imitated the Turn of his *Wit* and *Genius*. We can by no means, however, assent to the Propriety of the Terms made Use of by *Athenæus*, pag. 187. where he says, that *Plato διασύρει, χλευάζει τε*, scoffs and jeers at the *ισόκωλα* and *ἀντίθετα* of *Agatho*. We rather think, that, though he intended to satyrize the immoderate Use of those too splendid Figures of Speech, by giving a glaring Example of their Excess, and consequently exposing it to the Ridicule of the Judicious, yet he has set them off to the best Advantage possible: for he has made their Excess the less nauseous by varying them so agreeably; and has softened his Satyr still more by introducing them in proper Time and Place, in an idle Speech professedly calculated for Entertainment, and upon a Subject which opens the Mind most to Pleasure: whereas *Gorgias* and *Agatho* introduced them there, where least of all they ought to have any Place; the One, in grave Orations on Affairs of State, before an Audience whose own Interests were at Stake; the Other, in solemn Representations of Tragical Events, intended to excite the graver Passions, and to interest the Audience as deeply as if it was their own Case. Nor did *Agatho* commit this Capital Fault only in the Chorus-Scenes, where the Drama or Action was suspended, but frequently even in the Recitativo-Scenes, where it was con-

midable Speaker, Gorgias, ⁹⁷ to assault my Imagination; and thus should, by the Conclusion of His Speech, stop My Speech, and turn into Stone my Speaking Faculties! — I considered, how ridiculous it was in Me, to profess myself a great Master in Love-Matters, and consent to bear a Part with You in making Panegyricks on Love, when at
the

tinued. For so *Philostratus*, speaking of *Agatho*, says, *πολλαχῶ τῶν ἱαμβείων γοργιάζει*, *he gorgiases, or uses Gorgiasms in many places of his Iambicks*, that is, in the *Dramatic Part* of his Tragedies. How cold those affected Graces are on such Occasions, and how greatly they diminish the Passion of the Scene, must be felt by All: but in *Agatho's* Speech on Love they appear so beautiful, that a Man must have a very correct and sober Judgment, not to be smitten with them too vehemently, and be tempted to cry out, with *Mnesilochus* in *Aristophanes*, after hearing some of *Agatho's* Poetry, Ὡς ἡδὺ τὸ μέλος! *How sweet the Melody!*

⁹⁷ This Passage in the *Greek* runs thus, — ἐφοβέμην, μή μοί τελευτῶν ὁ Ἀγάθων Γοργίᾱ κεφαλὴν δεινῶ λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πέμψας, κ. τ. λ. In this, as also in the preceding Sentence, where *Gorgias* is mentioned, *Cornarius* would have us read Γοργῆς, instead of Γοργίᾱ, and consequently, in this last, δεινὸς instead of δεινῶ, referring this Attribute to *Agatho*; and quite insensible, as it seems, to the many Strokes of Humour in this Passage: for he gravely gives this notable Reason for his Alteration, — that the Head of *Gorgias*, truly, had no such Power, as is here attributed to it. — But he has forgotten to clear up a small Difficulty, which attends his Alteration; and that is, — how *Agatho* the Handsome, for so he was commonly called, or *Agatho's* handsome Speech, should immediately put *Socrates* in mind of the *Gorgon's* Head. — The Train of Thought here is evidently This; — *Agatho* put *Socrates* in mind of *Gorgias*, through the Similitude of their Styles;
the

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the same Time I was entirely ignorant of the Affair we undertook, and knew not the right Way to celebrate the Praise

the Thought of *Gorgias* put him in mind of *Gorgon*, through the Similitude of their Names; and perhaps because he thought them both alike πέλωρα, *Prodigies*; and the Thought of *Gorgon* brought to his Mind the following Passage in *Homer's Odyssey*, L. 11.

—— ἐμὲ δ' ἔχλωρόν δέος ἦρει,
Μή μοι γοργεῖν κεφαλὴν δεινοῖο πελώρου,
Ἐξ αἴδος πέμψειεν ἀγὰυὴ περσεφόνηα.

*Pale Fear then seiz'd me, and the dreadful Thought, ——
—— Now should the Gorgon's Head, that Prodigy
Terrific, be by stern Proserpine sent,
Forth from her viewless Realm, to assault my Eyes,
Visible in all it's Horrors! ——*

'Tis easy to observe, that *Socrates* not only alludes humorously to *Homer's Thought* in this Passage, but to heighten the Humour, has used several of *Homer's Words*. We have followed him in so doing, where it was possible for us; adapting these Passages, one to the other, in the Translation. But in One of the Words, an important one to the Humour, we found it scarcely possible. For the Word δεινός, here in *Homer*, signifies terrible or frightful; and the same Word, as used here by *Plato*, signifies great, weighty, or powerful. Now in English Both these Meanings are not to be expressed fully and exactly by the same Word. The Word "Formidable," however, tho' it would weaken the Sense in *Homer*, may serve to express the Allusion in *Plato* to *Homer's "Terrific."* —— This double Meaning of the Word δεινός, and the Similitude of Sound between *Gorgon* and *Gorgias*, or between Γοργεῖν [κεφαλὴ] and Γοργεῖν, seem to be

Praise of any Thing. ⁹⁸ For I was so silly, as to imagine, that we ought never to say any Thing but what was true in our Encomiums on any Subject whatever; that the real Properties of it were the Materials, which lay before us, as it were, to work on; and that the Business of a Panegyrist was nothing more, than out of these Materials to select the handsomest and best, and frame them together in the most skilful and the best Manner. Prepossessed with this Imagination, I had entertained a strong Opinion, that

be humorous Imitations of the Style of *Agatho* and *Gorgias*, who were, Both of them, fond of such Puns and Puerilities. See Note 49. — It is necessary to take Notice of some other Words in this Passage, because *Stephens* has thrown in a Suspicion of their not being genuine, the Words ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, — probably imagining them to be a Marginal Gloss on the Word λέγειν: whereas they are in truth absolutely necessary to the Sense; λόγῳ here being opposed to ἔργῳ, to the *actual* sending forth, and presenting *visibly*, the Head of *Gorgias*. See Note 25. to *the Io*. Besides, that the Omission of those Words would much diminish the Glare of another *Gorgiaſm*, which seems intended in λέγειν, λόγῳ, and λόγον, the Repetition of the Words “speak” and “Speech.”

⁹⁸ *Socrates*, having satyriized *Agatho's* Style, with regard to the affected Ornaments of it, and its Want of Simplicity; but doing it with that delicate and fine Humour, in which He led the Way to all the politer Satyrists, particularly to the Roman Poet *Horace*, and our own *Addison*; proceeds now, in that Ironical Way, peculiar to Himself, to satyriize the *Sentiments* in *Agatho's* Speech, with regard to their Want of Truth, Justness of Thought, and Pertinence to the Subject.

I should speak well on the Subject proposed, ⁹⁹ because I well knew what Praises were with Truth to be ascribed to Love. Whereas I now find, that This is not the right Way of making a Panegyrick; but that, when we praise, we are to attribute to our Subject all Qualities which are Great and Good, whether they truly belong to it, or not. Should our Encomiums happen to be false, the Falshood of them, to be sure, is not material. For the Proposal, it seems, was this, — that each of us should make a Pa-

⁹⁹ We should paraphrase this Passage thus; — “because I was well “acquainted with the true Nature and Propertys of Love, and was “*therefore* well qualified to celebrate his just Praises.” — In all the Editions of the *Greek* Original, we here read, ὡς εἰδὼς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῷ ἐπαινεῖν ὅτιον. Whether the last Word of this Passage should not be ἔρωτα, as we have supposed in the Translation, we appeal to the Common Sense and Reason of all our learned Readers; but especially of those, who are versed in the Writings of *Plato*; in many Places of which *Socrates* makes the same Profession. Two such other Passages occur in this very Dialogue; one, in page 49, the other in the following Speech of *Socrates*, just at the Close. — This Error in the Editions of the *Greek*, for we have no Doubt but that it will appear such to the Persons, to whose Judgments we appeal, seems to have arisen from the Words ἐπαινεῖν ὅτιον, occurring in the very next Sentence. — In the Sentence now before us, the 2d. *Basil* Edition of *Plato* has omitted the Word ὡς before εἰδὼς: from which Omission the Sense considerably suffers; as will appear to a judicious Reader from our Paraphrase of the Sentence in the beginning of this Note.

negyrick,

negyrick, which, by common Consent, was to pass and be taken for a Panegyrick made on Love; and not — to make a Panegyrick properly belonging to Love, or such a one as he truly merited. Hence it is, I presume, that You gather from all Quarters every Topick of Praise, and attribute to Love all Kinds of Perfection; representing Him and his Operations to be of such a Nature, that he cannot fail of appearing in the highest degree Beautiful and Good,—to all Those, I mean, who are unacquainted with him;—for he certainly can never be deemed so by Those who know him:—and thus the Panegyrick is made fine and pompous. — But for My Part, I was an utter Stranger to the composing of Panegyricks after this manner: and in my Ignorance it was, that I agreed to be One of the Composers. Only with my Tongue therefore did I engage myself;—my Mind was no Party to the Agreement. And so Farewell to it; for I shall never make Panegyricks in this Way:—I should not indeed know how.—Not but that I am ready to speak the Truth concerning the Subject proposed, if You have any Inclination to hear it, and if I may be allowed to speak after my-own manner: for I mean not to set My Speech in Competition with any of Yours, and so run the Risque of being deservedly laught at. Consider therefore, Phædrus, for it is Your Affair, whether such a Kind of Speech as you have to expect from Me would be agreeable to
4
you;

You; and ¹⁰⁰ whether You would like to hear the Truth spoken concerning Love, in Terms no higher than are adequate and fitting, and with such a Disposition of the several Particulars, as shall happen to arise from the Nature of the Subject. Phædrus then, and the rest of the Company, made it their joint Request to him, that he would speak in the Manner which He himself judged to be the most proper. But stay, said Socrates; give me Leave first to propose to Agatho a few Questions: that, after we have agreed together on some necessary Premises, I may the better proceed to what I have to say. You have My Consent, said Phædrus: so propose your Questions. — Socrates then, as Aristodemus told me, began in this Manner; —

¹⁰⁰ We have already observed in *the Argument*, page 8, that the Speeches of *Phædrus* and *Pausanias* are set in *Contrast* together: and in Note 50 to the Dialogue, we have hinted a *Contrast* also between the Speeches of *Eryximachus* and *Aristophanes*. It now becomes opportune to take Notice, that the Speech of *Socrates* is opposed in like manner, in the way of *Contrast*, to the Speech of *Agatho*. — The Contrast between the two first Speeches relates to their Frame or *Composition*: That between the two next regards the *Spirit* and *Humour* of them: and That between the two last is with a View to what is of most Importance, the *Propriety* and the *Truth* of the Doctrines contain'd in them. — The Reflections therefore, pretended here politely by *Socrates* to be made on the past Speeches *in general*, are all levelled at the Speech, in particular, of *Agatho*; and give us an Intimation, besides, of what we are to expect from the Speech of the Great Philosopher himself.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES.

IN MY OPINION, my Friend Agatho, you began your Speech well, in saying, that we ought in the first place to set forth the Nature of Love, What he is in Himself, and afterward to shew his Effects, and What he operates in Others.—This Introduction of yours I much approve of. Now then tell me farther concerning Love: and since you have so fairly and amply display'd the other Parts of his Nature and Character, answer me also to this Question, —whether Love is a Being of such a Kind, as to be ¹⁰¹ of Something; or whether he is of Nothing? — I ask you not, whether he is of some Father or Mother; for the Question, whether Love is the Love of Father or Mother would be ridiculous; but I mean it in the same Sense, as if the Subject of my Question was the very Thing, now mentioned, that is, a Father; and the Question its self was — whether a Father was the Father of Something or not: — in this Case, you would certainly answer, if you answered rightly, — that a Father was the Father of a Son or of a Daughter: — would you not? — Certainly I should, said Agatho. — And an Answer of the same Kind you would give me, said Socrates, if I asked you

¹⁰¹ That is, whether his Nature is *absolute*, not of necessity inferring the *Co-existence* of any other Being; or whether it is *relative*, in which the Being of some *Correlative* is implied.

concerning

concerning ¹⁰² a Mother.—Agatho again assented.—Answer me now, said Socrates, to a Question or two more ¹⁰³, that you may the better apprehend my Meaning.—Suppose I were to ask you concerning a Brother, with regard to that very Circumstance, his being a Brother, is he Brother

¹⁰² After one Instance of *Relative Beings* had been already given, in That of *Father*, sufficient to explain what may seem to be the whole Meaning of *Socrates's* first Question, (and what is indeed as much as he thinks fit to discover of it, as yet, to *All*) the going on to other Instances, and those too exactly of the same Kind with the first, those of *Mother* and *Brother*, must seem not only needless, and flat, but nauseous, to every Reader of Good Taste, if he is unacquainted with *Plato*. For this excellent Writer, whenever he illustrates any thing obscure by Instances, uses the utmost Care and Nicety in the selecting those Instances; referring his Choice of them always to some Design, of Importance to the Subject, which seldom appears at first Sight, and often breaks not out till long afterwards.—With what View these particular Instances are here chosen, cannot be so easily explained, till we come to the Fable “*Of the Birth of Love*” told in the Person of *Diotima*. — But this is to be observed in the mean time, that by setting out with them, and producing them at first, when the Attention is most awake, he imprints them so strongly in the Mind, that they easily occur to it afterwards, when there is Occasion to recollect them. — The Propriety also of beginning the Discourse of *Socrates* with these very Instances will then appear.

¹⁰³ In This, he intimates to his *Friends*, who were acquainted with his Manner in discoursing, that *They* might be able to discover *immediately* his secret Meaning, from the Question he was going to ask; and at the same time he quickens the Attention of the *Others*, and prepares them for apprehending his Meaning the more easily in proper time.

to some Person or not? — Agatho answered in the Affirmative. — And is not this Person, said Socrates, either a Brother or a Sister? — To which when Agatho had assented; — Try then, said Socrates, to tell me concerning Love; is it the Love of Nothing, or of Something? — Of Something ¹⁰⁴, by all means; replied Agatho. — Whatever you think That Something to be, said Socrates ¹⁰⁵, for the present keep your Thought to your Self; only remember it. And let me ask you this Question farther, relating to Love; — Does Love desire That Something, of which it is the Love, or does it not? — Desires it, answered Agatho, without doubt. — Whether, when possess'd of that which it desires ¹⁰⁶, of that which it is in Love with,

¹⁰⁴ Meaning, that it was a Thing highly valuable, — *Something indeed*, That which was the *Object of Love*.

¹⁰⁵ All these Preliminary Questions are very general and indefinite: so that in the Answers to them nothing precise or explicit is pronounc'd concerning the Nature either of *Love*, or of the *Object* of it. Their apparent Meaning and Tendency is only to lay a Foundation for confuting the Speech of *Agatho*. But they secretly lead to a Discovery of the most important Truths, according to the Doctrine of *Plato*: and so necessary a Relation have they to the *latter Part* of the Speech of *Socrates*, that the Reason, why That has been generally misunderstood, seems to have been, either for want of giving due Attention to this *Introductory Part* of his Speech, these *Previous Inquiries*, or for want of applying them to that wonderful Subject, which the Philosopher at last rises to; as will appear in our Notes to that Part.

¹⁰⁶ Beauty being the Object of *Love*, and Good the Object of *Desire*; *Socrates*.

with, does it then desire it? or only when not possessed of it? — Only when not possessed of it, 'tis probable; replied Agatho. — Instead of being Probable, said Socrates, consider if it be not Necessary, that every Being, which feels any Desire, should desire only That which it is in want of; and that as far as any Being is free from Want, so far it must be free also from Desire. Now to Me, Agatho, this appears in the highest Degree Necessary. But how does it appear to You? — To Me in the same manner; replied Agatho. — You say well; said Socrates. I ask you then, — Can a Man, whose Size is large, wish to be a Man of large Size? or a Man, who is Strong, can he wish to be Strong? — The Impossibility of this, replied Agatho, follows from what we have just now agreed in. For the Man, who is what he would wish to be, must, in that respect, and so far, be free from Want. — True; said Socrates; for if it were possible, that the Strong could wish to be Strong, the Swift wish to be Swift, and the Healthy wish to be Healthy, one might then perhaps imagine it equally possible in all Cases of the like Kind, that Such

Socrates here mentions Both these Affections of the Soul at the same time, purposely, as we imagine, to present to our Minds the Ideas of *Beauty* and *Good* together; leaving it undetermin'd for the present, *Which of the Two* he means precisely; or whether he would have us consider them *together*, tho' distinctly, beholding them *Both* at once, or *in One View*; or whether he intends we should perfectly *unite* them *Both*, and consider them as *One and the same Thing*.

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as are possessed of any thing Good or Advantageous, could desire That which they already have ¹⁰⁷. I mention this in

¹⁰⁷ That is, if it were possible in Some Instances, or with regard to Some particular Advantages, the Possibility of it might then be inferred in all Others of the same Kind; that is, with regard to all Personal Excellencys, and even all other Things good or advantageous.—It is of Importance to observe, What are the Particular Instances, here produced.—The First is *Magnitude* or Greatness, a Thing *meerly relative*, and of its self *infinite*, but *bounded* every where, and in every Particular Being, by That which bounds *the World*.—The Second Instance is *Strength*, a Quality, which also is *relative*, and admits of *Increase* and *Diminution* in every Being less than *the World*, or the united Force of All things; but in That, is *perfect* and *compleat*, incapable of Addition, because more than what is in That there cannot be.

—Οὐτε τι μείζον,
Οὐτε βεβαιότερον πέλεται.—

Parmenides ap. Platonem.

Nought e'er becomes in *Greatness*, or in *Strength*,
To That Superiour. —

—The Third Instance is *Swiftness*, a Quality also *relative*, and *comparative*; which, in every Corporeal Thing, with whatever Force impelled, in every Part of Nature, considered by its self, and as having a Motion of its own, even in the Celestial Planetary Bodys themselves, the Velocity of whose Motion is so amazing, is yet but Slowness when compared to that Celerity, with which the whole *World*, according to the Hypothesis at that time generally received, is continually wheeling round.—The Fourth Instance is *Health*, a State which is indeed *absolutely good* to every Being who enjoys it, abstracted from the Consideration

in general, to prevent our being imposed upon¹⁰⁸. For the Person, who enjoys any of these Advantages, if you consider, Agatho, must appear to you to have of Necessity at present that which he has, whether he wills it, or not: and how can This ever be the Object of his Desire? Should any Man therefore say thus; — I, who am now in Health, desire to be Healthy; — or — I, who now have Riches, desire to be Rich, and long for those very Things which I have; — we should make him this Reply; — you mean, Friend, You that are at present possessed of Riches, or Health, or Strength, would be glad to continue in Possession of them always: for at this Present you possess them,

tion of Others; and in any Particular Being may for a Moment perhaps be *perfect*: but is *durable* only in *the World*, considered as permanent, undecaying, and *always the Same*. — Now all these Instances are taken from the *Corporeal Universe*, and from *Corporeal Excellencies* in Men *from thence derived*. — Such is *Plato's* usual Manner, leading us thro' Objects of *Sense* to those of *Intellect*; and by familiar Instances, drawn from *Body*, hinting to us, in the way of Analogy, what he would have us apprehend concerning *Mind*.

¹⁰⁸ *Imposed upon*, in particular, with regard to the Nature of *Love*. — That this is Part of what *Socrates* here means, will be seen presently, before the Introduction to his Speech is finished. — What *other* Beings he would guard us from being deceived in, may perhaps appear in the Principal Part of the Speech its self, or in the Notes to it. — In this place, it is evident, from his manner of expressing himself, that he purposely conceals his Meaning, and at the same time gives a Hint of its Importance.

whether

whether you will, or not. When you say therefore, that you desire what is present with you, consider, whether you mean any other Thing than This; — you would be glad, that what is present with you now, might be present with you for the time to come. — Would he not acknowlege, think you, that This was his only Meaning? ¹⁰⁹ — Agatho agreed that he would. — This then, said Socrates, is to love and desire That, from which he is now at some Distance, neither as yet has he; and That is, the preserving of what he possesses at the present, and his continuing in Possession of it for the future. — It certainly is so; replied Agatho. — This Man therefore, said Socrates, and Every one who feels Desire, desires That which lies not ready for his Enjoyment, That which is not present with him, That which he has not, That which he Himself is not; and That which he is in Want of; Such things only being the Objects of Love and of Desire. — Agatho to This intirely assented. — Come then, said Socrates; let us agree upon these Conclusions: — Is not Love, in the first place, Love of Something? — In the next place, is it not Love of that which

¹⁰⁹ In *Stephens's* Edition of the Original we here read, — ἄλλό τι ὁμολογοῖ ἄν; — as if the Confession was demanded from *Agatho* in his own Person. In all the former Editions, however, it is rightly printed, — ὁμολογοῖτ' ἄν. — But we presume, they are all wrong, in giving us ἄλλό τι [διὰ δυοῖν] instead of ἄλλοτι [δι' ἐνός] *whether*; misled probably by the preceding Sentence, where ἄλλό τι signifies *any other Thing*, and is therefore rightly there divided into Two Words.

is wanting¹¹⁰? — Clearly so; replied Agatho. — Now then, said Socrates, recollect, What it was You told us in your Speech was the proper Object of Love. — But I, if You please, will remind you of it. — I think you said something like this; — “that the Affairs of the Gods were put in good Order, and well established, thro’ Love of Things Beautiful: for that Things of opposite Kind to these could never be the Objects of Love.” Did you not tell us some such Thing. — I own it; answered Agatho. — You own the Truth, my good Friend; replied Socrates. Now if This be as You say, must not Love be Love of Beauty, and not, of Deformity? — I agree; said Agatho. — And have you not agreed too, said Socrates, that Love is Love of something which is wanting, and not, of any thing possessed already? — True; replied Agatho. — It follows then, said Socrates, that Love is not in Possession,

¹¹⁰ The first Conclusion leads us, by reflecting on our Selves, to observe, that *Desire* is *indefinite*: the *Natural Object* of it being, not this or that Particular Good, but *Good in General*, any and every Thing which is *good*. — From the next Conclusion, if we attend to it, and examine our Selves at the same time, we learn, that *Desire* is, in its own Nature, unlimited or *infinite*: because to all Particular Beings, who are the only Subjects of Desire, there is alway Something left desirable, Some Good, which they have not yet attain’d to,

That cruel Something, unpossess’d.

Prior.

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but

but in Want, of Beauty.——It follows of Necessity, said Agatho. — Well then, said Socrates; That to which Beauty is absolutely wanting, That which is totally unpossessed of Beauty, do you call That Beautiful? — Certainly not; replied Agatho¹¹¹. — Are you still then, said Socrates, of the same Opinion, — that Love is Beautiful, — if We have reasoned rightly? — Agatho then made answer; — I am in danger, Socrates, of being found ignorant in the Subject I undertook to praise. —— You have honestly and fairly spoken; said Socrates. And now answer me to this little Question more: — Think you not, that Every thing Good is also Fair and Beautiful? — I do; replied Agatho. — If then, said Socrates, Love be in Want of Beauty, and if Every thing Good be Fair and Beautiful, Love must be in Want of Good too. —— I am not able, replied Agatho, to argue against You, Socrates; and therefore I admit it to be True, what you say. —— You are not able, my belov'd Agatho, said Socrates, to argue against the Truth: for to argue against Socrates is nothing difficult. —— And here shall

¹¹¹ *Socrates* ends this Introduction to his Speech with Two Demonstrative Conclusions, in Confutation of the Two Parts of *Agatho's* Speech; in one of which that Poet had maintained, that Love possessed every *Excellence*, which entered into the Composition of *Corporeal Beauty*; in the other, that Love was endowed with all those Prime and Comprehensive Virtues, the Principal *Goods of the Soul*, which constitute the *Beauty of it*, and form a Character completely *Virtuous*.

I dismiss you from being farther question'd. — But the Discourse concerning Love, which I heard formerly from Diotima the Prophetess¹¹², a Woman wise and knowing in these and many other Subjects; so profoundly knowing, that when the Plague seem'd to be approaching Athens, and when the People offered Sacrifice to avert it, She caus'd the Coming of that Distemper to be delayed for the

¹¹² Should any of our Readers wonder, what Relation this Story has to the present Subject; and think, that the barely telling us, *Diotima was a Prophetess*, would have been sufficient to answer all the Purposes mentioned in the *Argument*, page 11; we recommend to their repeated Reading and Attention the Pages 82 and 83 of this Dialogue; as we cannot help thinking, for our own Parts, that *Socrates* alludes here to that Part of the Speech of *Eryximachus*, which relates to *Divination*. For *Divination* and *Prophecy* in those Days meant the same Thing, and were expressed by the same Word, *Μαντιχή*. It seems therefore, as if *Socrates* would insinuate, that *Diotima* persuaded the *Athenians*, to repent of their Impiety and Injustice, and thus opened again the Intercourse between the Gods and Them; that the same Method was now and always to be pursued; the *wrong* Loves, which lead to Impiety and Injustice, were to be removed first, in order to make Way for that *right* Love, in the Nature of which he was now going to instruct his Audience. — That this Passage is thus to be interpreted, may appear perhaps more clearly a little farther on, where is a plain Reference to what *Eryximachus* had said on this Subject, as above cited. — And if this Interpretation be true, it seems sufficient to justify the reading of *Μαντιχή*, in the beginning of this Sentence, according to all the Editions; and to make us reject the reading of *Μαντινική*, proposed by *Stephens*, and warmly contended for by *Dr. Davis* in his Notes to *Maximus Tyrius*, page 588.

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Space of Ten Years ; (She it was who instructed Me in the Knowledge of All things that appertain to Love ;) a Discourse, I say, on this Subject, which I once heard from Her, I will try if I can relate again to You ; laying down, for the Foundation of it, those Points, agreed on just now between Me and Agatho ; but purposing, however, to relate the Whole of This by my Self, as well as I am able.

THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES.

RIGHT AND PROPER is it, Agatho, to follow the Method, marked out by You ; in the first place, to declare What Kind of a Being Love is, and afterwards to show What are the Effects produced by him.—Now I think, the easiest Way, that I can take in executing this Plan, will be, to lay before you the Whole of this Doctrine in the very Manner and Order, in which I my Self was examined and lectured on the Subject by Diotima.—She began with me, on my saying to Her much the same Things that were asserted just now by Agatho ;—that Love was a Deity¹¹³ excellent in

¹¹³ In all the Editions of the *Greek* we here read, — *ὡς εἴη ὁ ἔρως μέγας θεός, εἴη δὲ τῶν καλῶν.* This Reading is blindly followed by all the Translators, *Latin*, *French*, and *Italian* ; not One of them, it seems, having discovered any Error in the Text. But there are the strongest Reasons to suspect one, and to induce us to think, that the Right Reading

in Goodness, and was also ¹¹⁴ One of Those who were Fair and Beautiful.—And She refuted me with the same Arguments

ing is this, —ὡς εἴη ὁ ἔρως μὲν ἀγαθὸς θεός, εἴη δὲ τῶν καλῶν.—The Series of the Argumentation, the Speech of Agatho, the Confutation of that Speech by Socrates, and above all, the Sentence, which immediately follows this, demand the Alteration.—ὡς εἴη ὁ ἔρως ΜΕΓΑΣ θεός, had indeed been asserted by Phædrus, in the Beginning of His Speech; and This probably remained in the confused Memory of that Transcriber, who first corrupted the Text of this Place, in consequence of his imagining the Assertion to have been Agatho's. The usual Way of writing μὲν ἀγαθός with these Contractions, μ' ἀγός, might possibly first give Occasion to the Blunder.—The Conjunctions μὲν and δὲ are here used, as they frequently are elsewhere in Plato, by way of Copulatives in the Enumeration of Particulars. See Forster's Index to the five Dialogues of Plato, Kubnius's Lexicon to Ælian, V. H. and Vigerus de Idiotismis Græcis.—It may be proper to observe farther, that in all this Argument, ἀρετή, *Virtue*, signifies the *Whole of Moral Goodness*; and that the Epithet of ἀγαθός, *Good*, is given to the Man, possessed of such *complete Virtue*. In the same Sense is the Word σπουδαῖος used by Aristotle, in this Sentence of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος.—In every partial and every inferior Sense of the Words ἀρετὴ and ἀγαθός, they answer to one another in the same manner.

¹¹⁴ Such as *Venus, Apollo, Bacchus, Hebe, Pollux, &c.*—But 'tis astonishing to see, how little the *Latin* and *Italian* Translators attended to the reasoning. For they imagined, because of the like Expression a little before —δι' ἔρωτα καλῶν—that the same thing was meant here, —the *Love of Beauty*, or of Things Beautiful. If Their Translation of Both Parts of this Sentence be right, *Diotima* by no means refuted any thing which had been said by *Socrates*, tho' *Socrates* himself tells us, that she.

guments I have made Use of to refute Agatho; proving to me, that Love, according to my own Account of him, was neither Beautiful, nor Good. — How say you Diotima? then said I. — Is Love an Ugly and an Evil Being? — Soft! replied She; no abusive Language! Do you imagine, that every Being, who is not Beautiful, must of course be Ugly? — Without doubt; answered I. — And every Being, who is not Wise, said She, do you conclude it must be Ignorant? Do you not see, there is Something between

she did. The *French Lady*, however, has translated the latter Part justly, and tho' she saw no fault in the Word μέγας, (thinking it perhaps not amiss, that at all times, whether in or out of Season, the *Power and Greatness of Love* should be celebrated) yet saw, it seems, a Defect in the Reasoning, if the Word *Good* were wanting; She has therefore judiciously supplied it in Her Translation, thus, — “que l'Amour etoit un Dieu puissant, bon et beau.” — *Socrates*, we may suppose from his own Account, had politely been entertaining *Diotima* with a General Discourse on *Love*, and treating it as a *Virtuous* and an *Honorable* Passion: but according to all Editions of the *Greek*, and the old Translations, his Gallantry seems to have proceeded much farther: we must suppose, he had been complimenting her Beauty, courting her, and urging to her the Power, which her Beauty had upon himself; — Suppositions, not at all agreeable to that Conversation between them, which here begins, and to which his own preceding Discourse, he says, gave Occasion. — Our Readers, who are acquainted with the *Attic* Style, will observe an elegant Ellipsis of the Word εἰς in this Passage, parallel to that in the *Phædo*, pag. 271 of Dr. *Forster's* Edition, — εἰπερ εἰ τῶν φιλοσόφων, a Phrase no less elegant in our own Language, — “if You are of the *Philosophers*,” that is, ONE of them.

Wisdom

“Wisdom and Ignorance? — I asked her, what That could be. — To think of Things rightly, as being what they

“It is of Importance to a right understanding of the latter and more profound Part of this Speech, to enquire what is here meant by *Wisdom*. — That it means *Science* of some Kind or other, appears not only from the Term *Wisdom* being *changed* for that of *Science*, in the very next Question put by *Diotima*, but also from the *Explanation* of it immediately afterwards, exactly tallying with the Account given of *Science* and *Opinion*, in *Plato's Meno* near the Conclusion, and more at large in *Lib. 7. de Repub.* pag. 531 & seq. This is farther evident from a parallel Passage in *Lib. 5. de Repub.* pag. 477, 8; where he proves *Opinion* to be placed between *ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀγνοία*, *Science and Ignorance*. — But, that we may not imagine every *Particular Science* to be here meant, the Philosopher seems to have purposely introduced, as if it were by the Bye, a Definition of *Science*. For his Definition fits not any of the *Particular Sciences*; and is true only of that *Universal Science*, the *Science of Mind*, or *Dialectick*; as *Plato* himself has proved in that Part of the Seventh Book of his *Republick*, above cited. He there tells us, that only This deserves the Name of *Science*, because only This leads us up to the *Causes or Principles of Science*, and to the *Reason of All things*. Agreeably therefore to the Passage now before us, This *Science* is in the *Epinomis*, called the *only true Wisdom*. Exactly consonant with *Plato* in this Point is *Aristotle*, who tells us, that *Wisdom is to have the Science of those Things, which are First and Highest in Nature, and are the Principles of all Science:*” which *Wisdom* or *Chief Science* he calls *σοφία*, *Intelligence*. *Ethic. Nicom. Lib. 6. Cap. 6. and 7.* This *Wisdom* it is, which *Plato* in his *Republick*, Book 7. says, is “*scarcely attainable*;” and in another place, that “*very Few arrive at it, and that with much Difficulty, and not till their Lives draw near the End.*” In his *Phædo* he takes the Subject in a still higher Key; and tells us, that “*Wisdom is impossible to be attained by Man in any*

they really are, without being able to assign a Reason, Why they are such. — Do you not perceive, said She, that This is not to have the Science or true Knowledge of them? — For ¹¹⁶ where the Cause or Reason of a Thing remains unknown, how can there be Science? — Nor yet is it Ignorance: — For That, which errs not from the Truth, how should

Purity or Perfection, whilst he is incumbered with Body. In like manner, in his *Epinomis*, he says, that “*the Wisest of Men becomes not compleatly Wise and Happy, till after Death, when he is freed from Multitude, and is become One,*” that is, pure Intelligence, or Mind. Farther, he says in his *Phædrus*, that “*the Name of Wise belongs properly to God alone:*” and in his *Philebus*, that “*the Cause of the Order and Beauty of the Universe is most justly to be called σοφία καὶ νῦς, Wisdom and Mind.*” — It suffices for the Present to add, that *Wisdom, Beauty, and Good*, in the Passage now before us, we may observe ranked in the same Order of Being: opposite to These are placed *Ignorance, Deformity, and Evil*: and in the Middle Rank, bordering on both the Others, we find *Opinion, Love, and Desire.*

¹¹⁶ We have here taken the Liberty to paraphrase a little, for the sake of rendering this Passage more easy to be understood. — In the *Greek* it runs thus, — ἀλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιτήμη; *Aristotle* expresses the same Meaning in the same concise Way, thus, — μετὰ λόγον γὰρ ἡ ἐπιτήμη. *Ethic. Nicomach. Lib. 6. Cap. 6.* where λόγος is the same Thing with That, which *Plato* in his *Meno* calls λογισμὸς αἰτίας, that is, *the Rational Account of a Thing, deriving it from its Cause.* For the Cause [the Formal Cause] of every Particular Truth is some General Truth, in which that Particular is virtually included. Accordingly, in a perfect Syllogism we may see the Truth of the Conclusion virtually included in the Truth of the Major Proposition. Nor can we properly be said to know any one Truth, till we see the Whole of that Higher Truth, in which the Particular one is contained.

That

That be Ignorance? — Such then is Right Opinion, Something between Wisdom and Ignorance. — You are certainly in the Right; said I. — Deem it not necessary then, said She, that What is not Beautiful should be Ugly; or that What is not Good, must of consequence be Evil. To apply this to the Case of Love; tho' you have agreed, he is neither Good nor Beautiful, yet imagine not, he must ever the more on that account be Ugly and Evil; but Something between those Opposites. — Well; said I; but he is acknowledged by All to be a ¹¹⁷ Powerful God, however. — By All who know him, do you mean, said She, or by All who know him not? — By All Universally; replied I. — Upon which she smiled, and said, — How, Socrates, should he be acknowledged a Powerful God by Those who absolutely deny his Godship? — Who are they? said I. — You, your Self, replied She, are One of them, and I am Another. — Explain your Meaning; said I. — My Meaning, said She, is easy to be explained. For answer me to this Question; — say you not, that the Gods are, All of them, Blest and Happy? or would you offer to say

¹¹⁷ In the Greek, — μέγας θεός. — *Diotima*, having already proved, that Love is neither *Beautiful*, nor *Good*, proceeds farther to prove, that he is not a great or powerful *God*, as vulgarly imagined. This therefore, being introduced as *new Matter*, in a *farther Prosecution* of the General Subject, may serve to confirm us, if we need any Confirmation, in rejecting the Word μέγας where it occurred before: for which see Note 113.

of any One of the Gods, that he was not a Blest and Happy Being? — Not I, for My Part, said I, by Jove. — By a Happy Being, said She, do you not mean a Being possessed of Things Fair, Beautiful and Good? — 'Tis granted, answered I. — And you granted before, said She, that Love, from his Indigence and Want of Things Good and Beautiful, desired those Things of which he was destitute. — I allowed it. — How then, said She, can He be a God, He, who is destitute of Things Fair, Beautiful, and Good? — It appears, said I, that he by no means can. — You see then, said She, that, even in your own Judgment, Love is no God. — What! said I; must Love then be a Mortal? — Far from That; replied She. — Of what Nature was he then, I asked her. — Of like Kind, answered She, with those Natures we have just now been speaking of, an intermediate one, between the Mortal and the Immortal. — But What in particular, O Diotima? — A powerful Dæmon; replied She. For the Dæmon-Kind is of an Intermediate Nature between the Divine and the Human. — What is the Power and Virtue, said I, of this Intermediate Kind of Being? — ¹¹⁸ To transmit and to interpret

¹¹⁸ *Diotima* says This, and what follows, in her *Religious Character*, suitably to her *Profession*, that of a *Divinerefs* or Prophetess, according to the Vulgar-Pagan Superstition. The Opinion or *Belief*, which at that time prevailed, concerning *Dæmons*, so far as this Passage alludes to it, is explained.

interpret to the Gods, said She, what comes from Men; and to Men, in like manner, what comes from the Gods; from Men their Petitions and their Sacrifices; from the Gods, in return, the Revelation of their Will. Thus these Beings, standing in the Middle Rank between Divine and Human, fill up the vacant Space, and link together All Intelligent Nature. Thro' their Intervention proceeds every Kind of Divination, and the Priestly Art relating to Sacrifices, and Expiations, and Incantations, with the whole Business of Prophecy, and the Working of Miracles. For the Divine Nature mixes not with the Human immediately; but by Means of that Middle Nature is carried on all Converse and Communication between the Gods and Mortals, whether in Sleep or Waking. Whoever has Wisdom and Skill in things of this Kind, is ¹¹⁹ a Divine Person:

explained more at large by *Maximus Tyrius*, Cap. 14. Edit. *Davis*: and by *Porphyry*, Lib. 2. de *Abstinentiâ*, §. 38. where this very place in *Plato* is referred to by that learned Philosopher. See also *Plato* himself in his *Epinomis*. But for the secret and philosophic Meaning, see at present Note 112. It will appear more plainly in the Notes which immediately follow this.

¹¹⁹ The Term, here used by *Plato*, is δαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ, by which he means a Man inspired, that is, taught, guided, or actuated, by such a *Dæmon* or *Intermediate Being*, as he had been describing; and conversant in the Sentiments and Notions belonging to the Nature of that Being: in the same manner, as in his *Meno* he terms that Man δῆος, who, not having had the usual and natural means of ascending to the Knowledge

son : ¹²⁰ The Knowing in any other Thing, and the Skillful in Arts, whether Mechanical, or of any other Kind, are comparatively illiberal and sordid. These Genii or Dæmons are many and various ¹²¹. One of them is Love.

of Divine Things, speaks or acts as if he knew them, and therefore seems *inspired* immediately by God himself. Thus also in his *Phædrus*, he gives the Appellation of *δαίμων* to every Mind, conversant in those Things, which are eternally the Objects of the *Divine Mind*. The same Distinction between *δαίμωνιος* and *δαίμων*, which we have remarked here, is taken Notice of in Note 103. to the *Greater Hippias*.

¹²⁰ That is, Those whose Kind of Knowledge or Skill has no direct Tendency to make Men Wise and Virtuous, and thus to conciliate the Human Nature to the Divine.—By comparing this Passage with what *Plato* delivers more at large in his *Αντιφασις*, a Dialogue concerning *Philosophy*, and in his *Ἐπινόησις*, concerning the *Philosophic Character*, his Meaning here may be ascertained with exactness; and the *δαίμωνιος ἄνθρωπος*, or *Divine Man*, of whom he now speaks, will thus appear clearly to be the Man under the Guidance and Direction of the *Dæmon of Philosophy*, leading him to Truth; or, in other Words, the Man of a truly *Philosophic Genius*, in Love with and in Search of *Wisdom*: whereas *δαίμων ἄνθρωπος*, or the *Divine Man*, in the higher Sense of that Expression, signifies the Man, (if such a Man there be, for *Plato* every where denies it) already perfect and godlike, in full Possession of Divine Wisdom, and consummate Virtue.

¹²¹ In the Greek, *παντοδαπαί*, “of all various Kinds.” “Ὅσαι φύσεις ἀνδρῶν, τοσαύται καὶ δαιμόνων,” says *Maximus of Tyre*. “There is the same Variety in the different Tempers and Dispositions of the Dæmons, as there is in those of Men.” A Sentence, leading us to the Secret of this ancient Doctrine. For indeed the *Δαίμων*, *Dæmon*, in the Philosophical Sense of the Word, is no other than the *Mind*, or superior Part of the Soul, of Man. Numberless Authoritys from the *Platonists* and *Stoicks* might be produced

in Proof of this Assertion: many of which may be seen collected by *Gataker*, Annotat. ad *Antoninum*, Lib. 2. §. 13. by *Upton*, Not. in *Arrianum*, pag. 47. by *Lindembrog*. Not. in *Censorinum* de Die Natali, Cap. 3. by *Forster*, Not. in *Platonem*, pag. 287. and by the elegant Author of *Hermes*, in the Notes on his *Three Treatises*, pages 321, and 335. It will be sufficient for our Purpose to cite from *Plato* himself this Passage in his *Timæus*. Τὸ δὲ δὴ περὶ τῆ κυριωτάτης παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἶδος διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὥς ἄρα αὐτὸ δαίμονα θεὸς ἐκάστῳ δέδωκε τῆτο. Now the Souls originally are alike in all Men, as being all equally derived from the same Source; yet, in different Men, being united to Bodys of different Frames and Temperaments, and from the time of such Union being conversant with different Kinds of Objects; being thro the Nature of that Union liable to be affected in all Ways, not only by the Bodys to which they are intimately joined, but also by all Things around them, with which those Bodys of theirs have any Concern; they severally thus receive different Impressions. These Impressions are as infinitely various, as is the Structure of the Body and the Mixture of its Humours in different Men, the System or rather aggregate Heap of Notions and Opinions received in Education, and the Conjunction of Accidents and Circumstances relative to each Particular Man, in the midst of which he finds himself first situated, and which make what the French call *son Monde*, a World to each Man his own, where He himself is the Center. The Depth and Durableness of these first Impressions, made on the Soul, give the peculiar Turn of Mind thro Life; and constitute every Man's *particular Genius*, or strong Bent to some favorite Pursuit. *Apuleius* therefore, the most ancient of the Latin *Platonists*, had Reason, when he took upon him, suo periculo, at his own Peril, as he expresses himself, to interpret the Greek Word Δαίμων by the Latin Word GENIUS, *is Deus*, says he, *qui est animus sui cujusque*. *Apuleii Opera*, vol. 2. pag. 79. Edit. Lugd. — We are informed by *Censorinus* in his Treatise de Die Natali, that *Euclid*, the Disciple of *Socrates*, maintained an Opinion of *Two Geniuses* in every Man; meaning undoubtedly those *Two Souls*, mentioned by *Xenophon* in his *Institution*.

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Love¹²².—But, said I, from what Parents was he born?—The History of his Parentage, replied She, is somewhat long to

tution of Cyrus; as having been taught by the same Master to recognise their Distinction. See Lord Shaftesbury, vol. 1. page 169. and also Note 70. to the *Greater Hippias*. It is probable, that *Euclid* alluded to the Opinion, which seems to have prevailed in ancient times over all the *Eastern* part of the World, “that Beings superior to Man, but inferior to the Divine Nature, *Dæmons* or Spirits, Some *Evil* and Others *Good*, filled the seemingly vacant Parts of the Universe”; and that he meant to explain this Opinion in a manner consistent with Reason, and with the *Socratic* Principles. But *Plato*, to the best of our Remembrance, never uses the Word *Δαίμων* to signify any Thing *Evil*; as being much an Enemy to the Notion, that superior *Knowledge* or *Power* is ever in any Being joined with *Evil*; and therefore carefully avoiding a Metaphor taken from the Language of *Superstition*.

¹²² That is, the *Amorous Temper* or Disposition of the Soul, apt, from the Sight of Beauty, to be attracted and attached to it. — This *Love of Beauty*, it must be owned, is *natural* to the *Human Soul*; which, according to the *Platonic* System, is derived from the *Soul of the World*, the immediate *Efficient* of all Things naturally *beautiful*, and from the *Divine Mind*, which is original *Ideal Beauty* its self; consequently, every Human Soul has a *Natural Affection* to all and every *Beauty*, with which it is thus congenial. Yet this Affection or Inclination, however *natural* it be to *All Men*, is more or less strong in Each, in proportion to the *Purity* of the *Soul*, that is her Disengagement from meer animal Sensation, and in proportion to the *Clearness*, *Strength*, and *Brightness* of the *Mental Eye*. The fairest and the finest Genius therefore is That, which is the most apt to be enamoured with Beauty, — with every Species of it in proportion to its Degree of Excellence, and thus in the highest Degree with That *Beauty*, which is *highest in Nature*, the Beauty of *Wisdom*, *Mind*, and *Truth*. Accordingly *Diotima*, in the Sequel of her

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to relate; however, I will give you the Relation.—
At the Birth of Venus, the Gods, to celebrate that
Event, made a Feast; at which was present, amongst the
rest, Plenty, the Son¹²³ of Counsel. After they had sup-
ped,

her Lecture, teaches us, that Love, as a great Poet of our own expresses
the Sum of her Doctrine,

is the Scale,

By which to Heav'nly Love we may ascend.

Milton, Par. Lost, Book 8.

and again, that it

Leads up to Heav'n, is both the Way and Guide.

Thus Plato, in his *Phædrus*, couples together pure *Friendship* or Love of
Mental Beauty in others, and *Philosophy* or the Love of Wisdom, as the
“ joint Means of attaining the best and happiest Life:” and farther on in
that Dialogue, recommends, in the Person of *Socrates* speaking to *Phæ-
drus*, the joining *Love* or the *Love of Beauty in general*, with *Philosophical
Inquiries*, as the best Discipline of Man.”

¹²³ *Μέντις*. It was observed in Note 94, that the *Orphic* Theologers
gave to the *Divine Mind* the Name of *Μέντις*, *Contrivance*, *Counsel*, or
Design; a Metaphor not improper to indicate the Nature of That Mind,
which eternally conceives within its Self the *Archetypal Forms*, or Ideas,
of all Sensible Things. These Forms, thus conceived in the *Fulness* of the
Divine Mind, or *Universal Form* its Self, Plato expresses by the Term *Πό-
ρος*, *Plenty*, or a Fund of Wealth to supply Indigence: and by *Πενία*, *Po-
verty*, he means *Infinite Matter*, considered in its Self, as totally devoid
of all Form, and therefore *thoroughly indigent*. By the *Birth-Day of Venus*
he means that time when the Order of Nature was first established; and
when Beauty, according to the *Vulgar Hypothesis*, authorised by *Hesiod*,
arose

ped, Poverty came there a-begging, Good Cheer being to be had, and loitered about the Door. Just then, Plenty,

intoxicated

arose out of the vast *Ocean*, or *Chaos* of Things. Then, thro the *Immensity of Space*, metaphorically here termed *the Gardens of Jupiter*, where every fair Idea was to be now planted, and all the Species, the Seeds, or Seminal Essences of Things, *σπερματικὰὶ λόγοι*, were to be now sown, *Matter* was every where embraced by *Form*, and in every Part became bounded. Thus were created all Particular Beings: every one of which, in the whole of it, and in every Part, endeavored to attain the Perfection of that Ideal Form, its Original or Archetype: and when it could advance no farther towards it, endeavored to preserve its present Form, or to generate and nurture another such Being, which might continue that Form by Succession. In Beings Sensible and Conscious of their Existence, this Endeavour was attended with Desire and Longing; whence arose the Selfish Passions, and all such Social Affections as are common to all Animals. But Beings Rational, in whom were Minds, derived from the Universal One, the Seat of all Beauty, not only had thence a Capacity, themselves, of comprehending all, but must also naturally aim at this full Comprehension; falling short of which, they fall short of the Perfection of their Form. This Aim and Endeavour, this Desire and Longing after such Perfection, is, in these Beings, by *Plato* called *Love*; born first in each Individual, when the Mind begins to open, and when Beauty is first presented to its View; growing greater, as the Mind enlarges, and lifts her Eye to higher and still higher Orders of Beauty; and at length attaining the utmost Growth of its *Dæmon-Nature*, (thro which the *Human* is so closely linked to the *Divine*,) when the Nature of the Beautiful its Self, the Source of Beauty, is at length discovered. For this Discovery cannot fail of being attended with a Desire of enjoying it, and of living for ever in that Enjoyment. Thus the Mind, not only when she views Beauty in *Bodys* outward, but when she views it also in *Minds* not her own, in *Study*;

too

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intoxicated with ¹²⁴ Nectar, (for as yet ¹²⁵ Wine was not in the World,) went out into the Gardens of Jupiter; and oppressed with the Load of Liquor that he had drank, fell a-sleep. Upon which, Poverty, desirous of having a Child by Plenty, because of her own Indigence, and watching her Opportunity, lay down by him, and became

too which she is pursuing, in Arts which she is learning, and in Sciences to which she is opening, at the same time that she has Pleasure from the View of what is near and present, has a Prospect of much more which is remote and absent; and could she, in her present State, obtain the last Favours from Philosophy, in the Enjoyment of Wisdom, would long for an Immortality of that Enjoyment. Now Desire necessarily implies a Sense of Indigence, Indigence of That, which is the Object of its Desire: and Desire of course rises, as the Sense of Indigence increases, that is, in proportion as more and more is perceived still wanting. The Wants of the Soul are not fully perceived or felt by her, till she attains the Knowledge of the Divine Nature, and contemplates the Source of Beauty. In the Love therefore of this Beauty, the Natural Desire of the Soul is at its highest Pitch: and This Love it is, which *Plato*, in what follows, emphatically means by *Love*, when he attributes to it *Philosophy*, or the Love of Wisdom.

¹²⁴ *Plato* here means by *Nectar* the same Thing, which he means by it in his *Phædrus*, pag. 247. Ed. *Steph.* that Delight, which the Divine Mind, and all Others in any degree resembling it, enjoy from the Contemplation of Ideal and perfect Beauty.

¹²⁵ This is said, the better to open to us the Meaning of the Fable, by marking the *Time* there supposed, that is, the *Beginning of Outward Nature*, before any Art was invented, and before any Produce of Nature, requiring the Assistance of Art, existed.

with Child of Love. Hence it is, that Love is the constant Follower and Attendant of Venus, as having been begotten on the Birth-Day of that Goddess: being also by his natural Disposition fond of all Beauty, he is the more attached to Venus her Self on account of her being Beautiful. Now, as Love is the Son of Plenty and of Poverty, the Condition of his Life and Fortune is as follows.—¹²⁶ In the first place, he is always poor; and is far from being either fair or tender, as the Multitude imagine him; for he is rough, and hard, and dry, without Shoes to his Feet, and without a House or any Covering to his Head; always groveling on the Earth, and lying on the bare Ground, at Doors, and in the Streets, in the open Air; partaking thus of his Mother's Disposition, and
living

¹²⁶ From the First Part of what follows, concerning the Condition and Circumstances of Love, it may be imagined, that *Plato* had his Mind running on that Kind of Love only, described by *Pausanias* in his Speech: for we find the same *Features* drawn in each of these *Portraits* of Love. But when, in reading farther on, we shall have seen, that by Love *Plato* means the *Love* of whatever any way is *Beautiful*, and the *Desire* of whatever any way is *Good*, we may then reflect, if we have had any Experience of Men, that the Love of Riches, Honours, Power, the Passion of the Virtuosi in their several Kinds, and the Pursuit of Knowledge in any of the Arts and Sciences, is often attended with the same Sort of Conduct; a Conduct illiberal and mean, in proportion as the Object of such Love is mean, and unworthy of so vehement an Ardour in the Pursuit of it. Even the Love of the noblest Object, Wisdom, is
apt

living in perpetual Want. —¹²⁷ On the other hand, he derives from his Father's Side Qualities very different from those

apt to run into the same Excess, and to have the same Influence on the Conduct of the Lover here meant, the Philosopher: as appears, for Instance, from the Characters of *Antisthenes*, *Diogenes*, *Aristodemus*, and other Contemporaries of *Plato*. Accordingly, we are inclined to think, that, as *Plato* included every Kind of Love in *Diotima's* Account of that Passion, so in her Description here, of the mean and poor Circumstances of Love, he meant to include those of Philosophy; not only with a View to the Lives of those less sober Philosophers, just now mentioned, but also, and that principally, with a View to that of *Socrates* himself. For the same Attachment to Philosophy had somewhat of the same Effect upon His Conduct; as appears in the preceding Part of this Dialogue, and more so in the Part yet remaining, the Speech of *Alcibiades*. — We all know, that in the Pursuit of any thing, which the Mind deems her real Good, and supposes her self to be in Want of, and which consequently engrosses all her Attention, the Wants of the Body are used to be neglected. — Concerning this Inattention to their own Bodily Wants, in Artists, who are enamoured of their Arts, see *Marcus Antoninus*, L. 5. §. 1. — That Love has the same Effect on the Minds and Manners of Vulgar Lovers, is remarked by *Socrates* in speaking of Some of the Company, towards the Conclusion of his Speech. — The Description of Love thus far, in what ever Light we view it, must be acknowledged humorous and satirical; and tho it be in Fact true, yet it departs from That Meaning of the Word *Indigence*, in which it was used just before, as explained in Note 123.

¹²⁷ This next Part of the Description, like the former, is applicable to every Kind of Love. For tho at first sight it may not be apparent, how *Philosophy* is concerned in it; yet a Reader of *Plato*, when he reflects, that, thro' out this Author, *Socrates* in speaking of Himself uses the same

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those others: for hence it is, that he is full of Designs upon the Good and the Fair: hence it is, that he is courageous, spritely, and prompt to Action; a mighty Sportsman, always contriving some new Device to entrap his Game: much addicted to Thought, and fruitful in Expedients; all his Life ¹²⁸ philosophising; powerful in Magick and Enchantment, nor less so in Sophistry.—His Nature is not Mortal, in the common way of Mortality, nor yet is it immortal, after the manner of the Immortal Gods ¹²⁹.
for

Metaphors, taken from the Conduct of Vulgar Lovers, will, we doubt not, agree with us in our Opinion, that the Character of *Socrates* is here also principally intended to be drawn, as in *Love with* what is *Good* and *Fair*, and thence watching all Opportunities and employing every Stratagem and every Charm, to catch, and captivate to the same Love, those Dispositions which he deemed qualified to become Lovers in this way, as appearing to be fair and good themselves by Nature.

¹²⁸ *Philosophising* here means the *Searching after Happiness*. The Stoicks seem to have derived from *Plato* their Notion and Definition of *Philosophy*, that it was the *Inquiry after Happiness*.

¹²⁹ That this is the Nature of all Desire, may appear from a few slight Reflections.—The desire of any Good is animated by Hopes, and by a fair Prospect of Means to attain it. — The Desire dyes and is extinguished by Attainment.— But then the Attainment opens a View of farther Good, whence Desire is again kindled.— This alternate Life and Death of Desire must continue, so long as the Soul continues indigent: and, tho her Indigence be ever so frequently relieved, indigent she still continues; until she arrives at That Beauty, in which her own Form is perfect, and attains
That

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for sometimes, in one and the same Day, he lives and flourishes, when he happens to fare well; and presently afterwards he dyes; and soon after That revives again, as partaking of his Father's Nature.—¹³⁰ Whatever Abundance flows in upon him, is continually stealing away from him: so that Love is never absolutely in a State either of Affluence or of Indigence—Again;—¹³¹ he is seated in the

That Good, where Desire finds an End. For *Universality* and *Eternity* together exclude all Indigence, and, with it, all Desire.—But, tho all this be undeniably true, yet we cannot help suspecting, that *Plato* here intended to describe, not only the Nature of *Desire* as to its *Duration*, but the Nature of the *Soul* her Self in the same respect. We are led into this Suspicion by considering, that there is the same Double Meaning in many other Parts of this Speech of *Socrates*; as we shall have Occasion to observe in some of the subsequent Notes: and our Suspicion is confirmed by Two Passages in *Plato's Phædo*, page 192, 3, and page 235, ex Edit. *Forster*; where the Existence of *the Soul* of Man, both before and after its present State, is represented after a manner much the same with That here used in describing *Love*.

¹³⁰ For the Explanation of this Passage, so far as it relates to *Love* or *Desire*, we refer to the latter Part of Note 123.—How far it relates, metaphorically, to the *Human Soul*, may appear from what is said a little farther on, without a Metaphor in the Dialogue its self.

¹³¹ In the Beginning of the Speech of *Socrates*, this Circumstance, of *being between Wisdom and Ignorance*, is introduced, seemingly, on purpose to illustrate the *Intermediate* Nature of *Love* by some *Other* Nature, in like manner *Intermediate*, and therefore *analogous* to That of *Love*. In this place *Plato* opens more of his Meaning. That very same Circumstance of Being is here attributed to *Love* *plainly* and *directly*.—It was there said to belong to *Right Opinion*: we find it, a little farther on,

the Midst between Wisdom and Ignorance. For the Case is this with regard to Wisdom;—None of the Gods philosophise,

on, belonging to *Philosophy*, and attributed to *Love* on this Account only, as he is considered in his Character of *Philosopher*, or Lover of Wisdom. Now *Right Opinion* and *Philosophy* are the Property of no other known Being, than the *Human Mind*, in the highest and best State, which it is at present capable of reaching. The other two Characters of Love, given in this Speech, namely, *Desire of Good* and *Affection* or Inclination to Beauty, are indeed inherent in the Soul of Every Man by Nature; as also is *Opinion*: but *Right Opinion*, *Desire of the Chief Good*, and *Affection to the Supreme Beauty*, are the peculiar Property of the Human Soul then only, when it is exalted to the Highest Pitch it can arrive at, whilst it continues what it is, that is, *Human*. Now Love and Affection to the *Supream Beauty* is no other Thing, as we learn soon after this from *Plato*, than Love of *Wisdom*, or *Philosophy*. This Love necessarily supposes *Right Opinion*: for *Right Opinion*, when Good and Beauty are the Subjects of it, is nothing else than to deem of *Wisdom*, the σοφία καὶ νῆς in *Plato's Philebus*, as being the *Highest Beauty* and the *Highest Good*: from which Judgment or Opinion follow of necessity a *corresponding Love* and *Desire*. The other Kinds of Love are founded on Views of Beauty, to which they are proportioned, and are attended by Opinions suitable to them, and by proportionable Desires of Good. See Note 122. This Proportion, which every Man's Love bears to the *Disposition* of his *Soul*, and to the Degree of *Improvement*, in his *Mind*, seems to be the Meaning of those remarkable Words of *Socrates* in the *Banquet* of *Xenophon*, — Παρόντος δαίμονος μεγάλου, ἰσχυρὸς μὲν τοῖς ἀειγενέσι θεοῖς, ψυχὴ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἴσμεν, Ἐρωτος, — κ. τ. λ. “ Now that we are in the Presence of a Mighty Daemon, who, tho’ coæval with the Gods, of whose Generation was no Beginning, is yet equalled to the Soul of Man; — I mean Love.” This Passage represents to us MIND, whose Nature is eternal and divine, ἀειγενὴς θεός, united with the

sophise, or desire to become Wise; for that wise they are already; and if there be any other Being beside the Gods who is truly Wise, neither does such a Being philosophise. —Nor yet does Philosophy, or the Search of Wisdom, belong to the ignorant¹³². For on this very Account is the Condition of Ignorance so wretched, that notwithstanding she is neither fair, good, nor wise, yet she thinks she has no Need of any Kind of Amendment or Improvement. So that the Ignorant, not imagining themselves in Need, neither seek nor desire That which they think they want not.

the other Part of the *Human Soul*; which, being thus linked to the *Divine Nature*, and to That also which is *Mortal*, stands between *Wisdom and Ignorance*, more or less inclining, in each Individual, to the One or to the Other. Now the *Divine Nature*, that is, Universal Mind or Form, being properly denoted and characterised by the Term, *Beauty*; and the *Mortal Nature*, considered in its Self, in the Matter of which it is composed, without a Mind forming it, being well expressed by the Word, *Deformity*; it cannot rightly be judged improper to describe the *Soul of Man*, or the *Human Nature*, as it partakes of Both the others, under the Character of *Love*; seeing that by Love alone it rises from the Mortal Part of it to That which is Divine. Indeed, the *peculiar Nature* of the Human Soul cannot, with strict Propriety, be so well expressed by any other Term, as by that of Love, because as we shall have Occasion to observe a little farther on, by Love alone is the *Essence* of it distinguished from that of every other Being.

¹³² This Passage in the Greek Original is thus printed, — αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸτο ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, — but, we presume, that either the last Word of these should be printed ἀμαθία, figuratively meaning ἀμαθῆ, or else, that the first Words should be thus printed, — αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷτο.

—Who

—Who are They then, O Diotima, said I, who philosophise, if they are neither the Wise, nor the Ignorant?

—That is evident, said She: even a Child may now discover, that they must be Such, as stand in the Middle Rank of Being; in the Number of whom is Love. For Wisdom is among the Things of Highest Beauty; and all Beauty is the Object of Love: It follows therefore of Necessity, that Love is a Philosopher, or a Lover of Wisdom; and that, as Such, he stands between the Adept in Wisdom and the wholly Ignorant.—This, as well as all the rest of his Condition, is owing to his Parentage; as he derives his Birth from a Father Wise and Rich in All things, and from a Mother Unwise and in Want of All things.—Such, dear Socrates, is the Nature of this Superior Being. But that You had other Thoughts of that Being, whom you took for Love, is not at all surprising. For, if I may guess from the Description you gave of him your Self, you seem to have taken for Love That which is beloved, not That which loves: and from this Mistake it arose, as I imagine, that Love appeared to You in all respects so beautiful. For the Object of Love, the Amiable, is truly beautiful and delicate, is perfect and completely blest. But to the Subject of Love, the Lover, belongs a different Nature, such a one as I have described to you.—Be it granted such, Diotima, said I; for what you tell me bids fair to be the Truth. But now, such being his Nature, of what

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what Advantage is he to Human Kind?—¹³³ This, Socrates, said She, in the next place, I shall do my best to teach you.—Already then it appears, what Kind of Being Love is, and of what Parents he was born: and that his Object is Beauty, You your Self have asserted. — Now what Answer shall we make, should we be asked this Question, — “ O Socrates and Diotima! How or in what respect mean ye, when ye say, that Beauty is the Object of Love?

¹³³ This begins the *Second Part* of the Speech of *Socrates*, according to that Order, which He himself at first setting out professed to follow. — *Plato* executes this Part of his Plan in his usual manner; throwing on his Subject but little Light in the beginning; then a little and a little more, as he advances on; and opening his Meaning gradually: by which Method he puts his Readers on thinking for Themselves, and opens Their Minds too by the same Degrees.—But We of Modern Days and Modern Education, except Those who are exercised in Mathematical Studys, endure not this gradual Progress in our Inquiries: but imagine, that the Slowness, requisite in this way of proceeding, such as the Ancients observed, is unbecoming Our spritelier Wits; which are able, as We presume, at One Leap to gain the Summits of Science and of Truth. Accordingly, the Annotator humbly hopes, that the few Admirers of *Plato* and His antiquated Manner will forgive him, if, in Complaisance to that fashionable Impatience and Conceitedness, he quits his Author's Method in some of the Notes to this Second Part of *Socrates's* Speech, (as he has sometimes done in others before,) and blabs out here and there a Secret Meaning, before the proper time of revealing it; which a Reader, who could bear Suspense, and give his Author Credit for it a while, might Himself perhaps afterward discover, with Advantage from the Delay.

Y

—To

¹³⁴ — To express the meaning of my Question in plainer Terms, said She, — What is it, which the Lover of Beauty longs for? — To be in Possession, said I, of the beloved Beauty. — Your Answer, said She, draws on a farther Question. What will be the State or Condition of that Man, who is in Possession of his beloved Beauty? ¹³⁵ — I told her, I could by no means answer readily to such a Question. — ¹³⁶ Suppose then, said She, that, changing the Subject of the Question, and putting Good in the place of Beauty, one were to ask you thus, and say, — Answer me, Socrates, to this Question, — What is it, which the Lover of Good longs for? — To be in possession of that Good; answered I. — And what, She asked me again, will be the State of that Man, who is in Possession of Good? — This, said I, is a Question I can answer with much less difficulty, thus, — that such a Man will be Happy. — Right; said She: for by the possessing of good Things it is, that

¹³⁴ The Answer to this Question, had *Plato* intended it should be answered so soon, would have been this, — “ All Lovers have some *Good in View* when they Love; for All Men always *desire Good*. Now the *Object* of Love is *Beauty*: it follows then, that *Beauty* is *Good*, and that to love is to *desire*.”

¹³⁵ The direct Answer, agreeably to the preceding Note, would have been this, — “ A State of Happiness.”

¹³⁶ In this Supposition, *Plato* only brings Good and Beauty *in View together*, but forms no Hypothesis of their being *the Same Thing*. This he leaves, at present, to be suggested to the sagacious Reader by his own Mind. See Note 106.

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the Happy are in that happy State which they enjoy. Nor is there any Room to question farther, and ask, — Why, or for the sake of What, a Man wishes to be happy; but a ¹³⁷ Conclusive Answer appears to have been given, fully satisfactory. — True, said I, without dispute. — Now this Wishing and this Longing, said She, let me ask you, whether in Your Opinion it is common to All Men; whether you think, that All wish to be always in Possession of Things Good; or how otherwise. — I think just so, replied I; — that such a Wish is common to All. — Well then, Socrates, said She; must we not acknowledge, that All Men are in Love; seeing that the Affections of them All are always fixed on the ¹³⁸ Same Things? or shall we say, that Some are in Love, and Some are not? — 'Tis a Thought, said I, which, I confess, a little surprizes me. — Be not surprized, said She: for the Case is nothing more than

¹³⁷ Because *Happiness* is the *Ultimate End* of the Desires of every Man; all *particular Objects of Desire* being properly to be considered but as *Means*, whether just or not, in different Degrees of Aproximation leading to that End.

¹³⁸ The several *Particular Objects of Men's Desire*, let the *real Difference* of one from another be supposed ever so great, yet must, all of them, *appear* to their respective Admirers under the same common *Form of Good*. For *Good* is the *only Object of Desire* alike to All Men; however they may mistake *various Appearances* of Good for the *Reality*. — Socrates in this place alludes to that known Property of real Love, to fix the Mind constantly and continually on One and the same Object.

this,—that the Name of Love, which belongs to all Love in General, we appropriate to one Particular Kind of Love, singled out from the Others, which we distinguish by other Names.—To make me conceive your Meaning more perfectly, said I, cannot you produce some other Case parallel to This? — I can; said She. The following Case is parallel.—¹³⁹ Making or Creating, you know, comprehends many Kinds of Operation. For all Cause, by which any Thing proceeds out of Non-Being into ¹⁴⁰ Being, is Creation. So that all the Operations, and all the Works, executed thro any of the Arts, are indeed so many Creations: and all the Artists and the Workmen are real Creators, Makers, or Poets.—True; said I.—And yet you know, continued She, they are not All of them called Poets or Makers, but are distinguished by different Names: whilst one Par-

¹³⁹ *Socrates* here avails himself of a Passage in the Speech of *Agatho*, and borrows from it a Similitude: (See Page 112.) the Propriety of which will be observed in Note 144.

¹⁴⁰ *Being* does not here signify Being or *Entity in general*, but the particular *Form* or *Essence* of any Thing, the *being what it is*. So *Non-Being*, just before, does not signify absolute *Non-Entity*, but the Non-being of some *Particular Thing*, or the Want of some *Form*, which is afterwards introduced into Existence. Accordingly, *Creation*, immediately after, signifies not, what is now-a-days generally understood by that Term, a making of *Something* out of meer *Nothing*; for *Plato* seems to have had no Notion of the Possibility of This; but here is to be understood the making some *Form* or *Being*, in the Sense just now mentioned, newly to exist, a *Particular one*, which existed not before.

ticular

ticular Kind of Creation, That which is performed in Metre thro the Muse's Art, is singled out from the Other Kinds; and the Name, to which they have All an equal Right, is given to That alone. For That alone is called ¹⁴¹ Poesy or Making: and the Artists in this Species of Creation only are peculiarly distinguished by the Name of Poets, or Makers.—Perfectly right; said I.—Just so is it then in the Case of Love; said She. Universally, all Desire of Things Good, and all that Longing after Happiness, which is in Every Individual of Human Kind, is the Migh-

¹⁴¹ It hath been already said, in Note 92, that the Greek Words, which signify *Maker* and *Making*, signify, besides *Poet* and *Poetry*. The former, without doubt, was their only original Signification. They came afterwards to be used in the latter Sense *emphatically*, and by way of Eminence, because Poetry was deemed (even by the Vulgar of the *Grecians*) the most excellent of all the Kinds of *Making* or Creation, performed by *Human Art*. How much a good Poem resembles a Creation of *Nature's* own, or rather a *Super-natural Creation*, (according to the commonly-received Notion,) is thus finely described by a very experienced and successful Artist of this Kind,

—*Whilst Imagination bodys forth
The Forms of Things unseen, the Poet's Pen
Turns them to Shape, and gives to airy Nothing
A local Habitation and a Name.*

Shakespeare M. N. D.

In Imitation of this double Meaning of the Greek Word ποιητής, or in Allusion to it, some of the more learned amongst our own Poets style the Great Maker of All things, “*Almighty Poet.*”

ty

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ty Deity of Love, who ¹⁴² by secret Ways and Stratagems subdues and governs the Hearts of All. His Votarys in many

¹⁴² By this Circumlocution we have chosen to express in English the Word here used by *Plato*, *δολερός*, which means *cunning*, *crafty*, or *full of Wiles*, because it seems the most expressive of what our Author means, in applying this Epithet to Love, when he is considering Love in his own new and comprehensive Sense. — The Epithet is undoubtedly borrowed from the *Poets*, who frequently apply it to the *Vulgar Love* or *Cupid*, on account of the many Wiles and Stratagems, apt to be suggested to the Mind by this Kind of Love, in the Prosecution of its Ends. See Page 156. — And because the *Fair* are used to employ Devices and Artifices to gain Lovers, Epithets of the same Kind are by the Poets often attributed to *Venus*; as by *Sappho*, for instance, in that incomparable Ode, preserved by *Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, the Epithets of *ποικιλόφρων* and *δολοπλόκος*. — Sometimes even the *Native Charms* of undefining Beauty, operating on the Lover, and in like manner the *Natural Magick* of Love, operating by *Sympathy* on the Party Beloved, have Epithets given them, which denote Art and Design; because *Art and Design* are in the Cause of those Charms and of that *Magic Sympathy*: it is Nature's own cunning Device, thus to conciliate Love, and to procure it a Return. In this Sense it is, that *Homer* calls *Venus* *δολοφρονεῖσα*, when she is contriving to bring *Paris* and *Helena* together. See *Iliad*, B. 3. — Analogous to this Meaning of the Epithet *δολερός*, as applied to Love, is the Sense in which it is used here, and applied to all Desire of Good. For in every Appearance of Good, there is a secret Charm, which irresistibly attracts Desire. That the Human Soul is apt to be so attracted, is owing to her Nature, as She stands related to Good. For, as it is, in the next Period to this, intimated by *Diotima*, in a very striking manner, Good is Natural to the Soul of Man. As often therefore as the Soul sees, or fancies that she sees it, claiming as it were
old

many various Ways, such as ¹⁴³ Those engaged in the Pursuit of Wealth, or Strength of Body, or Wisdom, are not said to be in Love; nor is the Name of Lover allowed to any

old Acquaintance and near Kindred, she runs to embrace it. Inferior Goods belong to the Inferior Parts of the Human Soul; but the Good of Mind being Beauty, Harmony, and Truth, every Mind feels the Charm of these, and an Attraction towards them, in proportion to its own Rectitude and Fairness. Now these Attractive Powers and these Sympathys are the secret and cunning Ways, by which Nature rules in the Heart of Man; and by Such as these governs she in All things.

¹⁴³ These Instances of Things desired and sought after, as good, and productive of Happiness, we may observe are taken, the First, from among those Things, by which the Outward Circumstances of Life are bettered; the Second, from among Such, as directly benefit the Body; the Third, from among Such, as are immediately, and of themselves, beneficial to the Mind. They are, all Three, selected out of their respective Classes with great Judgment; as being, Each in its Class, the Principal and the Leading Good.——It is farther observable, that we have, in the Instances here given us, that Division of Things Good, the Author of which is commonly supposed to have been Aristotle, into Goods of the Mind, Goods of the Body, and Goods of Fortune. But, to say the Truth, it appears that this Division of Good is to be attributed to the Pythagoreans: for we find it made by Archytas of Tarentum, one of whose Auditors was Plato, if Credit may be given to what Cicero tells us in his Dialogue de Senectute. See the fine Fragment of Archytas, where this Division is made, amongst the Opuscula Mythologica, Edit. Amst. pag. 675.——Another Thing observable is this; that Plato here ranks his Instances according to a Climax, beginning from one of the lowest Class: and his Reason for so doing, we presume, is this; that the Goods of Fortune, as they are called, are good only on account of the Body;

any Such. But to Those only, who are devoted to Love in one Particular Way, and addict themselves to ¹⁴⁴ one certain Species of Love, we appropriate those Terms of Love, and Lovers, and the being in Love, which ought to be considered as General Terms, applicable in Common

Body; and the *Goods of the Body*, together with *the Body* its self, are for the Sake only of the *Mind*, whose Good therefore is the *Ultimate End* of all. Now all *Means*, and all *subordinate Ends*, are naturally placed before, as being *prior in Time* to, that End which is the *Ultimate*.——It only remains to be observed, that *Plato* leaves it at present doubtful, to which of the Three Orders of Good (for every Good is of necessity comprehended in one or other of these,) Beauty, or the Beautiful its Self, is to be referred; and even whether it be any Good at all. He has shewn indeed in *the Greater Hippias*, pages 50, 63, and 70, that it belongs not to the *Lower*, nor to the *Middle Order*; but he has reserved the telling us, in express Terms, 'tis to be found in the *Higher*, till the Truth of it strikes us strongly in the Conclusion of this Speech of *Socrates*.

¹⁴⁴ *Agatho*, in his Speech, had represented *Love* as a *Maker* or *Creator*. His Representation was indeed true: but it was true in a Variety of Meanings unconnected and incoherent, as He had put them together. *Socrates*, in the Remainder of his Speech, not only makes those various Meanings to cohere one with another, but shews them united, as Parts, tho' differing in Degree of Excellence, comprised in One Whole. This he does by the *Definition of Love*, with which he is now going to present us,——that 'tis a *Desire of generating upon That which is Beautiful*. But, as yet, *Creation* seems as if mentioned by him only for the sake of illustrating his Subject by a Similitude or Parallel Case.——His specifying in the noblest Kind of *Human Creation*, *Poetry*, where the *Mind* generates upon her own beautiful *Ideas*, and the *inward Species of Harmony and Measure*, is perhaps intended to set us on thinking, beforehand, of that

mon to all the different Kinds. — In all Appearance, said I, You are entirely in the Right. — She proceeded, however, to confirm the Truth of what she had said, in the following manner. ¹⁴⁵ — There is a Saying, continued

She,

that noblest Kind of *Love*, which he opens to full View before us in the Conclusion. For the Operation of that Love is in the same Way, and is performed by the same immediate Agents, or *generating Causes*; tho' the Effect or *Issue* is of a much higher Kind; in as much as the *Subject*, in which it is produced, is not *Language* and *Sound*, but *Action* and the whole *Conduct of Human Life*. — But whether This be his Intention, — or whether he likens *Poesy*, or *Making*, only to the *Vulgar Love*, whose Operation and Effect is, according to the French Phrase, *faire des Enfans*; (and his Expression here, we must own, at first Sight seems to import no more;) or whether indeed he means any thing farther at present, than to illustrate a *Particular Use* of a *General Term*, in one Case, by another *like Instance*; and by chusing for his Instance the Term *Poesy*, or *Making*, to prepare us for what is soon to follow, when he comes to describe the *Issue* or Progeny of Love; — however This be; it is certain, that hitherto we are to consider what is said by *Socrates* on the Subject of *ποίησις*, *Creation*, or *Making*, as introduced only in the way of *Similitude* or Resemblance. The View of *Love* as *really a Creator*, in all the various Kinds of Creation, is as yet concealed. — In such a manner does *Plato* often amplify, illustrate, and confirm some particular Truth, by drawing Parallels, as they seem, and as He would have us at first suppose them; but which afterwards appear to be like so many Alleys in some spacious Garden, gradually inclining one to another, and at length all terminating in one and the same Object.

¹⁴⁵ *Socrates*, having made a proper Use of what *Agatbo* had said improperly, in the same manner now applies to his own rational and serious Purpose what was most fanciful and ludicrous in the Speech of *Aristo-*

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She, that Lovers are in Search of the ¹⁴⁶ Other Half of Themselves. But My Doctrine is, that we love neither the

phanes, by putting an Interpretation on it agreeable to Truth. For thus it is ;——the whole Chain of those humorous and ridiculous Conceits, which run from the Beginning to the End of the Speech, spoken by the Comic Poet, depends on the false Use he makes of a Saying, which seems to have been almost Proverbial,——that “*Lovers are looking after their other Halves.*” *Aristophanes*, for the sake of Mirth, is pleased to consider this Saying as meant of the *Human Body*. But *Socrates*, by considering it as relative to the *Soul*, whose *better Part* is *Good*, and is derived from *Essential Good* its Self, takes Occasion from it to proceed a Step farther, than he had yet gone, in delivering his Doctrine concerning Love ; and to teach us, that *Good* is the *only Thing Amiable*, and that Nothing can possibly be loved by Any Person, which does not some way or other *appear* to the Lover of it to be *good*. Now he had before taught, that *Beauty* was the only Object of Love, that is, was the *only Thing Amiable*. From Both these Premisses, taken together, it follows, that what is *Beautiful* is also *Good*, and that *Good* and *Beauty* are the *Same Thing*.

¹⁴⁶ In Allusion to this Saying, *Horace*, speaking of his Friend *Virgil*, expresseth himself thus,

——— *Animæ dimidium meæ.*

Horat. Od. 3. L. 1.

——— *My Soul's dear Half.*

To the same Purport was another Expression, frequently used of old, as we learn from *Aristotle* in these Words, ὅταν βεβλόμεθα σφόδρα φίλον εἶπαι, μία, φάμεν, ψύχη ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ τέτα. *When we would express the Greatness*

the Half nor even the Whole of ourselves, if it happen not, my Friend, some way or other to be Good. For we are willing to have our Feet and our Hands cut off, tho' our own, if we deem them incurably and absolutely Evil. Tis not to what is their Own, that Men have so strong an Attachment, nor do they treat it so tenderly on That Account, — unless there be a Man who thinks¹⁴⁷ Good to be his own, and properly belonging to him, but Evil to be foreign to his Nature. — So true is it, that

Greatness of our Love or Friendship for Another, we use to say, "My Soul and His are One." Aristot. Mag. Moral. L. 2. C. The same Author, in his Nicomachean Ethicks, L. 9. C. 4 and 9. cites, as if in common Use, another Phrase of the same Kind, this, — ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός. A Friend is another Self. All these Expressions continue in Use at this day. But the Philosophical Truth, which they carry with them, agreeably to the Mind of Plato and his Great Disciple just now quoted, is this, ——— that, as Friendship subsists only between the Good, Goodness is the Bond of their Friendship and Union; or, in other Words, that Souls meet and are united together only in Good its Self.

¹⁴⁷ The most sublime of all Plato's Doctrines, from which is to be explained what he here says, is This, ——— that the *Divine Nature* is the Essence of Good, or *Good its Self*. For since *Good* is the *End* of all *Being*; *God*, who is pure *Mind*, the only *True Being*, must either Himself be *his own End*, or be dependant for Good on the Outward Part of Nature: now this last Hypothesis involves in it a Contradiction; because *Outward Nature* is formed and moulded by its *Author* according to *Himself*, according to his own *Mind*, and the fair *Ideas* of it, or, in other words, according to *Beauty*; all the *Motions* of this Outward Nature are managed and directed for *Good*, for the most Good of *All Particular Be-*

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that there is no other Object of Love to Man, than Good alone.—Or do You think, there is?—By Jove, said I, there appears to Me no Other.—Is this now sufficient for us? said She: and have we done Justice to our Argument, if we finish it with this simple and slender Conclusion, that All Men love what is Good? — Why not? said I. — What? said She; must we not add This, — that they long to have Possession of the loved Good? — This, said I, must be added. — And not only now to have Possession of it, said She again, but to have Possession of it for ever too; must not This be added farther? — This farther; said I. — Love then in fine, said She, is the Desire of having Good in Perpetual Possession.—Most true; said I; in every Tittle you are right.—Since then, said She, this General Desire is found
always

ings, and for the *Continuance* of that Good in Succession; and every Particular Being is made to move and act for *its own Good*, controlled in its Motions and Actions only when such Good becomes incompatible with the *Good of Others* now in Being, or with the Good of *Future Generations*. — The Truth is, that into every Being Good is *introduced* by *Form*. For, as *Life* conveys some *Form* along with it wherever it comes, and *operates* afterward to the *Perfection* of that Form, so *Form* is as it were the *Vehicle*, and also the *Organ* or Instrument, of Good. But, in *Universal Nature* Good is *First* in Order. For, as *Mind* is the first *Spring* of all *Motion without*, and as it were the *Fountain* of *Life*, so Good is the *first Mover* or leading Motive to the *Mind within*, and may therefore justly be considered as the *Prime Source of all Being*. Now as *Outward*
Form,

always to subsist and to operate in All, can you tell me, in what particular way it operates on Those who are commonly said to be in Love? what the Aim is of Such Lovers, and what the Work or Effect of this Kind of Love? — Were I able to tell, O Diotima, replied I, I should not have been so full of Admiration at Your Wisdom; nor should I have applied my self to You, to be taught these very Things, if I already knew them. — Well, said She; I will teach you then. — The Aim of These Lovers, and the Work of This Love, is to generate upon the Beautiful, as well in a Mental Way, as in that which is Corporeal. — Your Words, said I, have need of some Diviner to interpret them: I confess, I do not apprehend their Meaning. — I will express my self then, said She,

Form, which is but the *Copy of Mind*, being introduced by Life, introduceth always with its self *some Good*, so *Mind*, which is *imparted* to the Soul of Man immediately from *Mind Universal*, and is of its *own Essence*, introduceth always with its self a *Participation* of the very *Essence of Good*. Thus is *Good* most *natural* to Man, and *congenial* with his Mind; is most *intimate* to him, and most properly *his own*; and indeed is, in the truest Sense, *Himself*. Hence it is, that whilst every other Animal hath its *Capacity* of enjoying Good limited by narrow Bounds, and its *Views* of Good confined within the Reach of that Capacity, Man alone hath his Views of Good unconfined, and is by Capacity adequate to the Enjoyment of the Highest: and hence the *Love of All Good*, even of the *Highest*, is seated in the Depth of his Affections, in his *inmost Soul*, and is indeed the proper and peculiar *Characteristick* of the *Human Nature*.

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in plainer Language.—All of Human Race, O Socrates, are full of the Seeds of Generation, both in their Bodys and in their Minds : And when they arrive at Maturity of Age, they naturally long to generate. But generate they cannot upon the Ugly or Uncomely, and only upon the Fair and the Agreeable. For the Work of Generation is carried on, you know, by Means of the Natural Commerce between the two Sexes : and This is a Work above Human Art ; it is Divine. For to conceive and to impregnate is ¹⁴⁸ to immortalise the Kind : it is producing Immortality out of an Animal which is mortal. In each of the Sexes therefore is some Immortal and Divine Principle, the Cause of Conception in the One, and of Impregnation

¹⁴⁸ The Greek Text runs thus, — καὶ τὸτο ἐν θνητῷ ὄντι τῷ ζῳῳ ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, ἡ κύσις καὶ ἡ γέννησις. There is a Passage in *Aristotle* somewhat parallel to it, which is this, — γένεσις γὰρ γένεσιν ἀποδεχομένη, κατὰ προκοπὴν, ἀπαθανατίζειν βέλεται. *Generation succeeding to Generation, in a continual Progress, means to immortalise the Kind.* *Aristot. de Generat. & Corrup.* L. 1. C. 3. Agreeably to which, we might have supposed, that in the Passage of *Plato* now before us, ἀθανατίζον should be read instead of ἀθάνατον, were it not that a little farther on we meet with another Passage, where is the like Expression, — ἀειγενές ἐστι καὶ ἀθάνατον, ὡς θνητῷ, ἡ γέννησις. In both these Passages indeed the Expression would seem rather too bold, and too highly figurative, were the Meaning, intended to be conveyed by it, as simple and easy, as that of the Passage of *Aristotle*, just now cited. But we apprehend, that here, as well as elsewhere, *Plato's* Sense is deeper and more recondite ;

pregnation in the Other. But in neither of them can this Principle operate effectually, unless the Subject, on which it operates, be suitable to it and corresponding. Now Deformity and Ugliness but ill suit with aught which is Divine. Beauty alone agrees with it and corresponds. For Beauty is that Celestial Influence which favours, and that Goddess who patronises, the Work of Generation. Hence, whenever That which teems with Generative Power approaches That which is Beautiful, it smiles benignly ; and thro the Delight it feels, opening and diffusing its self abroad, breeds or generates. But whenever it meets with That which is Deformed or Ugly, it grows morose, saddens, and contracts its self ; it turns away, ¹⁴⁹ retires back, and generates not ; but restraining the swoln Power within, which is ready to burst forth, it bears the Burthen with Uneasiness. Hence it is, that They who are full of

recondite ; and that he means nothing less than NATURE her Self, for ever *pregnant* with fresh Life ; or That Immortal *Life-giving* or *Generative Principle* in Nature, by which even the *Outward World*, in its own Nature *mortal*, and every Species of Animals in it, is in a manner *immortalised*. — To express this Meaning in some tolerable degree, we have been obliged a little to paraphrase the Passage.

¹⁴⁹ The Greek Word here, as printed in all the Editions, is ἀνελθται. From *Timæus's Lexicon*, lately published, pag. 24. there is some Ground to think, it should be read ἀνείλλεται. But of how little Consequence it is, whether of the Two Readings be preferred, see the learned *Hemsterbusius*, and *Ruhnkenius* in *Animadvers. ad Timæum*, pag. 52, and 69.

This, and long to generate, ¹⁵⁰ employ much of their Creative Power upon That which is Beautiful: it is because the Beautiful frees them from those Generative Throws, with which they labour. But, Socrates, This is not, as You imagined, the Love of Beauty. — What is it then? said I. — It is the Love, replied She, of generating, and begetting Issue, there where we find Beauty. — Be it so; said I. — It certainly is so; she replied. — But, said I, what

¹⁵⁰ In translating this Passage, we have adhered strictly to the printed Text, which is this; — ὅθεν δὴ τῷ κυντί τε καὶ ἡδὴ σπαργῶντι πολλὴ ἢ ΠΟΙΗΣΙΣ γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλόν, κ. τ. λ. But we doubt, whether the Right Reading be not rather ΠΟΝΗΣΙΣ. If this Alteration be admitted, the Translation must run thus. — “*employ much Affiduity and Pains about the Beautiful: it is because only the Beautiful frees them, &c.*” An attentive Reader will discern, at least when he reads farther on, that this whole Description of the *Generative Virtue* of Love is *metaphorical*; and that, by Metaphors, taken from one certain *Species* of Love, the *Vulgar*, and from the *Animal-Way* of Generation, *Plato* means to describe the *Higher Kinds* of Love, the Power which *Mental Beauty* has upon the Mind, and the Manner in which *the Mind* generates her proper *Offspring*. In numberless Passages of *Plato's* Writings the same Metaphors are used, in speaking of *Socrates*, of the *Attachment* he had to *True Beauty*, and the *Desire* he had to *generate* in that *Mental Way*, that is, to propagate Wisdom and Virtue. Accordingly, we are inclined to suppose, that *Plato*, in this Passage also, alludes to *Socrates*, in that principal Part of his Character, his *assiduous Endeavours* to cultivate the Minds of Such, as had the Good Fortune to share in his particular Regards; and These were all Such as, in their Countenance, or outward Figure, discovered an ingenuous Turn of Mind, or an easy and docile Disposition in their

what has Love to do with Generating? — Because Generating, answered She, perpetuates and in some manner immortalizes That which is Mortal. Now, that the Desire of Immortality must always accompany the Love of Good, follows from what we before agreed in, — that Love was the Desire of having Good in Perpetual Possession. For the necessary Consequence of that Position is This, — that Love desires Immortality. — ¹⁵¹ All these Things learned I formerly in a Conversation with Diotima,

their inward Frame. — The same Allusion will take Place, and our Supposition still hold good, tho the Right Reading should be *ποίησις*, and not *πόνησις*. The only Difference will be this, — that the *Alteration* [*ποίησις*] represents what *great Pains* were taken by *Socrates*, and how *assiduously* he *laboured*, to discharge the Office he believed himself born to, in mending the Minds and Manners of as many as seemed to Him capable of Amendment: whereas the *Common Reading* [*ποίησις*] represents to us, what less immediately concerns the present Subject, that is, the *great Success* those Labours of his met with, in often *effectuating* such Amendment. — The Sense, made by the Alteration, relates immediately to the *ἔργον*, or Philosophical Love; and shews, how this Love *affects the Lover*: but the Passage, as it is printed, relates rather to the *Effect, Production, or Issue* of that Love, a Topick, which we are not yet arrived at.

¹⁵¹ *Plato* here makes a short Stop, or Interruption, in the Progress of his Argument. This is very usual with him: and his Reason for so doing is always this, — to renew the Attention of his Readers, by giving them as it were a Breathing-Time, before they advance farther; especially when that Part of the Way, on which they are next to enter, is steep and arduous.

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discourfing upon Love.—At another time, ſhe thus queſtioned me; —¹⁵² What do You imagine, Socrates, to be the Cauſe of that Love, and that Deſire, which lately was the Subject of Converſation between You and Me? — Do you not obſerve, how vehement are the Paſſions of all Brute Animals, when the Seaſon comes, in which they couple? Birds as well as Beaſts, you may perceive them all ſick with Love: ſo intense is their Deſire, in the firſt place to generate and breed: nor is their Ardour leſs afterwards in the rearing of their Young. In Defence of Theſe, you ſee them ready to engage in Fight, the weakeſt Animals with the ſtrongeſt. To ſupport Theſe, you ſee them willingly, themſelves, perishing with Famine: in ſhort, doing and ſuffering, for Their Sakes, the Utmoſt poſſible. Thoſe indeed of Human Kind, continued She, one might imagine acted thus from a Motive of Reaſon in Themſelves: but in Brute Animals, can you aſſign the Cauſe, why the Affections of Love ſhould be ſo deep and ſtrong?—I told her, I was at a Loſs to account for it.—And do you think, ſaid She, ever to become a thorow Adept in the Science of Love, if you are at a Loſs in a Caſe

¹⁵² The following Account of the *Generation of Animals*, and their *Succession* in a continued Series of *Individuals*, by which the *Kind* is for ever kept up in Exiſtence, gives us a juſt Representation of *all Outward Nature*: for 'tis in the ſame manner, that *the World its Self*, tho continually paſſing away, and changing, in every Part, yet remains for ever *the Same*

Case so easy? — It is for this very Reason, said I, Diotima, as I lately told you, that I come to You for Instruction: it is, because I am sensible how much I want it. Do You therefore teach me, what the Cause is of those vehement Affections you mentioned just now, and of every other Sentiment and Passion incident to Love. — Upon which she said, — If you believe, that Love is, what you have often owned it to be, the Desire of having Good in Perpetual Possession, you will be at no Loss to conceive what the Cause is of those Affections. For the Case of Brute Animals and that of the Human Kind are in this respect exactly the Same; in Both the Same Principle prevails; the Mortal Nature seeks to be perpetuated, and, as far as possible, immortalized. Now This is possible in one only Way, that is, by Generation; in which some new Living Thing is constantly produced, to supply the place of the deceased Old one. And in no other manner than This, is Life continued to any Individual Being, of

Same in its whole and entire Form; Life continually arising, and repairing the Ruins made by Death in every Kind of Things; and the fresh Growth keeping Pace with the Decay. To preserve this Living Beauty in such its Immortality and unfading Youth, Animals have those Affections, Impulses, or Instincts, here described, given to them, as imparted from the Mundane Soul: analogous to which are the Powers of Gravitation, Attraction, Mixture, Cohesion, and others of like Kind, which are indeed so many Vital Powers, given to the insensible Parts of the Universe, as partaking of the Life of Nature.

which we say, that it lives still, and pronounce it to be the Same Being. Thus every Man, for Instance, from his Infancy on to Old Age, is called the Same Person; tho he never has any Thing in him, which abides with him; and is continually a New Man; having lost the Man he was, in his Hair, in his Flesh, in his Bones, in his Blood, in fine, in his whole Body. ¹⁵³ Nor in his Body only, but in his Soul too, does he undergo incessant Change. His Ways, his Manners, his Opinions; his Desires, and Pleasures; his Fears, and Sorrows; none of these ever continue in any Man the Same; but New ones are generated and spring up in him, whilst the Former fade and dye away. ¹⁵⁴ But a Paradox, much greater than any yet mentioned,

¹⁵³ From *Outward Nature* our Philosopher proceeds to the *Soul of Man*, and shews a most exact *Analogy* between them, as to the *Manner* of their *Continuance* and *Identity*.—The like Analogy there is, as he intimates to us a little farther on, between the *Propagation* of the several *Kinds* and *Species* in *the one*, and the Propagation of every Kind of *Manners*, *Tempers*, *Passions*, and whatever else is seated in *the other*: between the *Inclinations*, *Impulses*, and *Powers*, given to every *Corporeal* Being for the Purpose of continuing its Kind; and the mutual *Sympathys*, by which *Souls* also propagate, their *Desires* to *beget*, and their *Readiness* to *conceive*, an *Inward Offspring*.

¹⁵⁴ *Plato*, being now about establishing a Position somewhat strange and paradoxical, prevents the Shock it might give our Understandings, and at the same time puts us on examining whether it be true, by a previous Declaration of his own, that it is a *Paradox*. It is this; — that the same Analogy, mentioned in the preceding Note, is extended even

tioned, is with regard to Knowledge; — not only some new Portions of Knowledge we acquire, whilst we lose others, of which we had before been Masters; and never continue long the Same Persons as to the Sum of our present Knowledge; but we suffer also the like Change in every

to the Higher Part of the Human Soul, *Mind*; to all her *Ideas*, and to all her *Knowledge*, even that of *Eternal Truths*: in as much as These, eternal as they are in their own Nature, yet, considered as *Objects of the Human Mind*, are continually *perishing* in Oblivion, and Others of like Kind *arising* in their Room; or, in other Words, Some *vanish* from her View, and Others *take their Place*. For thus it is; — whenever the Human Mind has a *present View* of any Truth, she sees it only by virtue of the *eternal Principles of Mind and Science*, that Divine Light, which is always indeed within her, but only *then actually shines* on her, and shows her that Truth, which she before saw not. This *present View* is but of *short Duration*. The Object soon *vanishes* away, and appears not again, till the Mind again *opens* her *inward Eye*, and *directs* her Sight the *Same Way*. For if, opening her Eye, she looks a *Different Way*, a Different Truth will, by virtue of the same Light, appear to her. But, whatever the Mind makes or suffers to be her Object, the *Motion* within is such, that she can *look* but a *short time* stedfastly at *any One*; and such is the *Weakness* of her Eye, that she cannot for a long time *at once* keep it *open at all*, or attentive to Mental Objects. Thus *Science*, in every Branch of it, *dyes to Man* continually, and *revives* to him again; or, to speak with more Propriety, He dyes and revives again to Science. — After we have found this to be true of the Human Mind, with regard to her *Knowledge of Things eternal and immutable*, Ideal Essences, with their Connections and Oppositions, that is, Positive and Negative Truths, a Kind of Knowledge, peculiarly and properly by *Plato* termed *Science*; after this, I say, we cannot be surprized to find it hold true with

ery Particular Article of that Knowledge. For what we call Meditation, supposes some Knowledge to have actually, as it were, left us; and indeed Oblivion is the Departure of this Knowledge: Meditation then, raising up, in the room of this departed Knowledge, a fresh Remembrance in our Minds, preserves in some Manner and continues to us
That

with regard to the *Knowledge of Things mutable and perishable*, a Kind of *Knowledge*, if it may be called by so high a Name, conveyed to us thro *Outward Sense*. The first Impressions, made by these *Sensible Objects* upon the *Imagination*, are very *different*, as we every day experience, from those *Images* of them, which are afterwards from time to time excited in the *Memory*; every *Successive Image* being more and more unlike the *First*.—And not only is each particular *Article of Knowledge* thus transient in Man, thro the Weakness of his Powers of Understanding and Memory, but these Seats of Knowledge gradually sinking and decaying, all his Knowledge sinks at length and perishes together with them: not to mention the Death and total Dissolution of that Compound Being, Man, with whom it is probable that whatever Knowledge he has acquired in his *temporary State of Being upon Earth* is totally extinguished.——To remedy all these Failures, Nature has implanted in every Individual of the Human Kind a Desire to *beget*, in *Other Minds*, *Ideas* and *Images* *similar* to those, which are *perishing* in *Himself*, and from other Minds to *conceive* the *Copys* and *Resemblances* of such as are *perishing* in *Them*. Hence, in the *Young*, their *Curiosity* and *Inquisitiveness after Knowledge*, in proportion to the Vigour of their Facultys, either of *Imagination* or of *Understanding*. Hence too, in the *Mature of Age* and the *Knowing*, their *Love of communicating Knowledge*, a Love in them proportioned to the Value they set upon that Knowledge. And hence also, in the gradual *Decline of Life* and *Decay of Understanding*, with equal Steps comes
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That which we had lost; so as to make the Memory of it, the Likeness, seem the very Same Thing. Indeed every thing Mortal is preserved in this only Way, not by the absolute Sameness of it for ever, like Things Divine, but by leaving behind it, when it departs, dyes, or vanishes, Another in its room, a New Being, bearing its Resemblance.¹⁵⁵ By this Contrivance in Nature, Socrates, does

upon Men the Love of *Story-telling*, and of reporting all that passed in their Youthful Years; till at length the Memory of what then happened to Themselves, and of what They themselves performed, is all which is left remaining in the Mind; and the Fondness for repeating it over and over then becomes extreme. Thus is Knowledge and Science *immortalized* in Man; Notions and Opinions, of the same Kind, are thus for ever *kept alive* and flourishing in *some Minds or other*; the Aged thus live their Youthful Years *over again* in their own Recitals; and their past Actions thus live in the *Memory of Others*, when they Themselves are departed.

¹⁵⁵ This whole Speech of *Diotima's* hath so much of the pompous and enthusiastic Air given it by *Plato*, tho with great Propriety, as coming from the Mouth of a professed Prophetess, that a sober-minded Reader may perhaps be diffident of its being strictly or literally true, and even may be doubtful whether *Plato* himself intended it should be so received. The Thoughts in this Passage in particular may seem elevated and fine, rather than just and natural. And yet they appeared to the cool, the accurate, the rigid *Aristotle*, to be so truly sublime and beautiful, that, without making any mention of *Plato*, he has thought fit to borrow, and transfer them into his own Writings. For in his *Treatise on the Soul* are these Words, — Φυσικώτατον τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν ἔργων, ὅσα τέλεια, — τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἶον αὐτό, ζῶν μὲν ζῶον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτὸν, ἵνα

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does Body, and every other Thing naturally Mortal, partake of Immortality.¹⁵⁶ Immortal after a different manner is That, which naturally is Immortal. Wonder not therefore, that all Beings are by Nature lovingly affected towards their Offspring. For this affectionate Regard, this Love, follows every Being for the Sake of Immortality.—
These

τὸ αἰὲ καὶ τὸ θείον μετέχουσιν, ἢ διῶνται· πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνῃ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἐκείνῃ ἐνεκα πράττει ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν πράττει. — ἐπεὶ ἔν κοινῶν αἰὲ καὶ τὸ θείον τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν· ἢ μετέχειν δύναται ἕκαστον, ταύτη κοινῶν. — καὶ διαμένει ἐκ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οἷον αὐτὸ· ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἔχ' ἐν, εἶδει δὲ ἓν. “The most natural of all the Operations performed by Living Things, such as are perfect in their Kind, — is for each to create or make Another such as its Self; an Animal, such another Animal; a Vegetable, such another Vegetable; to this End, that All may partake of Immortality and Divinity as far as it is possible for them. For all [natural Things] aim at This, and for the Sake of This do they whatever they do by Nature. — But it being impossible for them to partake of Immortality and Divinity by the Continuance of Themselves, because nothing mortal or corruptible can for ever continue One and the Same Numerical or Individual Being; Each of them partakes of the Immortal and Divine Nature in that only way in which it can; — it continues, not as the Same, but as it were or like the Same; not indeed numerically One, but One in Kind.” Aristot. *de Animâ*. L. 2. C. 4. The same Thoughts are expressed, tho in a much more concise manner, by the same Philosopher in the Passage cited before, from another Part of his Writings, in Note 148.

¹⁵⁶ Reason teacheth us, concerning those *Mental Forms*, termed by Aristotle the *Kinds* and *Species* of Things, [γένη καὶ εἶδη] and by Plato usually called *Ideas*, of which all Things existing in Nature are the *Copys*,
that

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These Things, said I, O Diotima, Wisest of Women! undoubtedly are so. — To which She, in the Language of the most accomplished Sophists, replied, — You may be assured, Socrates, it is the Truth. — Nor is it less plain that they always *are*, and are always invariably *the same*; because *Science*, which is the Knowledge of those Forms, is *the same* thro all Ages and in all Countrys. *Nature*, considered as *changing* continually in every Part of her, and consisting of *temporary* Beings, Some just rising into Life and Form, Others increasing and growing vigorous, whilst Others again are tending to Dissolution, This *ever-shifting Scene* of Things, is the *Subject* of *Sense* and of *Opinion*, not of *Science*. Yet are we always able to tell, of what *Kinds of Being* the World is composed; and so far as we advance in that Part of the Knowledge of Nature, called *Natural History*, we know the *Propertys* of each *Kind*. But this Knowledge we are able to attain, only because the successive *Individuals* of each *Kind* differ not, one from another, in any Property *essential* to the *Kind*. Thus, finding *Nature never to fail* in producing *Individuals* of every *Kind*, we conclude, that there is in *Nature* some *unfailing* and *immortal Principle* or Cause: and seeing her *constant* and *uniform* in her Productions, we conclude, that such *Principle* or Cause is *invariable*: from the *Harmony* of those Productions we infer *Unity* of the *Design*; and from *Unity* of the *Design* we infer the *Unity* of that *Mind* where the *Design* lyes. This great and universal *Mind*, the eternal *Place* of those invariable *Forms*, which are the *Models* of all *Outward Nature*, is thus, in the most general and comprehensive Sense, That *NATURE*, which is *Immortal*, *Immutable*, and always absolutely *the Same*; and which also, as it is the *Principle and Cause of All Things*, is in the highest Sense, what it was just before stiled, that is, *DIVINE*. Whatever *partakes* of This, is, so far, its *Self*, *immortal* and *divine*: every Thing else is Part of the *Mortal Nature*; is, its *Self*, *mortal*; and *immortalized* only in its *Species* and *Kind*.

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from Instances of a different Kind, that Immortality is the great Aim and End of All.¹⁵⁷ For if you observe, how the Love of Fame and Glory operates on Men, and what Effect it has upon their Conduct, you must wonder at their Folly, in labouring so much and suffering so greatly in the Pursuit of it, — unless you consider the mighty Power of that Passion which possesses them, a Zeal to become illustrious in After-Ages, and to acquire a Fame that

¹⁵⁷ *Socrates* had laid down this Position, that the *Love of Good* is always attended with a Desire of immortalising that Good, or, to use his own Expression, with a *Desire of Immortality*. He has already proved the Truth of it, — first, in all *Brute-Animals*, whose *Good* is only *Animal-Life*, together with the *Pleasurable Sensations* that such Life affords; — and next, in that *Part of Man*, by which he is *superiour* to all other Animals, his *Mind*, the *Good* of which is *Science, Wisdom, and Truth*. It may seem remaining to be proved true in the *Whole of Man*, in the *Human Nature*, when all the Parts of it are taken together, the *Chief Good* of which is *Virtue*. But, since in the Conclusion of this Speech we learn, that true *Virtue* is the *Effect* only of *Wisdom*; and since in the latter Part of the Dialogue, the Speech of *Alcibiades*, we find this Doctrine exemplified in the Character there given of *Socrates*, whose whole Study was bent on the Propagation of *Virtue* by the means of *Wisdom*; it appears to have been already, under the Second Head, sufficiently proved with regard to *Virtue*. *Socrates* therefore proceeds to prove it no less true with regard even to those Images and *Resemblances of Virtue*, as he afterwards calls them, those *Glorious Actions* of some of the popular Heroes and Heroines of old, applauded by *Phædrus* in his Speech, and by Him attributed to the Power of *Love* and *Friendship*, but which the Philosopher here derives in great measure from their Love of

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that may last for ever and be Immortal. For This, more than for the sake of their Familys or Friends, are they ready to encounter Dangers, to expend their Treasures, to undergo the severest Hardships, and to meet Death its self. Do you think, continued She, that Alcestis would have dyed for her Husband Admetus, to preserve His Life? or that Achilles would have dyed for his Friend Patroclus, to avenge his Death? or that ¹⁵⁸ your Athenian Codrus would have dyed for his Children's sake, to secure to Them the Succession of his Kingdom? had they not imagined, their Virtue would live for ever in the Re-

of *Glory*, as the *Chief Good*; a *Love*, attended, like all other Loves, with a *Desire* of making the supposed *Good*, as far as possible, *Immortal*, even after their Sense of it should, with Life, be lost. This Third Head of the Argument, farther, paves the Way for prosecuting, in what is still to come, the principal Aim and Intention of the Dialogue: for which see *The Argument*, page 19.

¹⁵⁸ That in the Greek Original we ought here to read *ὁμέτερος*, and not, as it is printed, *ἡμέτερος*, we imagine, there needs not the Authority of any Manuscript to prove. It might be sufficient to observe, that *Diotima*, who is here the Speaker, is by *Socrates*, toward the End of his Speech, called *ξένη*, a *Stranger* or *Foreigner* at *Athens*. It would therefore have been a great Impropriety in Her, when she was speaking to an *Athenian*, to have called an *Athenian* King *ours*. But to confirm this, we shall add, that *Diotima* is careful to observe the very same Propriety, here used in the Word *ὁμέτερος*, *your*, a little farther on; where, in speaking of *Solon* the *Athenian* Lawgiver, she uses not the Pronoun of the first Person, *Us*, but that of the Second Person, *You*, meaning, *You Athenians*.

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membrance of Posterity ; as it actually does throughout all Greece at this very Day, Assure your self, ¹⁵⁹ their Conduct had been quite different, had they not been full of this Imagination. For with a View to the Immortality of Virtue, and the never-dying Glory which attends it, have all Great Actions ever been performed ; a View, which inspires and animates the Performers, in proportion to the Degree of their own personal Worth and Excellence. For they are governed by that Universal Passion, the Desire of Immortality. But tho Immortality be thus sought by All Men, yet Men of different Dispositions seek it by different Ways. In Men of certain Constitutions, the Generative Power lyes chiefly and eminently in their Bodys. Such Persons are particularly fond of the Other Sex, and
court

¹⁵⁹ These Three admired Patterns of Heroism, shown in their Contempt of Death, were vulgarly supposed to have been inspired and actuated solely by *Virtuous Affections* ; the First of them, by *Conjugal Love* ; the Second, by *Friendship* ; and the last, by the *Natural Affection* of a Parent. But *Plato* declares his Judgment, that the Motives of their Conduct were not *purely Virtuous* ; that One of the *Selfish Passions*, indeed the noblest of the Kind, the *Love of Glory*, had a considerable Share in those Motives ; and that without *This* the *Others* had been *insufficient* to produce such heroic Instances of Bravery. Nor will *Plato's* Judgment in these Cases appear uncandid to Any one who reflects, that the wisest *Legislators* and *Politicians* of old proposed *Glory* and *Praise*, as the *best Incitements* to Heroic Actions ; and that the ancient *Heroes* professed to make Those their *chief Ends* : that, as to the Two first Cases, here mentioned,

court Intimacys chiefly with the Fair: they are easily enamoured in the Vulgar Way of Love; and procure to themselves, by begetting Children, the Preservation of their Names, a Remembrance of Themselves which they hope will be immortal, a Happiness to endure for ever. In Men of Another Stamp, the Facultys of Generation are, in as eminent a Degree, of the Mental Kind. For Those there are, who are more prolific in their Souls than in their Bodys; and are full of the Seeds of Such an Offspring, as it peculiarly belongs to the Human Soul to conceive and to generate. And What Offspring is This, but Wisdom and ¹⁶⁰ every other Virtue? Those, who generate most, and who are Parents of the most numerous Progeny

mentioned, no Praise in the Softer Sex was of old deemed equal to that of *Conjugal Love*, nor was any in the Stronger Sex deemed equal to that of *Friendship*; and, as to the latter Case, that *the Great* of all Ages, by whatever Means they have acquired their Greatness, or given Splendour to their Names, are apt to fancy their *Greatness continued* by the Continuance of their *Names* in their own *Posterity*; and that a Progeny, to spring from themselves hereafter, and yet unborn, cannot be loved, nor their Greatness sought or desired, from any other Motive. See farther on this Subject in Note 168.

¹⁶⁰ Among these Offsprings of the Human Mind, it appears from the very next Sentence, that *Plato* meant to include all the *Arts*. If therefore in This Sentence the Words "*every other Virtue*" mean *every Moral Virtue*, then *Wisdom* here means *all Intellectual Virtue*, and includes *Knowledge* of the *Sciences*, and superiour *Skill* in *Arts* of whatever Kind; agreeably to the Vulgar Acceptation of the Word *Wisdom* in those Days:
See

Progeny in this way, are ¹⁶¹ the Poets, and such Artists of other Kinds, as are said to have been the Inventors of their respective Arts. But by far the most excellent and beau-

See Note 23. But if the Word *Wisdom* be here used in the philosophical and true Sense of it, as we are much inclined to think, then by the Word *Virtue*, immediately afterwards, is meant every Ability or Endowment of the Soul, whether *Moral* or *Intellectual*, acquired or improved by Discipline and Habit, and productive of whatever conduces to Human Happiness. In this latter Sense of the Words *Virtue* and *Wisdom*, *Wisdom* is the highest of the *Intellectual Virtues*, and the last acquired; and the *Moral Virtues*, such as are real and genuine, solid and substantial, follow of necessity from *Wisdom*; as *Socrates* in the Sequel of his Discourse will teach us. *Wisdom* therefore, being the noblest and most godlike Offspring of the Mind, and Head of the whole *Double Chain of Virtues*, all those in One Row leading up to it, and all in the Other depending from it, is singled out from the rest, and is the only one here mentioned by Name: and thus *Plato* is at length pleased to give us a plain Intimation of the End, whither he is conducting us.

¹⁶¹ *Poets*, — because their Works were, in a peculiar and eminent manner, the *Offspring* of their own Minds; (see Note 92.) and because They, by their Writings, were the chief *Teachers* of *Wisdom*, and of all *Moral* and *Political Virtue*, to the Youth in ancient times: (see Note 3. to the *Argument of the Io.*) — *Inventors of Arts*, — because they properly are, as they have been often justly stiled, *Fathers* of those *Arts* which they invented; and because they may, with no less Propriety in a Mental Sense, be called *Fathers* of those *Artists*, considered as Artists, Those, who follow them in their Arts; tho, as it often happens in Natural Things, Some of their Progeny out-do them, as Others fall short of them, in the Perfection of the Kind.

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teous Part of Wisdom is ¹⁶² That, which is conversant in the founding and well-ordering of Citys and other Habitations of Men; a Part of Wisdom, distinguished by the Names of ¹⁶³ Temperance and Justice. When the Soul of any Man has been teeming with the Seeds of this Wisdom from his Youth, (and of Divine Souls it is the native Property thus to teem,) as soon as he arrives at Maturity of Age, and those Seeds are fully ripened, he longs to
sow

¹⁶² This Part of Wisdom is by *Plato* stiled the *most excellent*, because productive of the *greatest Good* to Human Kind; and the *most beauteous*, because it copys after that *most beauteous Order*, the Formation and Administration of *the World*. — Who are the Parents, and What is their Offspring, in this way, *Plato* a little farther on expressly tells us.

¹⁶³ Unless a Man compared this Passage with many Others in *Plato*, he would be apt to suspect, that, instead of σωφροσύνης here in the Original, we ought to read φρονήσεως, understanding by that Word here the Virtue which is in Latin called *Prudentia Civilis*, that is, *Prudence*, applied to the Government of a Civil State, and to the Conduct of the several Members of it, with a View to the Public Good. For he would argue, that by *Prudence* of this Kind, as well as by *Justice*, Civil Societys are established and preserved: but that no other Virtues, beside these Two, have an *immediate Reference* to the Good of the Publick: the rest being either merely *Personal*, regarding the Private Good of *Individuals*, or of a *Domestic* Kind, regarding the Good of those *Subordinate Societys*, which are of much less Extent than Bodys Politick. The Reference, he would say, which all these inferiour Virtues have to the Publick, is more or less remote: and that, which σωφροσύνη, *Temperance* or *Sobriety*, hath, is this; — σώζει φρένα, or φρόνησιν, (according to *Plato's* own Derivation of the Word,) it preserves that *Understanding*, or that *Prudence*,
which,

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show them in the Souls of Others, and thus to propagate Wisdom. In this Situation of his Mind, his whole Employment, I suppose, is to look about and search for Beauty, where he may generate: for never can he generate on aught which is Ugly or Uncomely. Meeting first then with Outward Beauty, that of the Body, ¹⁶⁴ he welcomes and embraces it; but turns away from where he sees Deformity

which, according to the Object of it, is the *Preserver* of the *Man*, the *Family*, or the *Civil State*. To this he might add, that the ultimate End of all the Philosophy of *Plato* is the Good of a real Republick, or a Civil Society with One common Interest.—All this is true; and yet the Word *σωφροσύνη* is the right Reading. In what peculiar Sense *Plato* uses that Word here, and in several other Places, is shown in our Notes to the Dialogue called *the Rivals*.

¹⁶⁴ The first Part of this Period needs no Comment: for 'tis evident from Experience, that *External* Beauty or Deformity in any Person first strikes the Eye, before it can possibly appear with any Certainty, whether the *Soul* of that Person is beautiful or deformed.—What follows, implying a *Connection* between *Beauty* of the *Mind* and Beauty of the *Body*, is not quite so indisputable or clear. That in the *Whole of Things*, the *Universe*, there is this Connection, we venture to say, is demonstrable from the *Principles* of the *Platonic* Philosophy. To descend to Particulars, to the several *Kinds* and *Species* of *Animals*, and the *Individuals* of Each;—in all *Brute* Animals we see plain Marks of their Inward Temper imprinted in their Outward Forms, especially in their Visages, and still more especially in their Eyes. And whoever accurately observes those Animals, with which we are conversant the most, *Dogs* and *Horses*, will discern this in the *Individuals*, as well as in the *Species*. But whether the Analogy holds good in the *Individuals* of the *Human* Kind,

Kind, has been much doubted. However, — that a Prejudice in favour of Handsome and Comely Persons unavoidably and naturally arises in the Mind, at first Sight, and before they are known, is felt by All: — that the Colour of the Skin, Hair, and Eyes, produced by the Idiosyncrasy, or peculiar Mixture of Humours in the Body, and the Predominance of some One, indicates the Natural Temper of the Soul, we learn from the antientest and best Physicians: — that the Features of the Face, in their Make and Figure, indicate the Inward Disposition, we are told by the Physiognomists. — Farther; that every excellent Painter, Sculptor, and Theatrical Actor, knows the habitual Passions of the Soul, and even the Turn of Thought, from the Muscles of the Face, and the Lines made in it by the frequent Action of those Muscles, we find from his Power of expressing them in the Imitation proper to his Art. — We know, that every sensible Man discovers in the Countenances of Those, with whom he is conversing, any Passions which happen to be at that time predominant in their Souls: — and we see daily, that every sensible Child reads in the Eye the present Humour and actually prevailing Temper of its Parent. — But the *Platonists* are of Opinion, that human Sagacity and Skill may reach still farther; and that the natural Powers and Infirmitys of the Soul, a Disposition in the general to Virtue or to Vice, and even to some One Virtue or Vice in particular, may be conjectured, with Probability at least, from the regular or the irregular Frame of the Body in general, and from the Excellence or the remarkable Imperfection of any particular Member. — Supposing this Opinion true, we have elsewhere endeavoured to account for the Truth of it from the sole Difference of *Human Bodys* in their Frame. See Notes 43, and 44, to the *Lesser Hippias*. Others have accounted for it from the supposed Difference and Inequality of *Human Souls*, antecedent to their Union with Bodys in their present State; following the Hypothesis of a *Præ-existence* of those Souls in some former State of Being; and extending to all *Particular Natures* that *Platonic Doctrine*, most cer-

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Deformity in the Body; ¹⁶⁵ for his Soul is full of Love. But if, in his farther and deeper Search, he has the good Fortune to meet with the inward and hidden Beauty of a well-natured and generous Soul, he then intirely attaches himself, and adheres closely, to the Whole Person in whom it is found, the Compound of Soul and Body. He now finds in himself a Facility and a Copiousness of Expression, when he entertains this Partner of his Soul with Discourses concerning Virtue; — by what Means it is acquired; —

tainly true of *Universal* Nature, thus expressed by our learned Poet, *Spencer*,

— *Mind is Form, and doth the Body make.*

After all, nothing positive or certain, on this Point, is asserted here by *Plato*; the Truth of his Observation being fairly deducible from these Doctrines alone; — that Beauty of the Soul and Beauty of the Body are congenial, since they are Both derived from the same Source; and that the Love of every Higher Order of Beauty infers a Love, in some degree, of all those Orders which are subordinate or inferior; — Doctrines, which we shall soon find openly avowed by our great Philosopher. See in the mean time Notes 122, and 123.

¹⁶⁵ To see the Force of this Reason, we must remember, what has often been inculcated, that all *Love* is Love of *Beauty*; — that all Kinds of Beauty are *congenial*; — and that Corporeal Beauty in Other Persons is the only Beauty, not within Himself, supposed to be discovered clearly, as yet, by our Young Lover.

what

¹⁶⁶ what is a Character compleatly good ; — what Studys should be pursued ; what Arts be learnt ; and how Time should be employed, in order to the forming such a Character. Desirous therefore thus to form and perfect the Object of his Love, he undertakes the Office of Preceptor. Indeed, whilst he is conversing intimately with That which is Fair, those Seeds of Wisdom, which he was before big with, burst forth spontaneous, and he generates. From this time, whether in the Presence or Absence of his Mistress, his Mind and Memory become prompt and ac-

¹⁶⁶ It has been generally imagined, that *Plato* held the *End* and *Happiness* of *Man* to consist in a *Life Contemplative* and meerly *Intellectual*. But we hope to convince our Readers, before we have finished our Notes on the Speech of *Socrates*, that this general Imagination is a general Mistake ; a Mistake, which has arisen from this very Dialogue misunderstood ; and which *Plato* himself seems to have foreseen, and to have intended to obviate, beforehand, by this Passage. We see, that the End, proposed here, is *Virtue* ; by which Word never was understood Contemplative or Intellectual Virtue alone ; and we see, that the Discipline of Youth is here recommended only with a View to this End ; seeing, that the Learning of the Liberal Arts, the free Pursuit of any Studys, and all voluntary Employments of the Time, in fine, the whole Culture of the Mind, and the whole Conduct of Life, (for all this is here included,) have, in the Eye of *Plato's* Lover, desirous of procuring all Good to his Beloved, a Reference to *Virtue* only, as the *Perfection* of the *Human Character*, and therefore the Highest *Human Good*. — Thus much may suffice at present, as introductory to our Explication of what follows, and as giving a Summary View of the Doctrine there contained.

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tive; and he readily produces all his Mental Store. Both the Parents then join in cherishing, rearing up, and cultivating the Fruits of their Love and Amorous Converse. Hence it is, that a Friendship of the firmest Kind cements Such a Pair; and they are held together by a much stricter Band of Union, than by an Offspring of their Bodys; having a common and joint Interest in an Offspring from Themselves more beautiful and more immortal. Who would not chuse to be the Father of Such Children, rather than of Mortals, sprung from his Body? ¹⁶⁷ Who, that considers Homer, Hesiod, and other excellent Poets, with the Admiration they deserve, would

¹⁶⁷ What are the chief Articles, in which *Plato* makes Right Discipline to consist, and What those Things, which he considers as the fairest Offspring of the Mind, and the best Accomplishments of Man, we see in the Four following Instances; in which are proposed Four Kinds of Persons, as the proper Objects of Admiration, and the fit Patterns of Imitation, to All who are ambitious of the highest Glory.——The first Instance is in *Homer*, *Hesiod*, and other the best Poets; who by the Grecians in *Plato's* Time were deemed Masters in Natural, Moral, and Political Knowledge, and were actually their First Teachers in these Parts of Philosophy. *Hesiod* is mentioned by Name, because he was the earliest Writer, who delivered Ethical Precepts in a Didactic Way; and *Homer*, because He first painted the Moral Characters of Men; and because he was so excellent in this Art, that one of the best Judges both of Poetry and Manners, among the Romans, on this very account, as we presume, scrupled not to prefer him, as a Teacher in the Science of Morals, to those voluminous Writers, *Chrysippus* and *Crantor*, tho One was

would not wish for such an Issue as They left behind them, an Issue of this Mental Kind, such as perpetuates their Memory with the highest Honour, and procures for them an Immortality of Fame? Or Such a Posterity, said She, as That whose Foundation Lycurgus laid at Lacedæmon, a Race, of which Himself was the First Father, the Preservers of their Country and of all Greece? Amongst your Selves, what Honours are paid to the Memory of Solon,

was the subtlest of the *Stoicks*, and the Other the most minutely accurate of the *Platonists*.—The next Instance, produced by *Plato*, is *Lycurgus*; whom he celebrates as the Author and Founder of those Virtuous Manners in *Sparta*, by the universal Prevalence of which That whole City was for many Ages composed of Patriots; Men, whose Patriotism was so generous and noble, as not to be confined to the particular Interests of their own State, but to extend its self to those of that larger Body of all the *Grecians*, leagued together for their Common Safety. — *Plato's* Third Instance is *Solon*; whose Praise it was to have modelled the *Athenian* Laws anew; not by introducing new *Customs*, better than the old, (the peculiar Praise of *Lycurgus*, that Founder of the *Spartan* Commonwealth,) but by framing a System of *written Rules*, with *Sanctions* annexed, a Body of *Laws*, in the Vulgar Sense of that Word; the Fame of which became so great, that the *Romans*, some Ages after, sent a solemn Embassy to *Athens*, to procure a Transcript of them, for a Pattern of Laws to their own Republick. So that, in the Metaphor here used by *Plato*, those *Athenian* Laws, which were begotten by *Solon*, begat the Roman Law of the *Twelve Tables*.—The last Instance is in *Heroes*, and Others who have been illustrious Patterns of *Active Virtue*, in any Kind, to succeeding Generations.—From this Account of the Four Instances, here mentioned,—*Homer* and *Hesiod* with their Progeny of *Poets* and *Philosophers*,

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Solon, who begat the Laws! And abroad, as well as at home, how illustrious are the Names of many Others, Barbarians as well as Grecians, who have exhibited to the World many Noble Actions, and have thus begotten all Kinds of Virtue! ¹⁶⁸ To Men, like These, have Temples often

sophers,—*Lycurgus* with his Race of *Patriots*,—*Solon* with his Race of *Lawyers* and *Politicians*,—and the *Heroes* with that Succession of good and virtuous Men, formed by their Examples,—it appears, that Philosophy or *Wisdom*, *Public Virtue*, *Obedience* to the *Laws* of our *Country*, and every particular *Virtue* of *Private Life*, are by *Plato* deemed the noblest Accomplishments of the most excellent Persons, and the genuine Effect of the best Discipline or Culture of the Mind.

¹⁶⁸ Thus far *Plato*, or, if you please, *Socrates* himself, delivering his own Sentiments in the Person of *Diotima*, proposes *Glory* to us as the End of all our best Studys, Pursuits, and Actions: for he represents it as the Mark aimed at by all Those, whose Mind, or whose Conduct, he proposes to us for the Pattern of our own. — But in what follows, we shall find him fairly telling us, that the most glorious Actions, produced by this Motive, the Desire of *Glory*, are but Images or Shadows of *Virtue*, not the real Life and Substance. For the Comfort, however, of all Us who are of the Multitude, we are at the same time given to understand, not only that None are capable of attaining *True Virtue*, except Such as have attained *True Wisdom*, but farther, that Few, very Few, (for *Diotima*, that is, *Socrates*, speaks doubtfully even of *Socrates* himself,) are capable of comprehending clearly, What is meant by *True Wisdom*, and consequently What by *True Virtue*. Certain it is, that even the better Sort of Men, Those of honourable Birth and liberal Education, are, for the most part, governed by no higher a Principle than that of Honour: see Note 159. Accordingly *Xenophon*, the Disciple of *Socrates*, whose Writings are the best-adapted to the polished Taste of Such Persons,

often been erected, on account of Such their Progeny;
but never was any Man thus honoured on account of his
Mortal

sions, in his *Institution of Cyrus*, composed principally for the Instruction of the nobler Youth, seldom makes Use of any other Motive to recommend Virtue, than the *Love of Praise*, as being a Motive which operates the most powerfully of all on the fairest and most ingenuous Minds, in the Spring-time of Life, before they are capable of Philosophical Speculations. — Nay, *Socrates* himself, as represented by the same *Xenophon* in his *Memoirs*, adapting his Discourses to the Genius of the Multitude, as well as to that of Philosophers, persuades to Virtue by the Arguments of *Pleasure* and of *Utility*, the most persuasive to the *Populace*,—and by the Arguments of *Praise* and *Honour*, the most persuasive to the *Noble* and *Ingenuous*,—as well as by arguing from the *intrinsic Value*, *Dignity*, and *Beauty* of Virtue, the Power of which Argument can be thorowly felt only by Such as are inspired by the *Genius of Love*, that is, of True *Philosophy*: see Note 122. — But these different Arguments, drawn from *Pleasure*, from *Utility*, from *Honour*, and from real *intrinsic Excellence*, have, all of them, naturally some Weight in every Man's Mind, and some Influence on his Conduct; tho they affect different Sorts of Men in different Degrees and Proportions. As therefore those Objects of Desire to all Men are, all of them, to be found in one and the same Thing, that is, in Virtue, and as they are thus consistent together, they may, all of them, fairly and consistently be urged as *joint Motives* to Virtue; for as much as in Virtue, according to the Nature and the general Course of Things, they all meet.—Thus, while *Vulgar* Souls, insensible to *Honour*, as well as blind to *true Beauty*, are allured to Virtue chiefly from Considerations of *Pleasure* and *Advantage*,—of such *Pleasures* and *Advantages*, as in the Divine Constitution of Things naturally and generally attend on Virtue, shown them by *Philosophers*; of Such also, as are freely, by way of gratuitous Rewards, offered them by wise *Legislators* and good *Magistrates*; and of such

such *future Goods* and *Pleasures* as are to endure for ever, promised them by the *Founders* of all *Religions* friendly to *Virtue*; — Men of *nobler Souls*, and *brighter Understanding*, are won by the *Charms of Virtue*, and of her natural Companion, *Glory*, Both of them *Immortal*; Charms, exhibited to them jointly, as aiding Each to the Other, by *Poets*, *Philosophers*, and *Divine Prophets*. — *Pindar* would be sufficient to justify our Remark, as to the *Poets*: but to prove This Instance, would be to transcribe all the *Odes* of that sublime Poet. We chuse therefore to produce the following Passage out of *Silius Italicus*,

*Ipsa quidem Virtus sibi met pulcherrima merces:
Dulce tamen venit ad manes, cum gloria vitæ
Durat apud superos, nec edunt oblivia laudem.*

which we have attempted thus to paraphrase;

*Virtue her Self is her own best Reward:
Yet the departed Soul with Relish sweet
Tastes superadded Joy, when the fair Fame,
Surviving her past Life of Virtue, meets
Her conscious Ear; and join'd with Self-Appraise,
When her due Praises, here on Earth, she sees
O'er ruinous Time and o'er Oblivion dark
Justly triumphing. —*

—To prove, that *Philosophers* no less exhibit *Virtue* at the same time *beautiful* and *honorable*, we shall only add to the Instances, given before, these Observations; — that the *Greek Word*, καλόν, used so frequently by *Xenophon* and *Plato*, conveys this *double Meaning*; and that the *Latin Word*, *Honestum*, which occurs in every Page of *Cicero*, where he treats either of *Moral Dutys*, or of the *Standard of Good and Evil*, that is, of the *Principles of Virtue*, signifies at the same time *Honesty* and *Honour*, as being united. — This amicable Union is also shown by specially-
inspired

inspired Writers ; and those united Motives to Virtue are in their Writings presented even to Minds purified by Divine Mysterys. For One of these Writers sets in View before the Saints, at the same time, That *Glory* and That *Virtue*, thro Both of which those Holy Persons are elevated above the rest of the World : and Another of them recommends to the Practise of his Initiated “ whatever is *Lovely* and of *Good Report*, if there be any *Virtue*, and if there be any *Praise*”. See *Epist.* 2. D. *Pet.* C. 1. & *Epist.* D. *Paul.* ad *Philipp.* C. 4. But these Divine Teachers go farther in encouraging the *Love of Glory* : for, in proposing to the Followers of their Precepts a Felicity to come hereafter, and to endure for ever, they much oftener excite their nobler *Passions* by Promises of immortal *Honour* and *Glory*, than elevate their *Minds* with Expectation of that more solid, that pure, and Mental Happiness, consisting in the *View* of the *Divine Beauty*. And farther still, the Sacred Oracles both of *Jews* and *Christians*, condescending, we presume, to the Weakness of Human Apprehensions, represent *the Divine Being* himself, as not only actuated by a *Love of Good*, which is truly *his own Essence*, but by a *Zeal for his own Glory*, which in the best Sense of it, is a *Glory* resulting to him from the Contemplation of his Essence by Particular Minds ; nor more delighted with *bestowing Good* on Other Beings, than with *Thanks, Praises, and Honours*, paid him by those Beings *in Return* : tho this whole Representation of *the Divine Being* can no other way be true, than as He delights in the Happiness of his Creatures ; and delights therefore to see the Intelligent Part of his Creation blest with the noblest and the sweetest of all *Sentiments*, those of *Gratitude*, and with the finest of all *Contemplations*, that of the *Divine Essence*, that which makes the Supreme Felicity of all Intelligent Beings. — Thus much have we to say, in Defence of that noble and seemingly Godlike Passion, the *Love of Glory* ; and in Support of *Diotima*, who has hitherto espoused its Cause. — How it comes, that this Divine Prophetess, this inspired Teacher of Wisdom, supposed such at least here by *Plato*, speaks of that Passion afterwards in a very different manner, and treats it with

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Mortal meerly Human Offspring. — In the Mysterys of Love thus far perhaps, Socrates, may You be initiated and advanced. ¹⁶⁹ But to be perfected, and to attain the Intuition ¹⁷⁰ of what is Secret and Inmost, introductory to

Contempt, at least comparatively, it is not now the proper time to consider: it will be opportune to observe it, when we arrive at that Passage; and 'twill be more easy to discern it, after we have gone thro all which is between.

¹⁶⁹ We have here a Pause, or Break, more solemn and awful than any to be met with elsewhere in *Plato*. But it has great Propriety in this place; as it becomes the sublime and mysterious Character of *Diotima*; and as it is necessary, besides, for ushering in with the greater Solemnity those very sublime and mysterious Speculations, which follow it.

¹⁷⁰ Great Decorum of Character is here observed, in putting into the Mouth of the *Prophetess* a Metaphor, taken from the Method of *Initiation* into those *Religious Mysterys*, which at that time were held in highest Reverence. For, to make this Initiation perfect, Three orderly Steps or Degrees were to be taken. The First was called *Purgation*; the Second, *Illumination*; and the Third, *Intuition*; to which last but few Persons were ever deemed worthy to be raised. — Agreeable to this Gradation is the Method, observed by *Diotima*, in her Initiation of *Socrates* into the *Mysterys of Wisdom*. Her *Confutation* of his pretended former Notions, but, in reality, of the *preceding Speeches* in this Dialogue, answers to the *Purgative* Part of Initiation into the *Religious Mysterys*. Her succeeding *Positive Instructions*, in the *true Doctrine* of Love, answer to the *Illuminative* Part. And what remains of her Discourse, as She herself here plainly gives us to understand, alludes to the last Part of the Religious Initiation, the *Intuitive*.

which

which is all the rest, if undertaken and performed ¹⁷¹ with a Mind rightly disposed, I doubt whether you may be able. However, said She, not to be wanting in a Readiness to give you thorow Information, I will do my Best to conduct you, till we have reached the End. Do but You your Best to follow me.—Whoever then enters upon this great Affair in a proper Manner, and begins according to a right Method, ¹⁷² must have been from his earliest Youth conversant

¹⁷¹ What this right Disposition of Mind is, may be seen in Note 122.

¹⁷² The Human Mind takes a *Tincture* from the *Objects*, with which it is at any time *conversant*; it takes a *strong* Tincture from the *Objects*, to which it is *habituated*, that is, from those with which it has been *long conversant*; but a Colour of the *deepest* Dye, and the most *durable*, it takes from *Objects* presented to it, or with which it is surrounded, at a Time when its Self is void of All Colour, and susceptible of Any, that is, in the Age of *Childhood*. It is therefore of the utmost Consequence, that its *First Objects* should be *fair* and *beautiful*. Its *First Objects* are received thro the *Outward Senses*, and consequently are all of the *Corporeal* Kind: it is not till long after, that the Mind arrives at the Perception of *Objects* meerly *Mental*, by Modern Philosophers called *abstract Ideas*, (that is, Ideas abstracted from Matter,) by which they mean Forms Incorporeal, such as the *Species* and *Kinds* of Things, whether of *Substances*, or of the *Qualities* or other *Incidents* of Being. Of this Kind the earliest perceived by us are *Numbers*, those *Principles* of all *Proportion*. But *what* Numbers and *what* Proportions constitute the *Beauty* of Figures and the *Harmony* of Sounds, we perceive not, till we attain the Knowledge of those *Sciences* and *Arts* founded on those respective Numbers and Proportions. Yet so *natural* to the Human Soul are *Harmony* and *Beauty*, that she delights in them even before she discovers the *constituent Num-*

conversant with Bodys that are Beautiful. Prepared by this Acquaintance with Beauty, he must in the first place, if his ¹⁷³ Leader lead aright, fall in Love with some ¹⁷⁴ One particular Person, Fair and Beauteous; and on Her beget fine Sentiments and fair Discourse. He must

bers; tho, untill then, she knows not *why*; and tho her Delight is far short of what she feels, when she has found out the *Secret* of the *Charm*: for she approaches then to a Discovery of *her own Nature*, the Nature of *Mind*, and the Nature of the *Universe*. — Now That natural Delight in Outward Beauty, the Force of which is felt long before it is understood thro a Knowlege of its Causes, produceth these Effects; ——— to soften the Temper of the Soul, to harmonise her different Parts, to open and dilate her Views, to make her in Love with Beauty, and long for the Sight of it again, and thro all these Means together to prepare the Mind for the receiving and entertaining higher Orders of the same Beauty. ——— Whereas, on the contrary, the too early or too frequent Sight of the Deformed, the Ugly, the Horrid, and the Hideous, either in Persons or in Things, sours the Humours, renders the Temper hard and rough, contracts and narrows the Soul, begets Habits of Hatred and Averfion, lays deep the Foundation of Malice, and on all these accounts unfits the Soul for the perceiving, admiring, or loving any Beauty or Amiableness either in her Self, or in Others, much more in That Being, who is all-loving, and all-lovely.

¹⁷³ By *the Leader* here is evidently meant the *Δαίμων* within, or *Genius*; such a one, as is truly of the *Philosophic* Kind; such a one, as Providential Fate had allotted to *Socrates*.

¹⁷⁴ The opening of the Inward Eye to the *Discernment of Beauty* is like its opening to the *Knowlege of Nature*. The Mind begins always from *One* single Object, seen thro Sense; proceeds next to *Another*; compares

must afterwards come to consider, that the Beauty of Outward Form, That which he admires so highly in his Favorite Fair-one, is Sister to a Beauty of the Same Kind, which he cannot but see in some Other Fair. If he can then pursue ¹⁷⁵ this Corporeal Beauty, and trace it wherever 'tis to be found, throughout the Human Species, he must want Understanding not to conceive, that ¹⁷⁶ Beauty is One and the Same Thing in All beauteous Bodys. With this Conception in his Mind, he must become a Lover of all Visible Forms, which are Partakers of this Beauty; and in consequence of this General Love, he must moderate the Excess of that Passion for One only Female Form, which

compares the *Two together*, and sees in Each that which is *Common to Both*: she then goes on, collecting and comparing many Others of the Kind; till, on observing the *same Idea* to be found in as many as she inspects, she uses the way of reasoning by Induction, and concludes, that *one* and the *same Nature* runs thro *all Individuals* of the *Kind*: thus she attains a full Comprehension of this *Nature common* to them all, the *Species* or *Kind* its Self, that eternal and immutable *Idea*, which is the *Same in All*.

¹⁷⁵ This Beauty, in every Individual of the Human Species, who partakes of it, consists of the same Things; which are these, *Proportion* and *Harmony* of the *Members*, *Symmetry* of the *Features*, a *due Measure* of *Delicacy* and of *Strength* in the *Contexture* of the *Frame*, and a *just Disposition* of agreeable and proper *Colours*.

¹⁷⁶ For one and the same *Idea of Beauty*, which is found in the *Human* Species, runs thro every Species of Beings in the *Animal*, and even in the *Vegetable* World; an *Idea* composed of just *Measure* and *Proportion*,

which had hitherto engrossed him wholly: for he cannot now entertain Thoughts extravagantly high of the Beauty of any Particular Fair-one, a Beauty, not peculiar to Her, but which She partakes of in common with all other Corporeal Forms that are beauteous. After this, if he thinks rightly, and knows to estimate the Value of Things justly, he will esteem ¹⁷⁷ That Beauty which is Inward, and lyes deep in the Soul, to be of greater Value and worthy of more

tion, Symmetry and Harmony, both in the Shape and in the Colours. Thus the Mind, by an easy Exercise of Inductional Reasoning, gains a General Idea of Corporeal Beauty; in which will be found included all Specific Ideas of Beauty in Bodys, whether Animal or Vegetable; their Distinctions, whether of Skin or Bark, of Skin naked, or covered with Hair, Scales, or Feathers, whether of Limbs or Boughs, of Flesh or Foliage, of Blood or Sap, being utterly insignificant to Corporeal Beauty in general, and all involved in its General Idea.

¹⁷⁷ When finer Ideas of Beauty begin to open in the Mind, and the Soul is first smitten with *Inward Beauty*, Beauty of nearer Resemblance to her Self, she discovers, that neither Colour, nor Shape, nor consequently Body, to which alone belong Shape and Colour, is at all essential to Beauty: she discovers in some Companion-Soul a finer and more exact *Symmetry*, than it is possible for Body to partake of, that of the *Affections*; nicer *Measures* and truer *Proportions*, in the mixed *Strength* and *Delicacy* of the *Mental Facultys*; a more beauteous and more perfect *Order* and *Harmony*, in the easy Government of the Soul's superior Part, and the quiet Subjection of all which is inferior, than any thing of like Kind to be found in Body. The Lover of Beauty therefore now not only gains a larger and *more general Idea* of it, but in that larger Idea sees comprehended a higher Kind of Beauty, unknown to him before; in

comparison

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more Regard, than that which is Outward, and adorns only the Body. As soon therefore as he meets with a Person ¹⁷⁸ of a beauteous Soul and generous Nature, tho flowering forth but a little in Superficial Beauty, with this Little he is satisfied; he has All he wants; he truly loves, and assiduouſly employs all his Thoughts and all his Care
on

compariſon of which, he cannot but ſlight and diſregard that other Kind, to which he had hitherto paid all his Admiration.

¹⁷⁸ Before we proceed farther, we are to obſerve to our Readers, that the *Beauty of the Soul*, meant in this place, is nothing more than a native *Rectitude of Diſpoſition*, including, amongſt other Right Affections, *Candour*, and *Love of Truth* above all things; joined with *Docility*, and all other natural Requiſites for the acquiring Knowlege. The Improvements and Accompliſhments of the *Mind* are not mentioned till afterwards; when they are introduced as prior to this Beauty of the Soul in point of Merit, but ſubſequent to it in Time, and founded on it. — — What is ſaid juſt before, concerning the *Siſterhood* of Corporeal Beautys, reminds us of that Paſſage in the *Introductory* Part of the *Speech* of *Socrates*, where he dwells ſo long on the mutual Relationship of *Father*, *Mother*, *Son* and *Daughter*, *Brother* and *Siſter*; ſpeaking of them as Matters of Importance to our underſtanding rightly the true Nature of Love. The Occaſion now offers to attempt an Explication of that obſcure Paſſage, as follows. — The *Siſters*, here mentioned, thoſe *Corporeal Beautys*, are, we ſuppoſe, in purſuance of that Allegory by which *Diotima* deſcribes the Birth of Love, the *Daughters* of That formleſs *Matter*, their *Mother*, and of That *Plenitude of Form* and Beauty, their *Father*, called in that Fable by the Names of *Poverty* and *Plenty*, and there alſo ſaid to be the Parents of *Love*. The natural Excellence or Beauty of every fair Soul is, we preſume, a *Son* of the ſame Plenitude or *Plenty*, the Source
and

on the Object of his Affection. Researching in his Mind and Memory, he draws forth, he generates, such Notions of Things, such Reasonings and Discourses, as may best improve his Beloved in ¹⁷⁹ Virtue. Thus he arrives, of

and *Father* of all *Beauty*. Each of these more *Masculine* and *Active* Beautys therefore is *Brother* to Love, as each of those *Passive* and *Feminine* is *Sister*: that is, in plainer Language, a *fair* and *candid Disposition of Soul*, with which is often coupled in Birth *Corporeal Beauty*, as its *Twin-Sister*, is congenial with the Philosophic Genius, or true *Love of Beauty*. The Origin of every *particular* and *imperfect* Beauty being explained according to this Genealogy, and found to be the same with that of Love, in receiving this Explanation, we escape all that Danger, which *Socrates* in his Speech, as well as in his *Introduction* to it, cautions us to avoid; the Danger of being imposed on in the most important Points, either by mistaking for *Love* the *Divine Nature*, which is *completely beautiful* and *self-sufficient*, or by mistaking for this original and perfect Beauty, this *Divine Nature*, any Beauty *derived* from it, any *Particular Being* or Beings, however beauteous, whether in Body or in Mind, or Both. The Removal of these Dangers removes all Prejudice and Obstruction to the grand Doctrine, to which the Philosopher is now leading us, This, — that in the Enjoyment of that *Universal Beauty*, Love or Desire finds an *End*; and that the Enjoyment of every *subordinate* and lesser *Beauty* in its proper Place, according to the Order of Gradation, is a *Step* to the Attainment of that End.

¹⁷⁹ By comparing this Part of *Diotima's* Discourse with what She told us of the Offspring of the Human Mind a little before, it evidently appears, that by *Virtue* in this place she means every Ability or *Power* in the *Soul*, whether of the *Theoretic* Kind or of the *Practic*, which is acquired or improved by Right Discipline. See Notes 160, 167, and the next following to this.

course,

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course, to view Beauty in ¹⁸⁰ the Arts, the Subjects of Discipline and Study ; and ¹⁸¹ comes to discover, that ¹⁸² Beauty is congenial in them all. He now therefore accounts all Beauty Corporeal to be of mean and inconsiderable Value, as being but a small and inconsiderable Part of Beauty. From the Arts, ¹⁸³ he proceeds farther to the Sciences,

¹⁸⁰ The Word, here used by *Plato*, is ἐπιτηδεύμασι, in which he means to include all the Particulars of right Discipline ; every Study, and every Exercise, enjoined or recommended by ancient Policy to the Youth of good Familys and Fortunes ; in a Word, all the Accomplishments, formed by a Liberal Education. These may all be reduced to Three Kinds ; *Habits* of regular and polite *Behaviour*, *Knowledge* of the Liberal *Arts*, and *Practise* of the Liberal *Exercises* of the Body. But as all of them depend on Principles of *Art*, and are acquired by *Study* and *Discipline*, we have used these very Words, *Art*, *Study*, and *Discipline*, in translating *Plato's* ἐπιτηδεύματα, as the most expressive of his whole Meaning.

¹⁸¹ For a Man, in teaching any Art, best discovers the Principles of that Art.

¹⁸² Seeing that in the Works, Operations, or Energys of every one of the Arts, Beauty arises from *Rule* and *Measure* ; and consists in *Symmetry* and fair *Proportions*, in the due *Order* and *Arrangement* of the *Parts*, and the harmonious *Composition* of the *Whole*.

¹⁸³ When the Mind has acquired the *Knowledge* of *Arts*, by which we mean not the *Practic Habit*, or the *Skill* of a performing *Artist*, but *Knowledge* of the *Principles* of those Arts, and a true *Tast* of *Beauty* in the Performances, her next immediate Step is naturally to *Science* : because, tho the Subjects of Art and of Science are wholly different, and even opposite ; those of Art being mutable and transient, those of Science immutable and eternal ; yet the *Principles* of every *Art* depend on *Science*.

Sciences, and ¹⁸⁴ beholds Beauty no less in These. And by this Time having seen, and now considering within Himself, that Beauty is manifold and various, he is no longer, like one of our Domesticks, who has conceived a Particular Affection for some Child of the Family, a mean and illiberal Slave to the Beauty of any One Particular, whether Person or Art, Study or Practise; but launching out

For instance, tho the Subject of the Art of *Dancing* be *Motion*, that of the Art of *Musick* be *Sound*, and that of the Art of *Poetry* be *Language*; and tho *Motion*, *Sound*, and *Language* be Things mutable and transient; yet the *Principles* of these Arts being the respective *Measures*, *Proportions*, and *Symmetrys*, of *Motion*, *Sound*, and *Words*, are founded on *Science*, the Science of Measure, Symmetry, and Proportion in *Numbers*, Things immutable, and eternal, the *Science of Arithmetick*. In like manner depend other Arts on the Science of *Geometry*, the *Science of Measure*, *Proportion*, and *Symmetry*, in *Figures* exactly regular and Ideal, the invariable Measures of all external and corporeal Forms.

¹⁸⁴ The Sciences, here meant, are those by the *Platonists* termed *Mathematical*, as being the μαθηματικά, the Learning, which they deemed a necessary Preparation for the Study of true Philosophy. These were *Arithmetick*, *Geometry*, *Musick* in its Theory, and *Astronomy*. See Argument to the *Greater Hippias*, and Note 13. to the *Lesser* Dialogue of that Name. In these Sciences every Step, which the Mind takes, is *from Beauty to Beauty*: for every Theorem, new to the Mind, in any of these Sciences, opens to her View some *Proportion* or *Symmetry*, some *Harmony* or *Order*, undiscovered before. Each different Science seems a different *World of Beauty*, still enlarging on the Mind's Eye, as her Views become more and more extensive in the Science. For *Proportion* in *Arithmetick* differs from *Proportion* in *Geometry*; *Musical Proportion* differs from them

Both

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out into the wide ¹⁸⁵ Ocean of Beauty, and plunging into Contemplation of it, many fair and generous Thoughts and Reasonings begets he upon the Openness and unrestrained Freedom of Philosophy. Until his Mind at length, thro

Both; and the *Science* of the *Celestial Orbs*, of their several Revolutions, their mutual Aspects, and their Distances from each other, and from their common Centre, is conversant in Each of those *Three* different *Proportions*, and *comprehends* them all.

¹⁸⁵ Our future Philosopher, having been thus orderly conducted by his Philosophic Genius, the Love of Beauty, thro the *Liberal Arts* and *Sciences*, till he has taken a General View of the *System of the World*, and of those several *Measures* and *Proportions*, according to which the General Frame of it is composed, and all Nature being now before his Eyes, he examines her Parts with particular Attention, the Air above him and about him, the Water and the Earth beneath him, and the various Beings produced in Each. *Beauty* strikes his Eye, to whatever Part he turns it, and engages him to make a nicer Scrutiny into Nature. The nicer he makes this Scrutiny, the more he discovers of *Regularity*, *Symmetry*, and *Order* in the Constitution of Nature's Frame: the farther he penetrates into her deep Recesses, dividing and subdividing, opening and unfolding, as far as the minutest Parts visible of every Form which she produces, the more he sees of *Beauty within Beauty*, and finds every Order to contain a Variety of other Orders. And when his outward Senses, with all the Assistances they obtain from Art, fail him in his farther Searches, he goes on in Thought; his inward Speculations dive still deeper; and, reasoning by the fairest Analogy, he draws this very natural Conclusion, that Beauty reaches to all the invisible Corpuscula, the most minute and simple of Outward Forms, the *Elements of Nature*. Nature, thus contemplated in the Beauty of her Elements, those Forms which are every where diffused, of which all mixed Bodys are compounded, and with

thro such Contemplations acquiring Strength sufficient, gains a View of that ¹⁸⁶ One Science, so singularly Great, as

which all the Spaces between them, and all the Interstices of their Parts, are filled, is that wide *Ocean of Beauty*, into which the various Streams of Being, all Vital Forms, flow and are resolv'd; and from which the various Fountains of Being, the Seeds of all Vital Forms, are by secret Channels every where supplied. From these Considerations of Nature, as all-beautiful, not only in the Whole, and in all her Integral Parts, but in every Particle of her Frame, and even in her Elements, what fair Thoughts and generous Reasonings will naturally arise, is left by *Plato* to every Mind, capable of thinking fairly and nobly, to experience in her Self: but that he means Such as relate to the Divine Nature, the Cause of all things, is evident from what follows.

¹⁸⁶ As the Principles of all the *Arts* depend on the *Sciences*, so the Principles of all the several *Particular Sciences* depend on that *Universal Science*, the Science of Mind, or *Dialectick*. For the Truth of all Axioms, as well as of all Demonstration, in those Sciences, depends on this single Axiom, that "*'tis impossible for any Being to be the same with its self and to differ from its self, that is, to be a different Being from what it is, at one and the same time.*" See *Aristot. Metaphys.* L. 3. Edit, Sylburg. pag. 32, and 35. The Truth of this Axiom is founded on the eternal and necessary Distinction between *Identity* and *Diversity*: and these being the *Principles* of all *Science*, and of all *Reasoning*, the Knowledge of these is the Knowledge of the Principles of Science, and the thorow Knowledge of Reasoning. Hence is this primary and fundamental Science justly termed by *Aristotle* ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐπισήμων, *the Science of the Sciences*; for only by this Science is the *Cause* of all other Science known; and nothing can be known fundamentally and thorowly without the Knowledge of its *Cause*. The several *Particular Sciences* therefore naturally lead a Philosophic Mind to this One *Universal Science*; because such a Mind rests

as to be the Science of ¹⁸⁷ so singularly Great a Beauty.—

But

rests not satisfied with Knowledge, till it has reached the *Cause* of Things; nor indeed deems its self possessed of any true Knowledge, till it be able to explain, *how* it knows, and *thro what* Facultys, *what it is* to know, and what is the *Cause* of Knowledge.

¹⁸⁷ The Man, who, by the Steps which have been described by *Plato*, is arrived at this singularly great, this Universal, Science, is arrived at the true Knowledge of Nature, the Knowledge of her Principles: by the Word "*Nature*" we here mean the Vital Form of the Universe, in which are expressed outwardly all the Kinds and Species of Things. For to know all these Kinds and Species from the highest to the lowest, that is, to distinguish Nature into her most General Parts; suppose, into Animal, Vegetable, and Mineral; — each of these again into its several Kinds; for instance, Animal Nature into Terrestrial, Aquatic, and Aerial; — each of these Kinds into Others subordinate; and thus to go on, distinguishing, down to the minutest Specific Differences of Things, — This is the Knowledge of Nature: — in other Words, it is to see the *Samenesses* and the *Differences* of Natural Things. For all the Species, or Special Kinds, under each Genus, or General Kind, agree and are the *Same* in that *Genus*; that is, they have the same General Nature; and every Genus, divided into its several Species, *differs* in each of those *Species*. Farther; all the Individuals of each Species agree and are the *Same* in that *Species*; that is, they have the same Specific Nature: all the Individuals of every Species under each Genus agree and are the *Same* in that *Genus*; that is, they have the same General Nature: so is it with Individuals, whose Disagreements are yet greater; in some respects they still agree and are the *Same*: in fine, all Individual Beings throughout the Universe, whatever their Disagreements be, agree and are the *Same* in their Common Nature, in that Nature which is most General, Nature her Self. On the other hand, Nature *differs* from her Self in the several *Species* under each Genus, as in Doves and Eagles; she
differs

¹⁸⁸ But now try, continued She, to give me all the Attention you are Master of. — Whoever then is advanced thus far in the Mysterys of Love, by a right and regular Progress of Contemplation, ¹⁸⁹ approaching now to perfect Intuition, suddenly he will discover, bursting into View, Such Beauty, as surpasses all other Objects of Admiration; that

differs from her Self still more, where the Species *differ* in their *Genuses*, as in Hawks and Horses; and she differs from her Self most of all, where the most General Kinds, to which they belong, are wholly different, as in Dunghill-Cocks and Diamonds. Thus are *Sameness* and *Difference* together throughout Nature; and wherever Being is, they of necessity attend it. For if *Sameness* were wanting to any Being, such a Being would be no Part of General or Common Nature; if *Difference* were wanting to it, it could not be *distinguished* from any *Other* Being. So is it in the Whole of Things; if *no Sameness* were there, but *infinite Difference* reigned alone in the Principles of Nature, no Common Nature would be, no Bond of Union between Things; and if *no Difference* were in Nature, the Parts of Nature would have *no Distinction* one from another; nay indeed there would be no such Thing as *Multitude* or *Number*; All would be *undivided One*. Sameness and Difference therefore being the Principles of Nature, the Science of these is the Science of the Principles of Nature; without which Science, Nature her Self never can be known.

¹⁸⁸ This, which is the last, Pause in the Speech, intended to renew and invigorate the Attention, is very requisite in this place; for it precedes a Description as admirable, and as full of Wonder, as the Being which it describes: and accordingly, the strongest Attention is here expressly demanded.

¹⁸⁹ See Note 170.

Very

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Very Beauty, ¹⁹⁰ to the gaining a Sight of which the Aim of all his preceding Studys and Labours had been directed: a Beauty, ¹⁹¹ whose peculiar Characters are these; — In the

¹⁹⁰ The Philosophic Genius is the Love of Beauty in General, not the Love of Beauty in such or such Particular Subjects. For a Love of this Partial Kind forms a Genius of some particular Turn, and points the Mind to some one Study or Pursuit in an eminent Degree more than to others: whereas the Study of Nature requires an Universal Genius, or Love of Beauty in whatever Subjects it be found, — a Love of Beauty Universal, the Beauty of all Nature, — a Love of the Beautifull its Self, the Cause of all that Beauty. See Notes 121, and 122.

¹⁹¹ *Plato* proceeds to lay before us certain Characteristic Marks of this Divine Nature, *the Beautifull*, which our Lover, by launching out into the wide *Ocean of Beauty*, that is, by the Contemplation of *Nature*, has at length discovered. He acquaints us with these several Marks, on purpose to obviate several Mistakes, which Man is liable to incur on this Subject; and which indeed Few in any Part of the World, in any Age, have been able wholly to escape. These Mistakes, all such at least as are obviated here by *Plato*, may be ranked under Three General Heads. The First is of Those, who imagine the Divine Nature to be *Corporeal*; either the Whole of visible and outward Nature; or the Elements of that Nature, all of them taken together; or some One Element, deemed to have greater Force or Virtue than the Others. The Second General Mistake concerning this Sovereign Beauty supposes it to be *Particular*; to be either some Being invested with a Body too fine for Human Sight; or some Invisible Virtue, acting according to Art and Method, but operating only in One Way, and producing Effects only of One Sort; or some Mind, whose Thoughts differ from those of all Other Minds, and whose Will or Law therefore it is impossible for Other Minds to know. The Third General Error in this Point is of Those, who indeed acknowlege the

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the first place, ¹⁹² it never had a Beginning, nor will ever have an End, but always ¹⁹³ is, and always flourishes in Perfection,

the Supreme Being to be Incorporeal, and admit his Art or Reason, his Mind or Law, and his Design or End to be Universal; but believe him to *reside* in some one *Individual* of some certain Kind in Nature, in some Outward Form which he animates, or in the Soul belonging to that Form; or at least to have his Throne of Residence in some especial Part of the Universe, where he has a View of All Things, and from whence he exerts and issues forth his Universal Power.

¹⁹² The Greek is, — ὅτε γιγνόμενον, ὅτε ἀπολλύμενον, *neither the Subject of Generation nor of Destruction*: meaning, that it is not the Beauty of Outward Nature. For by the Characters, here mentioned, is Outward Nature usually denoted, even by those Philosophers, who maintained that the World had no Beginning; because *Outward Nature* is, in every Part of it, the perpetual Subject of *Generation* and *Destruction*; (see Note 152.) and may by this Character be easily distinguished from that *Inward Nature*, which is *eternal*, is for ever forming the other, and is the Cause therefore of Generation to those Forms, whose own Nature is the Cause of their Destruction. But since those very Philosophers, just now mentioned, especially the more ancient of them, as *Orpheus*, and the *Pythagoreans*, and *Plato* himself, the better to adapt themselves to Vulgar Apprehensions, did frequently in their Writings, when they treated of the Cause of Things, consider *Outward Nature* as having had a *Beginning*, we presume that the same Reason, which is still of more Force in these Days, will justify our Choice of such an Expression, when we are distinguishing the *Cause* from the *Effect*, the *permanent* World from the *perishable*, and the *Beautiful its Self* from That which, beautiful as it is, yet *of its Self* is *void* of all Beauty. See Note 94.

¹⁹³ Nothing is more usual with *Plato*, than to describe the Ideas of Things, or their General and Specific Forms, under the Character of Beings

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Perfection, unsusceptible of Growth or of Decay. In the next place, it is not ¹⁹⁴ Beautiful only when looked at Beings which ALWAYS ARE; in contra-distinction to Individuals, which have a *Beginning* and an *End*, and whilst they *are*, never continue truly the *Same* Things, but in their *Parts* are always changing, and in the *Whole* of their Forms are always either growing or decaying. See Note 156. Now as all those Ideas, or General and Specific Forms, are comprehended in the Inward Nature of Things, the Ideal World, Universal Form, or Mind, this is here characterised accordingly, as the Beauty, or Form, which ALWAYS IS; in contra-distinction to That Nature, and That World, which is changing continually, like the Ocean, in every Part of it, nay, even in the Elements themselves, and is preserved in its Wholeness, Strength, and Soundness, only by this Inward Nature: for This it is, which keeps the unstable Beings, those ever-rolling Waves of it, together; and makes it what it is, an *Ocean of Beauty*. — From *Plato*, in this Passage, *Callimachus* seems to have learnt the Character, which he attributes to *Jupiter*, in his *Hymn* addressed to that Deity:

Κρητες αἰεὶ ψεύσται· καὶ γὰρ τάφον, ὦ ἄνα, σέο
Κρητες ἐτεκτίναντο· σὺ δ' εἰ θάνατος, ἔσαι γὰρ αἰεὶ.

Cretans in all things falsify and feign:

The Cretans ev'n have dar'd, O Sovereign King!

For Thee to build a Sepulchre; but Death

Ne'er reach'd thy Being; for Thou ALWAYS ART.

¹⁹⁴ Meaning, that 'tis not the *Harmony of the Elements*: for this is "*rerum concordia discors*", *Concord discordant*. The Elements of Nature, viewed in one Light, show us only mutual Fitness, Amicableness, and Friendship: but viewing them in another Light, we discover nothing but Contrariety, Strife, and Enmity. See Notes 61, and 62.

One Way, or seen in One Light; at the same time that viewed Another Way, or seen in some Other Light, it is far from being Beautiful: it is not ¹⁹⁵ Beautiful only at Certain Times, or with reference only to Certain Circumstances of Things; being at Other Times, or when Things are Otherwise circumstanced, quite the Contrary: nor is it ¹⁹⁶ Beautiful only in Some Places, or as it appears to Some Persons; whilst in Other Places, and to Other Persons, its Appearance is the Reverse of Beautiful. Nor can This Beauty, which is indeed no other than The Beautiful its

¹⁹⁵ Meaning, we presume, that it is not *Jupiter*, or *Fire*, that Glow of *Æther*,

Sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Jovem.

Ennius ap. Cic. de N. D.

For the Appearance of This is beautiful only in the Winter-Season. Nor is it *Juno*, or the *Region of the Air*: for This only looks delightful when 'tis serene and clear, not when disturbed with Storms, or over-cast with Clouds.

¹⁹⁶ Meaning, as we presume farther, that it is not that *Magna Mater*, the *Earth*; tho in flowery Vales, and verdant Hills, she looks so charming and attractive: because in other Places, as in barren Sands, and abrupt Precipices, her Looks are the reverse, are forbidding and affrightful. Nor is it *Neptune*, or the *Watery Region*: for This appears beautiful to Such only as view it from the Land; but to Those, who are surrounded with it, and are far off from Land, the Face of it is tremendous.

§

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Self, ever be the Object of Imagination ; ¹⁹⁷ as if it had some Face or Hands of its own, or any other Parts belonging to Body : nor is it ¹⁹⁸ some Particular Reason ; nor ¹⁹⁹ some Particular Mind. It resides not in ²⁰⁰ any Being, of

¹⁹⁷ 'Tis obvious to see, that this is levelled in general against the Notion, current of old amongst the Pagan Populace, that the Gods had *Forms* resembling the *Human*, tho far more beauteous ; a Notion, authorised by their *Poets*, and encouraged by their *Statuaries*. But if we conjecture rightly, *Plato* here particularly alludes to the *Athenian Minerva*, carved by *Phidias*. See the *Greater Hippias*, page 64. and Note 53. to that Dialogue.

¹⁹⁸ It cannot therefore be *Ceres*, or *Bacchus*, or *Mercury*, or *Vulcan*, or any other of those *Artist-Deitys*, whose Art and Reason were exercised only on *One Particular* Subject. No more can it be any other Principle in Nature, tho more general, and operating according to a more extensive Rule or Method, if its Operations and Effects are *not Universal* : it can neither be *Plastic Nature*, nor *Animal-Instinct*, nor *Human Reason*, nor any other Reason more Divine, if it comprehends not every one of those Principles, by which every Part of Nature is severally governed.

¹⁹⁹ This concludes against the Divinity of all such Gods, as those of *Homer* ; to Each of whom belonged a *Seperate Mind*, which thought for its Self, and consequently had often a *particular* and *partial* Way of Thinking. For a Diversity of Minds must of necessity have produced a Diversity of Thoughts and Opinions : and such Diversity cannot be in the Divine Nature, because inconsistent with Wisdom ; nor between the Divine Mind and the Human, because the latter is derived from the former. Indeed whatever differs from the Divine Mind, must be some other Principle, and not Mind.

²⁰⁰ That is, not in any *Individual Being*, One amongst Many of the *same Species*, or in the *same Form*.

whose Kind there is any Other, resembling it; not in ²⁰¹ any Animal, for instance, or any other of the Forms of Nature. Neither ²⁰² dwells it in the Earth, nor in the Heavens,

²⁰¹ Many of the Ancients imagined, that *the Sun* was the immediate Seat of *Divine Intelligence*; and was, besides, like some vast *Eye*, the Organ of the *Divine Sight*: they supposed, that *Divine Power* or *Virtue* was emitted in those Streams of Light, which issued continually from the Sun; and that Notices of all Things, which passed in the mutable Part of Nature, were transmitted back to the Divine Perception, thro the Continuity of that *Ætherial Substance*; for that This, being of subtlest Nature, easily pervaded the deepest and the densest Bodys, and never was excluded from the thickest Darkness. If *Plato*, as we are inclined to think, intended here to censure this Notion, and by *Animal*, or *Living Form*, principally meant *the Sun*, then, by *Other Forms* of the same or like Kind, he must mean the other *Celestial Bodys*, or, at least, the *Fixed Stars*. To confirm this Conjecture of ours, would carry us too far from our present Point; we therefore chuse to submit it to our Learned Readers, who well know that the *Platonists* and *Stoicks* call all the Celestial Bodys “ζῶα.” But we presume, every Person of Taste and Judgment will agree with Us in thinking it unworthy of *Plato*, especially in this place which admits nothing ludicrous, to censure a Belief in any *Earthly Animal-Deitys*; such as the *sacred Cow* at *Memphis*; or in any of those other *Ægyptian Gods* who grew in *Gardens*: for this Kind of Religion was despised and ridiculed by the meanest of the *Grecians*. Nor in this Case would there have been any Occasion for that reserved and cautious manner of Expression, which *Plato* uses in this whole Passage, and wherever else he reflects on the false Religion of his Countrymen.

²⁰² This, we imagine, is intended in Opposition to another Opinion, countenanced, like that immediately preceding, by Some of Great Name amongst the Ancients, — that the Supreme Being was *locally* Supreme, and

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Heavens, nor in any other Part of the Universe : But ²⁰³
 Alone by its Self, with its Self alone ²⁰⁴ conversing, in its
 Self

and had his Seat in the *highest Heavens*, above the Region of the Fixed Stars, and beyond the Bounds of Nature ; that he there sat idly on his Throne, like the *Persian* Monarch, and governed the World by Provincial or Deputy-Gods, with the help of his Divine Envoys abroad, Ordinary and Extra-ordinary, and those his Eyes and Ears at home, his Divine Ministers of State. By such Metaphors as these was anciently described the Divine Administration of the World, by means of that *Æthereal Matter*, which, according to the Hypothesis in the preceding Note, is derived from the Sun, but, according to This Hypothesis, so near of Kin to that other, is derived from the Outward Sphere of the Universe. For the only material Difference between the Two Systems lyes in the different *local Seats*, which they assign to the Divine Being.—Hitherto the Description of the Supreme Beauty has been *Negative*, after the manner of the *Greater Hippias* : for which see the *Argument* to that Dialogue. Some *Positive* Characteristicks of it follow, which decisively and precisely point it out.

²⁰³ All outward Nature, in the Whole, as well as in each Part, depends on this *Eternal Being* for its Form, or the being *what it is*, in every Instant of Time. But 'tis absurd to suppose, that *Eternal Being*, the Form, from which all other Things receive their Forms, and by which they preserve them, can possibly ever cease *to be*, or ever be any Thing else than *what it is*. Thus therefore is it independant, and stands *by its Self*, unsupported and *alone*.

²⁰⁴ It was observed in Note 193, that all Ideal Forms or Beings, the Genuses and Species of Things, are contained in Inward Nature ; as all outwardly existing Forms, or Individual Beings, are contained in Outward Nature. The *Inward Nature* therefore of the Universe is MIND : for Mind is no other Thing, than a Comprehension of the most General Ideas ;

Self complete and perfect, it is ²⁰⁵ always Uniform and Invariable, ²⁰⁶ alway Sole and Single in its Essence. All other Forms, which are beauteous, participate of This; ²⁰⁷ but in such a Manner they participate, that by Their Generation or Destruction, This suffers no Diminution, receives

Ideas; in which all other Ideas, less General and Specific, lye involved: in other words, Mind is those most General Ideas themselves, and consequently all those of inferior Kind involved in them, comprehended *All in One*. Mind therefore, conversing with these, *converses with its Self*: and since the Eye of the Divine Mind is always open, always actually beholding all those Ideas unfolded, each of which is beautiful and perfect, the Divine Mind converses only with Beauty and Perfection, and is *its Self* the all-beautiful and all-perfect *One*.

²⁰⁵ The General and Specific Forms of Things, as they never change their *Absolute* Natures, that is, never vary from *Themselves*, so neither change they ever their *Relative* Natures, which would be to change places *One with Another*. The Mind therefore, in which they are, remains *Invariable* within its Self: and as there can be no other Form Universal, into which it may be changed, it must also be always *Uniform* with its Self. In truth, it is to the Sameness of This that those inferior Ideal Forms owe their Sameness; as their Diversity they owe to their own Nature, to their being less than Universal.

²⁰⁶ Because there is no higher Genus, or more universal Nature, of which This participates *in common* with *any other* Being or Beings. See Notes 200, and 201.

²⁰⁷ For Matter, being wholly distinct from Mind, and merely a Subject for Mind to fashion by its inward Presence, receives Form from the Ideal Forms, as Wax from the Seal, as imprinted Paper from the Types, or as melted Metal from the Dye. So that every outward Form partakes

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receives no Addition, nor undergoes any Kind of Alteration. — When from those lower Beautys ²⁰⁸ re-ascending by the right Way of Love, a Man begins to gain a Sight of this Supreme Beauty, ²⁰⁹ he must have almost attained
Somewhat

takes of Beauty no otherwise, than by being a Copy of some Part of Beauty Universal. Like other Originals therefore, This receives no Addition or Improvement from the Copys; nor suffers it any Diminution or Corruption, when the Copys are effaced, obliterated, or lost.

²⁰⁸ Hitherto the *Ascent* to the Supreme Beauty, and the several *Steps* in that *Ascent*, have been *described at large*. *Plato* is now proceeding to give a *Summary View* of those Steps, by way of *Recapitulation*. But not a Word has been mentioned all along concerning a *Descent*. The Word *re-ascending* therefore in this place is very remarkable. It carries with it a Suggestion, that the Human Soul had been with this Supreme Beauty before its Acquaintance with those lower Forms, and had descended from Mind into Body; a Doctrine, taught expressly by *Plato* in his *Meno*, and frequently alluded to in other of his Writings. That this Suggestion is here intended to be conveyed to us, is highly probable from the Sentence immediately preceeding; where Mention is made of the Participation of this Supreme Beauty by those Forms which are generated and destroyed. On Purpose therefore to prevent the Error of confounding the Human Soul with these Forms; and to give us to understand, that She partakes of the Sovereign Beauty in a Manner different from Them; that Her Generation is not similar to Theirs, and Her Being is not, like Theirs, liable to Destruction; but particularly with a View to what follows, concerning this very Point, near the Conclusion of the Speech, and by way of Preparation to it, the *Descent* of the Soul seems to be here signified, and shown by Implication, in this Mention of its *Re-ascent*.

²⁰⁹ It cannot but be observed by every attentive Reader, with what extreme Diffidence *Plato* here speaks of gaining a Sight of the Supreme
Beauty.

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Somewhat of his End. Now to go, or to be led by Another, along the right Way of Love, is This; — setting out from those Beautys of lower Rank, to proceed, in a continual Ascent, ²¹⁰ all the Way proposing this Highest Beauty as the End; and using the rest but as so many Steps in the Ascent; ²¹¹ to proceed from One to Many, from Many to All beauteous Bodys; from the Beauty of Bodys, ²¹² to that of Souls; from the Beauty of Souls, to that

Beauty, and of attaining the End of Man. This is agreeable to his usual Way of expressing himself on this Subject: see Note 115. More Instances of the same Kind will occur before the End of this Speech.— But 'tis farther observable in this Sentence, that the latter Part of it, where the Thing meant is *Good its Self*, is more carefully guarded and limited than the former Part, which speaks of the *Supreme Beauty*: as if Beauty and Good were Two distinct Things, and the Attainment of Good was at a little farther Distance than the Sight of Beauty. The meaning of this will soon appear, and all Doubt and Difficulty in these Points be cleared up. See Notes 106, 133, and the Four which follow it.

²¹⁰ The Man therefore, who, in any Part of his Progress, hath had any other *Design*, than to *view* the delightful Spectacle of *Beauty*, the Man, who, in the lower Steps, hath made Sensual Enjoyment his End, or, in the higher Steps, Profit, Praise, or Fame, hath not gone the *right way* of Love. Who, besides, seem excluded from a Sight of the *Supreme Beauty*, see in Note 191.

²¹¹ See Note 175.

²¹² In the *Greek* Original there seems here to be a considerable Omission, which we have endeavoured to supply as follows; the Supplemental Words being those included between these Marks []; — ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων [ἐπὶ τὰς καλὰς ψυχὰς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ψυχῶν] ἐπὶ τὰ

that of Arts; from the Beauty of Arts, to that of Sciences; until at length from the Sciences he arrives at That Science, which is the Science of no Other Thing, than of ²¹³ that Supreme Beauty; and thus finally attains to

τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, κ. τ. λ. Some such Words are plainly necessary to make this Recapitulation agreeable to the Account at large given before.

²¹³ As the Supreme Beauty is *Mind*, the Science of it is the *Science of Mind*; the same which is the Science of those *Principles of Science*, which are also the Principles of Nature, *Identity* and *Diversity*. See Notes 186, and 187.—We have already seen, that *Mind*, in a peculiar and eminent manner, is: it should seem therefore, that *Identity* and *Diversity*, together with *Being* or *Form*, are the most general, the *Primary Ideas* of *Mind*; and that *Mind its Self* is those Three Ideas comprehended in *One*. See *Letters on Mind*, in many places. Accordingly it appears, that when *Mind* stamps its Self on *Matter*, by its intimate Presence, it not only *forms* every Portion of *Matter*, and makes it to be *Something*, imparting to it *Form*, or *Being*, but together with *Being*, imparts to every such Portion of *Matter*, so formed, those other most General Ideas, *Identity* and *Diversity*, or *Sameness* and *Difference*: *Sameness*, by which it is the *Same with its Self*, so long as its *Form* endures; *Difference*, by which it *differs from all other Beings*: *Sameness*, by which it is *uniform* with its *Kind*; and *Difference*, by which it is *varied* from all other *Individuals* of the same *Kind*. For all *Uniformity* arises from *Specific Sameness*; and all *Variety* is produced by *Differences* in Things *Accidental* to the *Form* or *Being*, as *Colour*, *Size*, &c. of the *Whole*, or any of the *Parts*. To compleat this Argument, it appears farther, that when *Mind* to *Matter* gives *Form* or *Being*, *Identity*, and *Diversity*, it gives *Unity* at the same time; and makes every such *Form* or *Being*, which is thus the *Same* and thus *Different*, thus *Uniform* and thus *Varied*, so long as it is, to be still *One*.

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224 THE BANQUET.

Somewhat of his End. Now to go, or to be led by Another, along the right Way of Love, is This; — setting out from those Beautys of lower Rank, to proceed, in a continual Ascent, ²¹⁰ all the Way proposing this Highest Beauty as the End; and using the rest but as so many Steps in the Ascent; ²¹¹ to proceed from One to Many, from Many to All beauteous Bodys; from the Beauty of Bodys, ²¹² to that of Souls; from the Beauty of Souls, to that

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know,

know, What is the ²¹⁴ Beautiful its Self. — Here is to be found,

²¹⁴ *Plato* had not before this place made use of the Term αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, “the *Beautiful its Self*.” Now had he here meant to express the same Thought, which he had just before expressed by the Term αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο καλόν, “that very *Beauty*,” to which he had led us, *the Supreme*, it would be meer *Tautology*; or indeed rather, if the Word “*finally*” be of any real Import in this Sentence, the grossest *Absurdity* would be here committed; for it would be saying in effect, that a Man attains the *Knowledge* of a Thing, not till *after* he has arrived at the *Science* of it. But whoever is in the least acquainted with *Plato*, cannot suppose him guilty either of the one, or of the other, of these egregious Faults. We must therefore conclude, that the *Beautiful its Self* is a Thing *different* from the *Supreme Beauty*; or if it is the Same Thing, we must suppose, that by the Term “*Beautiful its Self*” it is shown in a brighter Light, and the *Essence* of it is more clearly and thorowly to be discerned. Now the *Supreme* or *Sovereign Beauty* has appeared to be *Mind*, *Form*, or *Being*, *Universal*. But what the *Beautiful its Self* is, we presume, no Genius less divine than that of *Plato* would be able to discover, without the Help of *Plato* himself. Happily for Us, this Help is yielded us, in his Dialogue called *Philebus*. For we thence learn, that *Measure* is the Cause or Principle of that *Symmetry*, that *Harmony* and *Proportion*, which constitutes *Beauty*, and in which the *Essence* of it consists. *Measure* therefore is the Cause or Principle of *Beauty*; is That, on which the *Beauty* of every Thing depends; That, from which all Things, even *Form* its Self, or *Mind*, derive their *Beauty*; is That, thro which they are beautiful; and consequently is the *Beautiful its Self*. Thus it is, that in this Dialogue, *The Banquet*, we advance a Step farther in discovering the Nature of the *First Principle* of Things, than we had gone in *the Greater Hippias*, which may therefore be considered as introductory to This: in like manner, and for the same reason, This introduces *the Philebus*: and

found, dear Socrates, said the²¹⁵ Stranger-Prophetess, here²¹⁶
if

the Philebus, as *Plato* himself hints in the Close of it, just so introduces *the Parmenides*.

²¹⁵ In all Editions of the Greek Original we here read *Μαντική*. This seems to have been the Ground, on which *Harry Stephens* and *Dr. Davis* built their Supposition, that the Word *μαντική*, where it occurred in a prior Passage, was a corrupt Reading, and should be changed into *Μαντιμική*. See Note 112. But we are inclined to think, that the Passage, now before us, ought to be accommodated to That, rather than That to This; especially since the reading of *μαντική* in this place, as well as in that other, is favoured by the Latin Translation of *Ficinus*; a Translation, which has always had the Authority of a Manuscript allowed it, as having been made from a Manuscript Copy, not consulted by any of the Editors, with an Exactness almost Verbal, and accordingly with very little Regard to Style, and with no great Attention to the Sense. Perhaps we are thought to have refined too much already, in supposing the Word *μαντική*, *Prophetic*, to have any particular Propriety in the former Passage: yet we are obliged, if we would deal fairly with our Author and with our Readers, to risque the same Censure again, by giving our Opinion, that the same Word has in this Place an immediate Reference to that *Prophetic View* of Futurity, which *Plato* opens to us in what follows; adding to the Dignity and Weight of Rational Conjecture an Authority deemed Divine. See *Argument* of this Dialogue, page 11. *Plato* had certainly some Reason or other for this solemn Mention of *Diotima* again, when otherwise the Personal Pronoun, *She*, would have served as well here, as in all the rest of this Narration.

²¹⁶ It cannot but be observed, with what Caution *Diotima* introduces the Mention of that State of Bliss, to which she here elevates our Thoughts; speaking only hypothetically; and making it a Problem, whether such a State has actually any Existence or Place in Nature.

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if

the Philebus, as *Plato* himself hints in the Close of it, just so introduces *the Parmenides*.

²¹⁵ In all Editions of the Greek Original we here read *Μαντική*. This seems to have been the Ground, on which *Harry Stephens* and *Dr. Davis* built their Supposition, that the Word *μαντική*, where it occurred in a prior Passage, was a corrupt Reading, and should be changed into *Μαντιτική*. See Note 112. But we are inclined to think, that the Passage, now before us, ought to be accommodated to That, rather than That to This; especially since the reading of *μαντική* in this place, as well as in that other, is favoured by the Latin Translation of *Ficinus*; a Translation, which has always had the Authority of a Manuscript allowed it, as having been made from a Manuscript Copy, not consulted by any of the Editors, with an Exactness almost Verbal, and accordingly with very little Regard to Style, and with no great Attention to the Sense. Perhaps we are thought to have refined too much already, in supposing the Word *μαντική*, *Prophetic*, to have any particular Propriety in the former Passage: yet we are obliged, if we would deal fairly with our Author and with our Readers, to risque the same Censure again, by giving our Opinion, that the same Word has in this Place an immediate Reference to that *Prophetic View* of Futurity, which *Plato* opens to us in what follows; adding to the Dignity and Weight of Rational Conjecture an Authority deemed Divine. See *Argument* of this Dialogue, page 11. *Plato* had certainly some Reason or other for this solemn Mention of *Diotima* again, when otherwise the Personal Pronoun, *She*, would have served as well here, as in all the rest of this Narration.

²¹⁶ It cannot but be observed, with what Caution *Diotima* introduces the Mention of that State of Bliss, to which she here elevates our Thoughts; speaking only hypothetically; and making it a Problem, whether such a State has actually any Existence or Place *in Nature*.

if any where, ²¹⁷ the Happy Life, the ²¹⁸ ultimate Object
of

Plat.

The same Caution is repeated, and the same Doubts are raised again, in the last Sentence of her Discourse.

²¹⁷ Nothing is more evident, than that the Happy Life, here supposed, cannot be the Life of Man in his present State of Being, nor of any such Being as Man is. For not only all Thought about supporting his Body, tho without Support it cannot subsist, but even Body its Self, tho a Part of his Being, we shall find excluded from the Hypothesis. The Good therefore of *Mind* only is meant, and the Happiness of a *Being*, divested of all Body, and purely *Mental*. But what Kind of *Mind*, or *Mental Being*, must this be, to be capable of enjoying the Happiness here described? For, not to mention, that the Human Mind appears incapable of the perpetual Contemplation of Intellectual Objects, (see Note 154,) because such Incapacity may be supposed the Effect only of its Union with Body, and if so, when this Union is broken, the Incapacity arising from it will be removed; not to lay any Stress therefore on this Incapacity, let the Life of such a Being be supposed wholly contemplative: let us observe, what Kind of Contemplation is here attributed to it; and let us see, what Consequence will follow. — The Contemplation of Beauty in any Other Minds is no Part of the Hypothesis: all Delight therefore thence arising, all Social Enjoyment, must be supposed wanting. — The View of Beauty in any of the Works of Art, or Contrivances of Reason, has no Share in the supposed Contemplation: the Pleasures of Reason therefore, of all such Reason as the Human, have no Share in the proposed Happiness. — Nor is the Beauty of Ideal Forms, those noblest Objects of the Human Mind, any Object of Contemplation to This Mind, so highly elevated above the Human: and thus it is deprived of all Mental Pleasure, of such at least, as can be tasted, or conceived to be Pleasure, by a Mind meerly Human. — In short, every Contemplation is excluded, beside that of One Object,

ject, the Beautifull its Self, the Principle of all Beauty; and in as much as Universal Mind is the same with Universal Beauty, no other Science, than that of the Principle of Mind, is requisite to the Sight or Contemplation of the Principle of Beauty. If Happiness therefore be found in such a Contemplation, it must be the Happiness, not of Man, nor of the Mind of Man, nor of any other Being, less than the Universal One, viewing its Self, and in its Self its own Principle and Cause. See Note 115.

²¹⁸ If the Life here described, a Life purely and perfectly Divine, be an Object of Desire to Man, Man must have in him an innate Capacity, a latent and dormant Power, of enjoying a Divine Life: to enjoy this, he must become a different Kind of Being from that which he now is, a Being purely and perfectly Divine: he must now therefore have in him the Capacity of a Divine Being, that is, the Power of becoming such hereafter. But were this Capacity to be now filled, were this Power to be awakened and exert its self in his present State of Being, Man would not be fit for this his present State, nor would he indeed be Man, the Being which he is. Now to prove, that the Divine Life is an Object of Desire to Man, we invert the Argument, and reason thus; — If Man has a Capacity of enjoying a Divine Life, that is, of always beholding Beauty in its Source and Principle, then is such a Life the proper and the ultimate Object of Desire to Man, considered in his superior Part, Mind, the Good of which is the View of Beauty: and that Man has such a Capacity, appears in that he is able, as we have seen before, by the Analytical way of reasoning, to ascend to that Source of Beauty; so far at least, as to gain a Certainty that it is, and that 'tis the Object of View to the Divine Mind. But this Capacity in Man is like the Nympha-State of an Insect; it must be divested of its Shell or outward Covering, before it can crawl; and of another interior Covering, before its Wings can expand themselves, and lift it up into brighter Light, to a Life of perfect Liberty, and a sublimer State of Being. But this is a Point, which will come before us more properly in *the Phædrus*. At present,

of Desire to Man: it is ²¹⁹ to live for ever in beholding
this

sent, 'twill be more pertinent to remark, that the superior Principle in Man is by *Plato* in some places called *God*, in others the *Dæmon* within him, and in others again, as in this, only *Man*, by which Name last-mentioned he means, that this Principle is peculiarly and eminently a Man's own *Self*, his only *Identical Being*, That only, by which he can ever be justly called *the Same Man*. — On this Occasion, we beg Leave to offer our Opinion, that *Plato*, in his *Greater Hippias*, under the humorous Representation, which *Socrates* there gives us, of *the Man who lived with him at his own Home*, would suggest to our Minds some such Thought as this. Nor can we help thinking, that *Marcus Antoninus* alluded to that very Representation, and that very Thought suggested by it, in a Passage, where he calls this Divine Principle in Man τὸν ἐνδον ἀνδρωπῶνα, *the Man within*.

²¹⁹ All the middle Part of this Speech of *Socrates* was taken up in establishing this Doctrine, that “*Immortality is the Aim and End of all Nature*.” The Instances, then produced in Proof of it, regarded, all of them, the Mortal Part of Nature, in which only the Species, or Kind, can ever be immortalized. But a different Sort of Immortality is here disclosed to us, that of the Same Individual Being. For *Plato*, having already led us, by the several Steps of Beauty, up to the Beautifull its Self, and having shown us the Eternity of its Essence, proposes it to us now as the Supreme Good, and the ever-lasting Enjoyment of it as the ultimate Object of Human Desire, supposing Man to be a Being capable of that Enjoyment. — Now the Enjoyment of every Beauty is only the Delight which the Mind feels in viewing it: and accordingly the Doctrine of *Plato* makes the Enjoyment of this Supreme Good, the Beautifull its Self, to consist in the View or Contemplation of it. But this Enjoyment, agreeably to the Principles laid down in the former Part of this Speech, is insufficient of its Self to constitute a Happy Life; for such
a Life,

a Life, it seems, must be Immortal. So that, to make Happiness complete, the Contemplation of the Beautifull, we find, must be as lasting as the Beautifull its Self, which can never possibly come to Destruction or Dissolution. The Subject therefore of this Contemplation, or the Being to be thus made happy, must be immortal, as well as the Object, the Being which it contemplates. Hence it follows, that if Man, or any Principle in Man, be the Subject of this Happiness, Man, or that Principle in him, must either be naturally immortal, or, if mortal, must be capable of being immortalised. Great Difficultys attend either of these Hypotheses. For, to begin with the latter, ——— if Man, with all the Principles and Powers within him, be naturally mortal, he is only a Part of the mortal or Outward Nature, and partakes of Universal Form, or Mind, in no other way, than the rest of that Outward Nature, and that is by being a Copy of some Inward and Ideal Form, comprehended in Form Universal: see Note 207. ——— But how shall a Part ever attain to comprehend the Whole? or how shall this Copy of Form be made to see any Thing, but the Copys of Forms inferior to its Self? With what Eye shall it see the Original of any One? or by what Discernment shall it distinguish that Original from the Copy? ——— However, let us suppose for once, according to some Modern Hypotheses, no Difference at all between them; let us take the Copy its Self for the Original, and admit no Ideal Forms; and let us suppose the Soul of Man to be a Being naturally mortal, but superior to all Outward Nature, and, in consequence of that Superiority, endowed with a Capacity of comprehending it; we ask again, ——— whence attains she such a commanding View of the Beauty of the Universe, and so thorow an Insight into the Nature of it, as to penetrate into its Principle or Cause, and contemplate the Source of all its Beauty? whence, but by this Divine Principle within her, presenting its self to her View, and enabling her to distinguish, to measure, and to know truly, all Things? ——— On the other hand, if Man has within him this Divine Immortal Principle, how can Immortality be the Aim and End of the Human Nature, in that Part of it, which already is Immortal?

this Consummate Beauty : the Sight of which ²²⁰ if ever you

Immortal? for as to the other Parts of the Human Nature, we have before observed, that they admit not Personal Immortality, the only Point now in Question. So far as Personal Immortality of Bliss belongs to Man by Nature, it cannot be the Object of his Desire; because in this case he would desire "That which was present with him, That which he already had, That which He himself was, and of which therefore he could never be in Want;" Absurdities, which *Socrates*, in the *Introduction* to his *Speech*, cautions us to avoid, with a View, in Part, to this very Subject, the Nature of the *Human Soul*, under the Character of *Love* or *Desire*. What he had in View besides, we have endeavoured to explain in Note 178. — Is this Desire of Immortality then, in Man's superior and divine Part, which is Immortal by Nature, any other, than the Desire of being freed from its Union with the other Part of Man, the Nature of which is Mortal; a Union, which makes it often seem to its self a Partaker of this Mortality, and apt to dread its own Dissolution; a Union, which obstructs its Views, and deprives it of the blissful Contemplation of the Source of Beauty? But a Desire of having this Union dissolved is incompatible with any Degree of Fondness for its Partner, or for the Life they lead together in this State of Separation from That, in which its own true Life and Happiness consist. Perhaps therefore that anxious Desire of Immortality, so frequent in Vulgar Souls, unconscious of the Divine Principle within them, is no other, than a foolish and absurd Desire of the Personal Immortality of that Part of them, which is Mortal, and must, at one time or other, inevitably perish; and of enjoying for ever a Life agreeable to the Taste of that Perishable Principle.

²²⁰ See Note 115.

attain

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attain, it will appear not to be ²²¹ in Gold, nor in magnificent Attire, nor in ²²² beautiful Youths or Damsels : with Such, however, at present, Many of You are so intirely taken up, and with the Sight of them so absolutely charmed, that You would rejoyce to spend your whole Lives, were it possible, in the Prefence of those enchanting Objects, ²²³ without any Thoughts of Eating or Drink-

²²¹ The Pagan Populace were taught to imagine, that all Divine Beings were invested with Bodys ætherial, luminous, and splendid. To represent this, they dressed up the Statues of the Gods in the most splendid Apparel; and, if the Statues were intended to be unattired and naked, they often either gilded them, or had them made of pure Gold. We are inclined to think, that these Golden Gods are ridiculed in the *Greater Hippias*, page 64, as well as here; and if so, then that Passage and this illustrate each the other.

²²² This Passage seems to allude to those ancient Fables, taken in a literal Sense by the Pagan Vulgar, that such beautiful Forms, as those of *Ganymede* and *Hebe*, were the Ornaments of the Court of Heaven, and the Delight of *Jupiter* himself. — We are to observe, from these and all other Passages in *Plato*, which allude to the Pagan Religion, that whenever the Vulgar Notions of the Divine Nature might possibly be any Obstacles to the Reception of Truth, the Philosopher always endeavor'd to eradicate those Notions out of the Minds of his Auditors, if he thought them capable, otherwise, of receiving the Truths he taught them.

²²³ In this Similitude *Socrates* seems only to railly, in his usual polite manner, Some of the Company then present, on their extravagant Admiration of Youth and Beauty in Forms meerly Human : but 'tis really introduced for the sake of representing the Divine and Happy Life, as exempt from all Care of what concerns the Body, and wholly unlike the Life, to which Man in his present State is designed by Nature.

H h

ing,

ing, but feasting your Eyes only with their Beauty, and living always in the bare Sight of it. If this be so, what Effect, think you, would the Sight of Beauty its Self have upon a Man, ²²⁴ were he to see it pure and genuine, ²²⁵ not corrupted and stained all over with the Mixture of Flesh, and Colours, and much more of like perishing and fading Trash; but were ²²⁶ able to view that Divine Essence, the Beautifull its Self, in its own Simplicity of Form? Think you, said She, that the ²²⁷ Life of Such a Man would be contemptible or mean, of the Man, who always directed his Eye toward the right Object, who looked always at real Beauty, and was conversant with it continually?

Perceive

²²⁴ The learned Reader may compare this with a celebrated Passage in *Plato's Phædrus*, page 250 of *Stephens's* Edition.

²²⁵ The Divine Life therefore has no Occasion for any such Thing as Outward Sense: consequently Body is quite excluded from the Subject, as well as from the Object, of this Divine Contemplation.

²²⁶ Intimating plainly, that Man is unequal to so Divine a View.

²²⁷ *Plato* here lowers his Flight a little, and descends towards Earth. For the Life, described in this Sentence, is evidently not the same Life with That, which he had been describing just before. This appears, not only from the Epithets bestowed on it, which are comparatively low, but also from the Terms in which it is described, Terms, which limit the Greatness and extenuate the Happiness of it. *That* Life was termed Happy, and the ultimate Object of Desire; *This* is only termed not contemptible or mean: *That* was said to consist in beholding for ever the Consummate Beauty of the Divine Essence; in the Account given of *This* the Eye is only said to be directed aright, to look beyond Corporeal Beauty,

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Perceive you not, said She, that in beholding the Beautiful²²⁸ with that Eye, with which alone 'tis possible to behold

ty, and to be conversant continually with the Beauty which is real. Upon these different Kinds of Expression we are to observe, that when *Plato* continues writing on one and the same Subject, 'tis usual with him to add Something as he proceeds. But, had he here thought fit to dwell on the same Subject without any Addition to it, he would never certainly have made his Description fainter, the farther he proceeded. We presume therefore, that here is meant, not the Divine Life, but the Philosophical, the Life of a Man, who, having attained to know what is the Beautiful, the Cause of all Beauty, from thenceforward sees it, not indeed by its Self, or its own pure Essence, that being impossible to Man, but in every Thing beauteous which he sees: for such a Man knows, that of all beauteous Things it is the Beauty; and that whatever else is in them, whether Number or Figure, Sound or Colour, is but the Subject of Beauty, not Beauty its Self; that of all Ideal Forms, those Perfect Beautys in their several Kinds, it is This alone, this *ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν*, the *Form of all those Forms*, which makes the Beauty; and that even the Beauty of all Truths is from this sole Principle; for that 'tis This alone, which makes them to be what they are, This, which is Truth its Self.

²²⁸ 'Tis evident, that This means some Faculty of Perception in the Mind of Man. Nor is it less evident, that the Mind of Man must have Facultys proper for the Perception of every Object which she perceives. By the Faculty of *Sense* she perceives Things *Sensible*, such as Sounds, Colours, and Figures; and so far as she is *differently affected* by different Sounds, Colours, and Figures, she is able, thro the same Faculty, to *distinguish* them: but it is not thro Sense, that she is able to refer any of these Sounds, Colours, or Figures, to one Subject more than to another, or indeed to any Subject at all. 'Tis by some other Faculty than that of

hold it, thus and thus only, could a Man ever attain to
generate,

Sense, that she *distinguishes* Forms or *Beings*, with their Propertys; and can say, — This is one Being, That Another; This belongs to One Being, That to Another. — Farther; *Sense* its Self *feels*, what Sounds or Colours are *agreeable* to Sense; but Sense feels not the Charm of *Beauty*: neither is it thro *Sense*, that the Mind perceives the *Harmony* of Sounds, or the *Symmetry* of Parts in Figures or in Numbers. These she perceives thro the Faculty of *Reason*, a Faculty, thro which she views *Many* in *One*; many *Species* in one *Genus*, many *Individuals* in one *Species*, many *Particulars* in one *Universal*, and many *Parts* in one *Whole*. For to perceive the least *Harmony*, That of any *Two* proportioned *Sounds*, it is necessary, that the Mind *comprehend* Both those Sounds together, and feel the Effect of that *Agreement* between them, of that *common Measure*, in which consists the *Harmony*. So, to perceive a *Symmetry* of Parts in the simplest right-lined Figure, a *Triangle*, it is necessary, that the Three Sides, of which it is composed, or the Three Angles, under which those Sides are subtended, should be *comprised* in *One View*, *compared* together, and their Proportions seen measured by *One common Measure*. It is easy to see, that the same is true of *Symmetry* in the first or least, the *Dual*, *Number*. Thus it is, that *Beauty*, in all Figures and Numbers, is beheld with the Eye of *Reason*, comprehending many Parts, duly proportioned, in one Whole. But with what Eye, or thro what Faculty, can the Mind perceive the Beautifull its Self, the Cause of all this Beauty, — Measure its Self, by which the Parts of every Thing beauteous are all thus duly proportioned? This must be an Eye, not like that of *Sense*, thro which the Mind only sees Many Things *separate* and *disunited*, without conceiving any of them together, or as Parts of any Whole; nor like the Eye of *Reason*, thro which she comprehends and views *Many together* and *united* in some Whole: it must be an Eye, which is able to penetrate deeper into Things, and not only to perceive

generate, not the Images or Semblances of Virtue, as not
having

One in and throughout every Thing, but to view also That ONE, of which every One partakes. For having discovered *Measure* to be the *Principle of Beauty*, thus we reason concerning it; — *Measure* is That, which sets a *Bound* to every Thing, and *defines* the Nature of it: for were *Measure* wanting, every Thing would be indefinite in its Nature, and would consist of Parts indefinite in Number: And *Bound* is That, which to the Whole and to every Part of every Thing is the *Cause of Form* in general, and makes it therefore to be *Something*: the Universe its Self without *Bound* or *Measure*, would be infinite Number, or numberless Multitude; or rather, since Multitude must be Multitude of Somethings, would be an Immense Nothing. Thro *Bound* or *Measure* is One Form *distinguished* from Another; Each having a certain *distinct* *Bound* or *Measure* of Being. Thro *Bound* or *Measure* is every Form *identified*; for the *Bound* or *Measure* of its Being must be destroyed, before it can become another, a different, Form or Being. Thro *Bound* or *Measure* it is, that the World its self, each Kind of Beings in that World, each Individual Being of each Kind, and in fine, every Part of every Whole, is *One*. *Bound* therefore, or *Measure*, is either ONE ITS SELF, or Both essentially belong to it, belong to that Essential ONE, of which Every One partakes. So that by partaking of this ONE, every Thing is, or is *Something*, is *One* and the *Same* Thing, and is not confounded with any *Other*. And thus are we arrived again at the *Source of Form* or Being, the Cause of Identity and Diversity, taken together; which, as we have before seen, is MIND. See Note 213. *Mind* therefore is the Essential Universal ONE, essential BOUND and MEASURE, the *Measure* and the *Bound* of all Things. Upon the whole it appears, — that MIND, considered as Universal, and containing all Forms, is UNIVERSAL BEAUTY; — that, compared with all those Forms which it contains, it is the Chief, Supreme, and SOVEREIGN BEAUTY;

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having his intimate Commerce with an Image or a Sem-
blance ;

BEAUTY ; — that, considered as the Cause of them all, the Cause of all Beauty, even of its own, involving in its Self its own Cause, it is the BEAUTIFULL ITS SELF, *Bound*, and *Measure* ; — and that, considered as viewing them all, its Self apart from them, alone and by its Self, it is THE ONE. Now then come to be examined these Two Questions ; — the First is, Whether the Mind of Man has any Faculty, by which she is capable of viewing so sublime an Object as the *Beautifull its Self*, or *Universal Mind*, considered under that Character : — the Other is, if she has any such Faculty, What that Faculty is. — As to the First Point ; tho *Plato* makes it a Doubt, whether 'tis possible for the Mind of Man, in her present State of Being, *actually* to attain this *Beatific Vision* ; intimating his own Opinion, that 'tis impossible ; yet he suggests at the same time a Supposition, that the Human Mind has in her at present a *Capacity* of attaining it. For otherwise he never would propose it to any Man as a proper Object of Desire to him ; much less would he propose it as the Ultimate Object of Desire to All Men. Indeed, unless he had had some faint and imperfect View of it Himself, he never could have discovered to Us, What that Object was : nor should We, without somewhat of the same Kind of View, be ever able to apprehend his Meaning. Besides, the Supposition of such a Capacity, latent in the Mind of Man, is agreeable to the Analogy of all the sensible and conscious Part of Nature. For every Animal, in its growing and imperfect State, has an obscure Foresight of That, which it is afterwards, when mature and perfect, to perform ; as it also has an inward Sense of the innate Capacity it has of performing it, long before such Capacity, grown into Power, can be exerted, or put in Act. — Next we are to examine, What this latent Capacity, or growing Power, is. Now it is certain, that every Faculty or Power of perceiving in the Mind must be adequate to the Object perceived. Thus, the Faculty of *Sense* is exactly adequate

to *Sensible Objects*: for, as Sensible Objects, if Form and Bound were wanting to them, would be all confused and *indistinct*; so Sense, if unaccompanied by Mind, would be *undistinguishing*, would be blind to Form, to Bound and Oneness, and confound all things. In a word, Sense and the Object of it are, Both of them, *infinite*. — In like manner is the Faculty of *Reason* adequate to its Objects: for the Objects of Reason are the *Kinds* and *Species* of Things, *Universals*, and every *Whole*; in a word, every such Thing as *comprehends Many*: corresponding and adequate to such an Object is the Faculty of *Reason*, which is no other than the Power of viewing *Many in One*. We see then, that in these two Facultys of the Human Mind, Sense and Reason, *Sense* belongs to her, as she is united to *Body*, which in its own Nature is *infinite*; *Reason*, as she partakes of That *Mind*, which is *Universal*. But can she partake of Universal Mind, in such a manner, as to have a Capacity of comprehending and viewing all the Kinds of Things comprehensible by Mind, a Capacity of contemplating every Whole, the Orb of the Earth, the Solar System, and the whole Universe, and yet not partake of that Eye, by which Universal Mind its Self always actually comprehends and views them All? Now this Eye is no other than the *Divine Intellect*, THE ONE. Supposing then the Human Mind to partake of this *Intellect*, we have here also a Faculty exactly adequate to its Object, which every where is *One*. By what other Faculty indeed, than This, can the Mind see *One* in and throughout every *Many*? by what other Faculty can she see every Thing *bounded*, which she sees? by what other Faculty, *distinguish* the Bounds of Things, and see This to be One Thing, That to be Another? Farther; as the Mind without this Faculty, *joined* to that of *Sense*, could not see *One* any where in the *Objects of Sense*; so without this Faculty, *joined* to that of *Reason*, she could not view *Many in One*, the *Object of Reason*: for, without the View of One, Many could only be viewed as separate, and not as in One united. But farther still; without this Faculty of *Intellect*, the Mind could not even see Many, Multitude, or Number: for in Ma-

ny, *One* is supposed; *Multitude* is Many Things, Each of which is *One*; and *Number* is only *One* repeated. If these Things then be so; if Mind, without Intellect, could see neither *One* nor *Many*, *Intellect* must be the *Eye of Mind*, by which only she sees at all, or to speak perhaps more properly, is *Mind its Self*. For indeed, only *Mind* sees or perceives any Thing:

—— νοῦς ὁρᾷ,
καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τὰλλα κωφοὶ καὶ τυφλοί.

Whatever sees, or hears, is Mind:
All things beside are deaf and blind.

But we give different Names to this one and the same Inward Eye, *Mind*, as differ the Objects of its View. Considered as *viewing Sensible Objects*, by means of its Union with Body, we call it *Sense*: considered as *viewing Intelligible Objects*, by retiring from Body, and from Outward Forms, to the Original Forms within its self, we call it *Reason*: considered as *viewing its Self*, by abstracting its View from all Forms inferior to its self, the inward as well as the outward, it is by *Plato* and *Aristotle* emphatically called *νοῦς*, Mind, or *Intellect*. — The Sight of this Inward Eye receives, in like manner, different Names from the Difference of its Object. When the Mind looks at Outward Things, if at too great Distance, or if the Medium of her Sight, whether the more remote, the Air or Water, or the nearer, commonly called the Organ of Sight, be obscured or disordered to a great degree, those Things appear confused and indistinct: nor less appear they so, if the Mind her self, thro any Distemper of the Body, or any Passion of her own, be obscur'd or in Confusion: in all these Cases she truly perceives nothing; either her apparent Object is *Confusion*, and her Sight of This is meer *Sensation*; or if she *fancys* she sees any Thing, her apparent Object is a *Phantasm*, and her Sight is called *Imagination*. But when all without and all within is, in sufficient measure, clear and bright, if the Mind at that time looks
outwardly,

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blance; but ²²⁹ Virtue true, real, and substantial, from
the

outwardly, whatever she views, her Subject is some *Outward Form*, and her Sight is then properly called *Perception*. When she looks within, but looks at the *Traces* or *Remains* of any such Outward Form, her Sight is then called *Memory*. When she looks at the brighter Ideal Forms within her Self, Each of which is One containing Many, many Kinds subordinate, or many Species, or many Individuals, her Sight is called *Intelligence*. And farther, if she views any of these Forms as so many distinct Ones, her Sight is also called *Apprehension*: but if she views any Two or More of them in One higher Kind, her Sight in such a Case is also called *Conception*, or *Comprehension*: and were she able to behold *her Self*, or to make That, which in the truest Sense is *One*, the Object of her Sight, her Sight would then be *Intuition*. But the Human Mind, immersed in Body, is unable so far to abstract her self from those Forms, of which Body partakes, as to contemplate her *Self* in her own pure Essence, or That *One*, of which She her Self partakes. She has at present the *Power* of seeing *One in Many*, and *Many in One*, but the bare *Capacity* perhaps only of seeing *One its Self*. She has the *Power* of viewing any *Forms*, at which she looks, with their *Beauty*, their *Symmetry*, and their *Order*; the *Power* of marking those *Bounds* in them, which *distinguish* their proper *Forms*, and of contemplating those *Measures* in them, which *constitute* their proper *Beauty*; but to contemplate *Bound* and *Measure its Self*, to behold That *Beautifull*, the *Source* of all *Beauty*, is indeed within her *Capacity*, but at present seems to be beyond her *Power*.

²²⁹ True *Moral Virtue*, which is the Virtue here meant, follows of Course from true *Wisdom*. For to see *Measure* in the *Nature of Things*, to see it as the Cause of all Beauty, or the Beautifull its Self, and as the Cause of all Good, or Good its Self, is true *Wisdom*, for it is the Knowledge of the first Principle of All Things. In the *Philebus* this Principle

is considered under the latter of those two Characters, or as it is the Cause of Good; in this Dialogue, under its other Character, the Cause of Beauty: but, even thus considered, it appears to be the Supreme Good; because the Enjoyment of it in Contemplation appears to be the Happiness of Mind; and as Mind is the Supreme of Things, That, which makes its Happiness, may well claim the highest Place among Things Good. The first Principle of Things, seen thus Excellent, seen as supremely Fair and Good, must be loved for its own Sake by All who have a Taste for true Excellence. Now this Love, as *Plato* here teaches, is the only Principle of true Virtue. For *Virtue*, considered as the Rule of Life, is no other than this supremely Fair and Good, *Measure its Self*, applied to every Part of *Man's Conduct* and *Behaviour*. It may then easily be conceived, that the Man whose Mind is continually conversant with *Measure*, and is charmed with the *Beauty* of it in all Things, will direct his Eye to it in all his *Actions*. For, as he welcomes and embraces it, wherever it is his Fortune to meet with it; certainly there, where 'tis in his own Power, as it must be wherever his own Conduct is concerned, he will adhere to it thro Life for the sake of its own Excellence. Thus we see, that true Virtue depends on Wisdom, so far as Wisdom is attainable by Man; depends on having a View of the Beautifull in all Things, and on having a Taste and Love of it as the Sovereign Good. The Diviner View of the *Beautifull* in *its Self* is beyond Human Wisdom; is, as we have seen, above the Reach of any Power in the Human Soul; and is indeed there only seated, where is no Necessity or Place for any Human Virtue. Why this Divine State of Being is proposed to our Hopes here by *Diotima*, may perhaps appear before our Notes on her Discourse are ended: in the mean time, we presume, it is sufficiently apparent, that the Happiness of Man, according to *Plato's* Doctrine, consists not in a Life of Contemplation: on the contrary, as Practic or Moral Virtue on its best Principle is here exhibited as the last of Philosophical Attainments, and the Result of Man's highest Wisdom, it is probable even from this Dialogue, that *Plato* held Moral
Virtue,

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the Converse and Embraces of ²³⁰ That which is Real and True. Thus begetting True Virtue, and bringing her up till

Virtue, as founded on Intellectual, to be the chief Good of Man. But as this appears most evidently in *the Philebus* to be his Doctrine, it is sufficient to add at present this Observation, that the Dialogue now before us is for this farther Reason, besides that mentioned in Note 214, introductory to *the Philebus*.

²³⁰ For this *Measure* and *Bound*, this *Rule* and *Law* of all Things, *Universal Mind*, is That which gives Reality, Stability, and Truth, to those very Ideal Forms, so real and substantial, whose Images and Shadows only are all the Beings, with which we are conversant thro Sense. Man, as he partakes of Mind, has this Measure of his Conduct, this Rule of Life, within him; and the Man, who is conversant with it, copys after That, which is of all Things the most real and substantial: whilst such Men, as make Other Men their Patterns, only copy after Other Copys, which are often vague and uncertain, as varying one from another; and are at best, faint and imperfect Images of Virtue. But since Human Actions arise from many Motives, as far as these are not all purely Virtuous, so far the Actions, produced by them, and pretended to be Virtuous, are meer Semblances and outward Show. Since the Motives, however, to each particular Action usually are mixed, it must be very difficult to discover, how far each of those Motives operated toward producing the Action; unless a Man's conduct be, in all Kinds of Action, and on all Occasions, uniform; which seems to be the Case of but very Few. But were the Discovery ever so easy, it would only afford Matter for idle Speculation; and accordingly the Search seems to arise only from idle Curiosity. Tis certainly injurious to the Cause of Virtue, to discover that such or such an Act of Fortitude, for instance, was owing to a Love of Fame, if by such a Discovery the Doer is deprived of the Fame he aimed at; because this tends to weaken the Force of One of the Motives to Virtue. Nor is it less

²³¹ till she is grown mature, he would become a Favourite of the Gods; and ²³² at length would be, if any Man ever

injurious to Nature and to the Order of Things, by which in all such Cases Ends are annexed to Means. When the Common Rules of Virtue are practised for the sake of procuring that Pleasure or Profit derived from the Observance of them, or for the sake of avoiding that Pain or Loss consequent to the Breach of them, the Ends aimed at are generally obtained; Nature and the Chain of Causes and Effects procure them. Nor is Glory less the Natural Consequence of eminent Acts of Heroic Valour, Patriotism, Generosity, Gratitude, or any other Branch of Justice: an Endeavour therefore to obstruct this noble End, by depreciating the Motive, and detracting from the Merit of noble Actions produced by it, is an Opposition to Nature and to the Order of Things; and, if it arises not from Malice, Envy, or other bad Passion, is owing to a false Refinement in Morals, equally pernicious to Human Society. But, tho it imports not to the rest of Mankind, What are the Motives to the Good and Virtuous Actions of any Person; since, whatever they be, the Consequences of them are the same to all Others whom they benefit; yet it may be of some Importance to a Man's Self, from what Motive he acts, if the following Hypothesis of *Diotima* be true; as will soon appear.

²³¹ That is, till the Virtuous Actions, constantly performed on the True Principle of Virtue, are grown into Habit; and the Soul is become ripe for that State of Being, to which a Habit of true Virtue is here supposed in Time to raise her.

²³² *Plato* does not say, immediately after Death, but "at length," in Process of Time, after the Soul has long been a Favourite of the Gods. The Transition from Humanity to Divinity is by the *Platonists* supposed to be gradual. Some intermediate States of Being, they imagine, are first to be gone thro, before the Soul is perfectly disposed or fitted to enjoy the Divine Life.

be,

be, Himself ²³³ One of the Immortals. — The Doctrines, which I have now delivered to You, Phædrus, and to the rest of my Friends here, I was taught by Diotima, and am persuaded they are True. Full of this Persuasion my Self, I endeavour to persuade Others, and to shew them, that 'tis difficult for any Man to find a better Guide or Assistant to him than Love, in his Way to Happiness. And on this account, I farther contend, that every Man ought to pay all due Honours to that Patron of Human Nature. For my own Part, I make it my chief Study, to cultivate the Art which Love teaches, and employ my self upon Subjects proper for the Exercise of that Art, with a particular Attention; encouraging Others to follow my Example, and at all times, as well as now, celebrating the

²³³ This ἀποθέωσις, or *Deification* of the Soul, by which she returns to her pristine State of Being, depends, according to *Diotima*, on the habitual Practice of Virtue from the Best Principle only, by whatever Name we chuse to call it, whether *Love of God*, *Love of Virtue*, or, with *Plato* in this Dialogue, *Love of the Beautifull*; for, as we have seen, they have all the same Meaning: and on no other Principle than This ever was, or will be, any Man, in every Part of his Conduct and in every Circumstance of Life, uniformly Virtuous. But let the Force of other Principles, or Motives to Virtue, be supposed ever so efficacious in producing Virtuous Actions, and even a whole Course of Life conformable to the Rules of Virtue; yet, where a *Sense* of the intrinsic Excellence or *Beauty* of Virtue, and a consequent *Love* of it, or in one Word, where a *Taste* for Virtue is wanting, it would be absurd to imagine,

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the Power and Virtue of Love, as far as I am able.——
This Speech, Phædrus, you may accept, if you are so pleased, for a Panegyrick in Praise of Love: or if you chuse to call it by any other Name, and to take it in any other Sense, be That its right Name, and That its proper Acceptation.

gine, that the *Beauty* of it can ever be *enjoyed*. For a true *Taste* of that which is enjoyed is requisite to every *Enjoyment*; which indeed always rises in proportion to the Improvement of that Taste or Relish. Since therefore *Diotima* places the State of *Divine Beatitude* in the pure and perfect *Enjoyment* of this very *Beauty*, it is manifest, that only a *Taste* for this Beauty, founded on natural Genius, like the Tasts for other Beautys, and improved in the same manner by long and constant Attention to its Objects, can ever qualify a Man for this Divine Enjoyment.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Translator of *Plato* into English is almost unanimously advised by such of his Friends, as are acquainted with the Original, not to publish his Translation of the last Speech in this Dialogue, that of *Alcibiades*, for fear of the Offence it may reasonably give to the Virtuous from the gross Indecency of some Part of it, the Countenance it may possibly give to the Vicious from the Example of *Alcibiades*, and the Danger into which it may bring the Innocence of the Young, by filling their Minds with Ideas which it were to be wished they could always remain Strangers to.

Centuriæ Seniorum agitant expertia frugis.

And all Men of Virtue condemn the exhibiting upon the Stage in Comedy Characters which are corrupt to an uncommon degree, villainous, or profligate, especially when treated in that ludicrous or light manner essential to Comedy. ——— *Plato's* Dialogues are by the ancient Criticks justly likened to Theatrical Representations, in that they exhibit alike the Manners and Characters of Men, attributing to each Person the Sentiments proper to his Character, with a Diction suited to those Sentiments. We venture to add, that they resemble Comedys, those of the graver Kind, rather than Tragedys. Poetical Justice in the one, and Philosophical Justice in the other, is fully satisfied in exposing to Laughter and Contempt Characters that deserve them, and in bringing petty Knaves or vain Sophists to Confusion. ——— As therefore we cannot but condemn Mr. *Congreve* for introducing into his Comedys such a Villain-Character as that of *Maskwell* in his *Double Dealer*, which properly belongs to Tragedy, so we cannot altogether justify and consequently ought not to follow our Author in introducing to his Banquet the tho-

rowly debauched *Alcibiades*, whom all the Pains taken with him by *Socrates* never could reclaim. — Yet *Plato's* Conduct in this Case admits of some sort of Apology; in that the Vices, exhibited here to View in the Character of *Alcibiades*, were not looked on with such extreme Abhorrence by the Athenians of that Age, as they are by Us in these purer and more virtuous Times. At worst, however, and waving all Apology for our Author, we assert, and are confident no Man of Understanding will deny, that This is the single Instance, in which he has perhaps departed from the excellent Rules he appears to have laid down to himself for Dialogue-writing, with regard to the *ἡδοναία* of it, and the Exhibition of fit Characters; Rules, which so well recommended themselves, thro the Pattern set by Him, to the Good Sense and polite Taste of the Athenians, that they soon effected a Reformation in the Athenian Stage, banished the Old Comedy, and gave Birth to the New thro a *Menander*: after whose Example the Roman Stage was reformed by *Terence*. And in Imitation of these ancient illustrious Reformers, an Attempt was made in our own Country, an Age or two since, by Mr. *Addison* and Sir *Richard Steele*, to purify the English Theatre in the same manner from Ribaldry and Licentiousness of every Kind, from grossly obscene Sentiment and Language, from Personal Abuse, as well as that of Party, and from turning into a Jest what the Public Interest requires should be held sacred; Vices these of ev'n our best Comic Poets for above half a Century before, which had a considerable Effect on the Manners of the People. To this End, those our Writers of a more refined Taste, just now mentioned, either wholly rejected in their Comedys all Characters of the most wicked Kind, necessary only to Tragedy, or at least took Care not to make them shine. Shocking Characters infer of course shocking Sentiments and Language: for Propriety demands, that all Dramatic Persons should think and talk in Character, that is, like Themselves. But this laudable Endeavour of our celebrated Countrymen to reform our Stage met with no Success, for want of being well seconded and supported by succeeding Writers. On the contrary, the ingenious

Pens of a *Gay* and a *Fielding* were afterwards employed in giving a fresh Lustre to the old abusive and licentious Comedy. At length, to the Honour of the present Age, we see rising among us an *English Terence*, who

Torquet ab obscenis jam nunc sermonibus aurem.

It would therefore be the more unpardonable in the Translator of *Plato* to interrupt this beginning Reformation, by presenting to the View of his English Readers a Character fit only for the Plays of an *Aristophanes*. Induced by these Reasonings and Reflections, he accedes to the Advice of his Friends; and thinks it prudent in him to follow the Example of Monsieur *Racine*, who, in publishing again the French Translation of the preceding Speeches in *Plato's Banquet* by the learned Lady, mentioned in Notes 79 and 114, together with a new Translation of the Speech of *Socrates* by Himself, concludes with This, and omits the Remainder of the Dialogue. — However, the English Translator, for the Satisfaction of his Learned Readers, from whom it would be absurd to think of concealing any Part of the Writings of *Plato*, takes this Opportunity of acquainting them with his Intentions to publish a new Edition of this Dialogue in the Original, with many new Conjectural Emendations of the Text, omitted in his English Notes; as being of little or no Importance to his Translation. This he intends by way of Specimen of a new Edition of all *Plato's* Works, which he would chearfully undertake, if the Specimen should meet with the Approbation and Encouragement of the Learned World. — It remains only to assure his English Readers, whose Expectation of the Speech of *Alcibiades* he may have raised by his Argument of this Dialogue, pages 12 and 18, that they will lose nothing from the Want of it, with regard to *Plato's* principal Design in it, if they will but give themselves the Pleasure of reading an English Translation of *Xenophon's Memoirs of Socrates* by Mrs. *Sarah Fielding*; where that excellent Man's Moral Character is shown in a much

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brighter and juster Light, than it appears in as set forth by the Encomiums of the drunken *Alcibiades* in this Dialogue. Such is the Judgment of the wise and good Emperor *Marcus Antoninus*, in his 7th Book, Section the 40th, where 'tis evident that he compares the Moral Character of *Socrates*, as drawn by *Xenophon*, with the Appearance it makes in this and some other Dialogues of *Plato*: and Such undoubtedly will, on making the same Comparison, be the Judgment of every other Wise and Good Man.



P R O P O S A L S

F O R

A NEW SUBSCRIPTION.

TH E Author of the Translation of Plato into English, and of the Notes subjoined to it, desires to lay before the Publick in general, and his own Subscribers in particular, the Causes which have for a long time retarded the Continuance of the Publication, and the Reasons which oblige him to alter the Terms of Subscription for the future. — Some Persons, who had given in to the Author's Friends their Names as Subscribers, whether thro Forgetfulness or Change of Mind, refused to take the first Dialogues which were sent them. — Very Many, after taking the First and Second which were published, were pleased to discontinue their Subscription; so Many, that whereas the First and Second are now out of Print, a great Number of the subsequent ones lye upon the Author's Hands, which it cannot be expected that any Person will purchase without having the former. — Some also, tho but a Few, have been so ungenerous, as to take them all without paying for any. — In consequence of these Disappointments, the Author, unable to proceed without Detriment to himself, had laid aside all Thoughts of continuing the Publication of his Work, when Mr.

Sandby

Sandby in Fleet-street, one of his Booksellers, of his own Motion kindly undertook to get printed at his own Expence, and to risque the Sale of this Second Part of the Banquet, which will compleat the First Volume. — To such Persons therefore, as are disposed to favour the Continuance of this Work, the Author proposes, that they give or send in their Names, as Subscribers, to one of the following Booksellers, Mr. Sandby in London, Mr. Fletcher at Oxford, or Mr. Merrill at Cambridge, or to the Author himself, paying at the same Time Half a Guinea toward the Expence of printing the Second Volume, which is to consist of the Rivals, the Meno, the Theages, and the Philibus: and that they pay Half a Guinea more on receiving from his Booksellers all these Dialogues together, Each of them stitched in Blue Paper.—The Booksellers above-mentioned will be desired to return the First Subscription-Money at the End of six Months, if within that Time the Author shall not have met with sufficient Encouragement to engage him to proceed. But if at the Expiration of that Time he finds such Encouragement, the Second Volume shall be put immediately to the Press. The Interval will be employed in printing and publishing a new Edition of the Symposium in its Original Language.



Floyer Sydenham.

